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Innovation and research have been key features throughout the sixty years 
the UK has publicly funded a National Health Service. Over the last thirty 
years, in planning health service reforms, successive Governments have 
drawn on the values of the private sector, where innovation is considered an 
imperative if firms are to survive in the global market place. Consequently, the 
innovation imperative is now at the heart of UK health policy. 
Traditionally innovation is regarded as a technical rational endeavour resulting 
from research and development activity. In order to examine the assumptions 
underpinning this orthodox view, this study takes a critical perspective. A view 
from the world of policy, captured through the analysis of semi-structured 
interviews with a cohort of eleven policymakers using the Framework method 
is complemented with an inductive examination of two innovations in health 
care, using case study methodology in which twenty-six participants were 
interviewed in some depth. Analysis of interviews with policymakers 
highlighted the contested nature of the concept of innovation, the range of, 
sometimes competing, stakeholder perspectives regarding the legitimacy of 
an innovation and the tensions and paradoxes in the system. Both cases 
examined sought to identify and address the health care needs of groups of 
people who do not routinely access mainstream health services. They were 
compared and contrasted by drawing on Lukes' conceptual analysis of the 
concept of power, and served to illustrate the complexity of the innovation 
process, the multiplicity of stakeholders involved and the potential of 
competing agendas to stifle innovation. 
This study demonstrates how political processes at an individual, 
organisational and national level have the capacity to impact on the potential 
of innovations in health care to flourish. It offers a range of factors that 
policymakers and practitioners may wish to consider when seeking to foster 
innovation in health care. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION & METHOD 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to contribute new insight into the conditions in which 
innovations in healthcare that seek to identify and address the healthcare 
needs of groups of people who not routinely access mainstream services, 
may flourish. The clarity and focus of this aim developed over time. As a 
student, on a taught MPhil programme in critical management studies (CMS) 
between 1997 and 2001, I was encouraged to think critically about a wide 
range of issues. Through the teaching and the debate with my fellow cohort 
members, both within and beyond the classroom, I was challenged to 
articulate and confront the fundamental assumptions that underpinned my life 
and my work. It was a destabilising process, at times painful, at other times 
exhilarating. There were occasions when I felt bereft, as if I did not know what 
I thought about or believed in anymore. Reynolds (1999) notes that critical 
reflection can prove to be mentally or emotionally unsettling and lead to 
disruption in home and, or, work life. This destabilising effect is not uncommon 
within CMS and Reynolds suggests that it is 'the dark side'. Whilst Reynolds 
problematises this effect, other CMS scholars, such as Knights (2005), argue 
that disruption is a legitimate and necessary part of the learning process. 
From my own position, I side with Knights and place significant value on the 
personal learning that resulted from this process. 
From a professional point of view for instance, CMS led me to surface and 
question some of my deeply rooted assumptions. For example, in my role as 
Research and Development Adviser at the Royal College of Nursing, I had 
previously published an article in a professional journal suggesting that 
recently announced funding arrangements for healthcare research within the 
UK Government health departments created opportunities for nurses and 
nursing (McMahon 1997). Later, upon critical reflection, I concluded that my 
analysis had been too superficial. When I looked more deeply into the context 
in which healthcare research funding was distributed (McMahon 1999), I 
suggested that it was extremely unlikely that there were any real opportunities 
for nurses and nursing, in this particular case (McMahon 2002). The 
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healthcare research agenda was effectively colonised at the inception of the 
NHS in 1948 by the medical profession, who as part of their professionalising 
strategy sought to underpin their practice with a solid, scientific foundation 
(Klein 2001). Any endeavour to destabilise that power base would inevitably 
meet with formidable opposition. 
Perhaps more fundamentally, I began to re-examine why I was focussing my 
energies on research in nursing. When I left school, I went to university to 
study for a degree in Biochemistry. Mixing with more senior students at 
university, who were exploring their career options post graduation, I rapidly 
reached the conclusion that I did not want a desk based job in, for example, 
the civil service, nor did I want to pursue a career centred on laboratory work. 
I knew that I wanted to work with people and I was attracted to the caring 
professions. After a summer job working as a nursing auxiliary in an inpatient 
facility for young, chronically sick people, I was clear that I wanted to be a 
nurse. I moved to a higher education institution where I could study for a 
degree in nursing. Inspired by the quality of teaching I felt privileged to receive 
from a mental health nurse academic, I registered as both a general and 
mental health nurse. Post-registration, I became increasingly interested in the 
mental health of people with physical illnesses and elected to specialise in 
cancer nursing. Working in a tertiary specialist centre, I was in a strong 
research environment. As a clinical nurse specialist I was recognised as a 
pivotal member of the multidisciplinary research team and often invited by 
principal investigators to contribute to the development and delivery of 
research protocols. These included, for example, surgeons trialling 
implantable drug delivery systems (Lambert et at. 1988) and medical 
oncologists trialling new combinations of cytotoxic drug regimes (Anderson et 
al. 1987). Whether the aim was to find a cure, halt or slow down the 
progression of disease or improve patients' experiences, research was a 
central component of the work of the centre and an integral part of my daily 
routine. It was 'a given' that research was the right thing to do and that we 
were doing the right research. 
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One nursing colleague, whom I met during a clinical placement on the ward 
where I was working whilst she was undertaking a Masters degree in nursing, 
particularly inspired me. She went on to complete her doctorate and 
specialise in teaching communication skills to nurses and doctors. By 
participating in her doctoral research, I not only improved my communication 
skills but reached the conclusion that I too should undertake postgraduate 
studies and develop my own research skills. I went on to complete a Masters 
degree and investigated the potential of cognitive behavioural interventions to 
reduce the severity of anticipatory nausea and vomiting, a particularly 
unpleasant side effect experienced by some patients receiving cytotoxic 
chemotherapy (McMahon 1989a; McMahon 1989b). 
After completing my Masters degree and returning to the clinical environment, 
I had the distinct and uncomfortable sense that some of my senior nursing 
colleagues perceived my higher degree as a threat. In addition, the small 
team of clinical nurse specialists, of which I was a part, felt that we fared 
particularly badly in the newly implemented `clinical grading' review. This 
particular job evaluation scheme was supposed to reward clinical expertise. In 
theory, it should have worked in the favour of clinical nurse specialists. In 
practice, in the hospital I was working in it was implemented by managers 
who, to all intents and purposes, appeared to reward managerial skills above 
all else. My peers and I undertook a national survey of similar posts and this 
confirmed our assessment. One colleague, the most experienced member of 
our team, moved north and was graded two grades higher for undertaking a 
comparable role. After a great deal of soul searching, I reached the conclusion 
that the only way I could survive the system was by getting myself into a more 
senior position from where, I believed, I could endeavour to change it. I, 
therefore, applied for, and took up, a senior post in a district general hospital, 
where I would lead a small team responsible for research and development 
across the organisation. Here I was able to apply and develop my research 
skills and bring about changes in practice. For example, the implementation of 
our research recommendations led to the development of more patient- and 
carer-centred respite service (Darby, Lam, & McMahon 1991) and, through 
the development of audit systems, we introduced a clinical risk management 
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programme to, for example, reduce the incidence and improve the 
management of pressure sores (Jackson, McMahon, & Cage 1993). I believed 
passionately that applied research led to better patient experiences and better 
patient outcomes (McMahon 1998). This was, for me, an unquestionable 
given. 
Translating national policy into local developments was a significant part of my 
role and so, for example, I worked closely with social service colleagues when 
the NHS and Community Care Act (Department of Health 1990) threatened to 
impact negatively on hospital discharge and patient throughput, in order to 
ensure the best outcomes for our patients. As a consequence of our close 
working relationship, I was able to persuade senior social service managers to 
commission a nurse-led research team to evaluate the impact of the systems 
we had put in place on patients and their families. 
My mantra in this post was that we should uphold patient dignity and treat all 
of our patients with respect. To expect our staff to do this, they too should 
expect the same treatment from their peers, managers and patients. In my 
sixth year in post, due to fiscal pressures on the NHS, a new deputy director 
of nursing was appointed specifically to review the nursing workforce and cut 
costs. Adopting a 'macho' management style, she made swingeing cuts in the 
nursing workforce and downgraded as many staff as she could. I had never 
seen morale so low and I felt deeply compromised and completely powerless. 
Once again, I reached the conclusion that I should move into a position where 
I might have more influence. I started actively applying for Nurse Director 
positions in the NHS when, as I saw it, a 'once in a life time' opportunity was 
advertised. The Royal College of Nursing (RCN) was seeking to appoint a 
"Research Officer" as a professional adviser. At the time, I was a member of a 
group within the RCN, drawn together by the then Director of Nursing Policy 
and Practice, to examine the future of nursing leadership. As a result of this 
experience, I felt that working for the RCN would sit more comfortably with my 
own professional values and that I could play a role in actively promoting and 
supporting research in nursing, which, as stated above, I fundamentally 
believed was good for patient care and public health. 
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CMS led me to question my assumptions, my reasons for getting up in the 
morning. I was working with the nursing research community to promote and 
develop research within nursing. I was driven, upon reflection, on autopilot, by 
my unwavering belief that research made a difference. My time as a CMS 
postgraduate student stopped me in my tracks and led me to question the 
legitimacy of my assumptions. Was research the right thing for nurses (and 
other members of the healthcare team) to do and were nurses (and other 
members of the healthcare team) doing the right research? Did research and 
development actually lead to improvements in health and heathcare? 
I was not the first to ask these questions and I will not be the last. The 
National Health Service Act (Great Britain Parliament 1946) formally gave the 
Minister of Health powers to "conduct research or assist by grant, research 
into matters relating to the causation, prevention, diagnosis of illness or 
mental defectiveness" throughout the NHS. In the early 1970's, Government 
investment in NHS research was formally examined by Lord Rothschild 
(1971), who recommended that a customer / provider relationship would 
enable a more effective alignment between the respective agendas of 
policymakers and researchers. Research conducted within the NHS was 
examined once again within a House of Lords Select Committee in 1988. This 
committee concluded that the impact of research activity within the NHS was 
severely hampered by the absence of a coherent strategy for the articulation 
of research needs and a lack of attention to the implementation of research 
findings (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 
1988). As noted above, the NHS research agenda had been colonised by the 
medical profession and the prevailing view at this time was that NHS research 
was investigator-led and did not address the needs of the NHS. This was 
considered problematic because it allowed powerful professionals to pursue 
their own research interests in order to further their careers and their 
academic standing, at the expense of the NHS. Nevertheless, the 
Government of the day rejected the politically challenging recommendation 
that an independent body should be established to identify research priorities 
within the NHS and instead appointed a medical academic, Professor Michael 
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Peckham (later, Sir), as the first NHS Director of Research and Development 
(R&D), to develop a strategy for R&D within the NHS. Perhaps the thinking 
was that only a medical academic could harness the expertise of the medical 
establishment and at the same time challenge vested interests. The argument 
for shifting the balance of power was to ensure value for money (VFM) 
through a measurable return on the investment of public funds in health 
research. The first NHS R&D Strategy "Research for Health" was published by 
the Department of Health (1991a). It had three broad aims, to provide the 
NHS with the capacity to identify problems appropriate for research, to make 
NHS decision making research-based and to improve the relationship of the 
NHS with the science base as a whole, rather than solely with medical 
research (Smith 1991). 
R&D Strategies were subsequently developed in all four countries of the UK. 
Their purpose was common: 
"to ensure that the content and delivery of care in the NHS is based on 
high quality research relevant to improving the health of the nation..... " 
(Department of Health 1993) 
To this end, there has been considerable investment in the synthesis of 
research evidence in order to increase certainty and thus provide more 
definitive, research-based guidance to planners, policymakers, practitioners 
and managers. The implicit assumption within the R&D strategies was that 
there is a cause and effect relationship between R&D and improvements in 
health and this is predicated as a linear relationship from research through to 
development through to innovation. Clearly this assumption sat very 
comfortably with my, arguably naive, belief that applied research, almost 
inevitably, offered the potential of better patient experiences and better patient 
outcomes. By taking a more critical view, I began to question whether my 
belief could, or should, be taken for granted. I began to consider the 
possibilities and the consequences of vested interests. I concluded that I 
should shift my gaze from research as the presumed means to an end, that is 
better patient experiences and health outcomes through 'innovation', and 
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focus on these ends, and cast aside any preconceptions about how these 
ends might be achieved. 
There is a body of knowledge, that challenges the conventional wisdom, that 
science follows a logical rational linear pathway through to innovation and 
discovery. This includes, for example, the works of Peter Medawar and 
Thomas Kuhn. Medawar (1969) challenged the belief that medical scientific 
advance was achieved through laborious, detached observation, and argued 
instead that true discovery was in fact a far more creative process. Based on 
his observation that scientists organise themselves into groups who operate 
within "paradigms", or conceptual boxes, Kuhn's (1996) thesis was that it 
takes nothing short of a crisis within a paradigm to bring about an innovation. 
Any attempt to innovate within a paradigm would at best be resisted and at 
worst vilified as it would sit outside the "common sense" dominant view. For 
example, today we take it as a given that the earth travels around the sun. At 
the time Polish astronomer Copernicus (1473 - 1543) muted this proposition, 
it was considered blasphemous to suggest that the earth was not at the centre 
of the universe. Galileo (1564-1642), an Italian mathematician, was later tried 
in a court of law for supporting Copernicus' position, where it was argued that 
to assert that the earth revolves around the sun was as erroneous as to claim 
that Jesus was not born of a virgin (Miller 1996). 
In more recent times, Le Fanu (1999) charted the rapid rise in medical 
knowledge through developments in clinical science, technology and 
pharmaceutical innovation over the last sixty years. He observed that most of 
the major breakthroughs, such as the discovery of penicillin, were 
serendipitous and an indirect or unanticipated consequence of scientific 
programmes. Examining the serendipitous discovery of penicillin as a case 
study, D'Andrade (1999) concluded that the development and application of 
new drugs were not dependent on scientific understanding of the underlying 
cause of a given disease. Penicillin was observed to kill bacteria long before 
the mechanisms by which this happened were understood. However, in order 
to turn a discovery such as the properties of penicillin into a marketable drug, 
the resources of industry were required. 
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More recently, Greenhalgh and colleagues published a systematic review of 
the evidence regarding the diffusion of innovation in healthcare organisations. 
In their conclusions they identified areas for further research. These included: 
"The main gap in the literature on complex service innovations in 
healthcare organizations is an understanding of how they arise, 
especially since the process is largely decentralised, informal and 
hidden from official scrutiny. " (Greenhalgh et al. 2005 p 17) 
and: 
"The empirical literature in the implementation of service innovations in 
healthcare is currently extremely sparse. We recommend........ a wide 
range of in-depth qualitative or mixed methodology studies into the 
process of implementation in organizations should be commissioned, 
perhaps ideally as responsive funding to capture innovative ideas as 
they emerge and spread. " (Greenhaigh et al. 2005 p 18) 
In this study, I have, therefore, taken an inductive approach and tried to put to 
one side any of my previously held assumptions about research and 
innovation, in order to examine from a critical perspective the conditions in 
which innovations in healthcare are developed and sustained. There are four 
parts to the study. In part one, a chapter outlining my epistemological 
standpoint and the methods employed, complements this introductory 
chapter. From a critical perspective, I have applied case study methodology 
(Stake 1995; Yin 2003b) to examine two cases of innovation in healthcare 
inductively. Both cases are of innovations that sought to identify and address 
the healthcare needs of people who do not, as a routine, access mainstream 
health services. As top-down policy innovations appeared to impact on both 
cases, these data were complemented with a view from the world of policy. In 
section two, I present my analysis of semi-structured Interviews with a cohort 
of eleven policymakers based in Scotland and England, using 'Framework 
(Ritchie & Spencer 1994), a method of choice within the policy analysis field, 
as my method of analysis. A discussion of this policy context, drawing on the 
political history of the National Health Service, completes the second section. 
In two chapters in part three, I present my analysis of the two case studies of 
innovation. By drawing on current debates within the literature, I discuss my 
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analysis of these cases in part four. This section incorporates a final chapter 
that draws together conclusions, examines the limitations of the study and 
offers recommendations for policy, practice, education and future research. 
10 
Chapter 2 Method 
2.1 Introduction 
The initial aim in this study was to examine the conditions in which innovations 
in the provision of health services can flourish, from a critical and arguably 
innovative perspective. Taking an inductive approach, the research focus 
became sharper during the course of the research process. This chapter 
describes that process, providing a rationale for the epistemological 
standpoint and methodological choices made. I discuss the ethical 
implications of the study in the penultimate section of the chapter. 
Utilising an exploratory case study methodology (Yin 2003a), I examined two 
cases of innovations in health service provision. The first sought to address 
the healthcare needs of farmers in the north west of England. The second 
endeavoured to identify and address the health needs of young people who 
did not as a rule access mainstream services, in a city on the east coast of 
Scotland. In both of these cases, it became apparent that current NHS policy 
had a significant impact on their development and sustainability. I, therefore, 
elected to incorporate a healthcare policy perspective into my research design 
and so identified and interviewed a sample of healthcare policy makers. 
Punctuated by poor health, data collection occurred over a protracted period 
from September 2000 through to April 2002. Table 2.1, for example, illustrates 
the timescales over which interview data were collected. 
This chapter begins with a rationale for the critical epistemological standpoint 
taken in this study. In the following section, the case study methodology used 
to examine these innovations in practice is presented and discussed. The 
concluding section details the methods used to incorporate a policy 
perspective into the research design. 
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2.2 Epistemological Standpoint 
2.2.1 The problem with the orthodoxy 
When Thompson (2000) examined the development of empirical and scientific 
knowledge in nursing he delineated three epistemological positions (table 
2.2): 
Table 2.2: Epistemological routes of scientific knowledge in nursing 
(and health) (adapted from Thompson (2000) 
Post- positivist (arising out of logical positivism): characterised by efforts to 
identify patterns and regularities to describe, explain and predict phenomena, 
and encompassing the use of diverse types of data and methods to develop, 
test and revise or replace theories 
Interpretative / humanistic or naturalist: concerned with understanding the 
meaning of experience. 
Critical or emancipatory: combines elements of the other two to address 
how socio-political and cultural factors influence experiences. This approach 
encompasses critical theory and action research 
In chapter 1, I suggested that the orthodox view reflected within the context of 
UK health policies would appear to interpret innovation as the product of R&D 
which follows a rational linear process. Arguably, this interpretation draws on 
the post-positivist tradition, where it is assumed that innovation is a technical- 
rational endeavour that can be managed and therefore controlled to 'deliver' a 
planned and predictable outcome. 
Whilst the attraction of this interpretation is clear -a technical-rational 
epistemology appears to reduce ambiguity and perpetuates a sense of control 
- it is not without its limitations and difficulties. In a world of chaos and 
uncertainty, anything that appears to reduce ambiguity is seductive. However, 
a technical-rational epistemology assumes that through the development of 
scientific knowledge it is possible to establish an absolute, value-free truth. 
This assumption is contested on the grounds that knowledge is neither 
universally authoritative nor value-free (Willmott 2003). 
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The interpretation of innovation as a technical-rational endeavour is, in part, 
based on a traditional view of management as a science. Taylor (1911), one 
of the founding fathers of management theory, defined the manager as a 
scientist whose role was to calculate and define the best method for 
undertaking any routinised task in a production process. Taylor assumed the 
legitimacy of the privileging of the manager over the worker on the grounds 
that the worker, through lack of education or mental capacity, was incapable 
of understanding 'his' scientific approach. 
Critics argue that the traditional view of management as a science ignores the 
socio-political aspects of organisational life or assumes that they can be 
resolved through technical-rational interventions. The "moral-practical" is 
subordinated to the "technical-instrumental" (Alvesson & Willmott 1996). A 
technical-rational view of innovation is based on the assumption that it is 
possible and desirable for managers to 'manage (and therefore control) 
innovation' and legitimate that they should endeavour to control the behaviour 
of subordinate workers to achieve political ends (in this case, speed up the 
process of modernisation of the NHS). Management is, therefore, not a 
politically neutral process (Alvesson & Willmott 1996). 
In chapter 1, I suggested that a technical-rational epistemology has significant 
currency within the NHS, and, within this context, innovation is conceptualized 
as a rational, predictable and controllable endeavour. My own experience of 
working in the NHS, echoed elsewhere (Buchanan & Badham 1999; 
Klein2001), is that it is a politically-charged, socially-complex enterprise. 
Consequently, I have purposefully employed an alternative approach to the 
traditional, authoritative and value-free scientific approach in this study. In 
order to give due regard to the socio-political complexity of the context, and 
offer an alternative, and arguably innovative, analysis to that provided through 
a technical-rational lens, the conditions in which innovation can flourish are 
examined from a critical management standpoint. 
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2.2.2 Critical management studies (CMS) 
Critical management theorists have asserted that traditional 'scientific' 
epistemologies remain dominant within health service management theory 
and management practices within the NHS, despite a plethora of alternative 
discourses within the literature (Learmonth 2001; Learmonth & Harding 2004). 
Alternatives, whose contribution has been considered within the context of 
health services management, include, for example, chaos and complexity 
theories (Plsek & Greenhalgh 2001; Plsek & Wilson 2001; Stacey 1992; 
Stacey 1996). 
Critical Management calls for no less than a paradigm shift in management 
thinking. According to Kuhn, scientists (in this case, those who study 
management, and the management of healthcare in particular, from a quasi- 
scientific perspective) organise themselves into groups who operate within 
"paradigms", or conceptual boxes. He states: 
"Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to 
the same rules and standards for scientific practice [which Kuhn argues 
is essential) ... for the genesis and continuation of a particular tradition. " (Kuhn 1996 p 11) 
Taking the analogy of a jigsaw puzzle, Kuhn argues that those working within 
the same paradigm share the same picture of what they are seeking to 
achieve. There is then a sense of cohesion amongst those working within the 
field. Scientists collectively seek understanding of how the bits of the jigsaw fit 
together. A crisis arrives, however, when the paradigm is challenged, when 
there is sufficient evidence to question the picture the jigsaw is believed to 
represent. Kuhn calls this a 'scientific revolution' because it brings into 
question all the work undertaken within the original paradigm and can lead to 
the emergence of a new paradigm. An examination of innovation in the 
provision of health services from a CMS perspective therefore aims to 
examine the limitations of the orthodox view of innovation and offer alternative 
insights. 
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CMS developed in the main as a sub-discipline within UK and European 
Management Schools (Fournier & Grey 2000), bringing together a range of 
sometimes contradictory critical perspectives which challenge the dominance 
of the orthodox, technical-rational paradigm. Empirical evidence suggests that 
a single perspective is incapable of providing all of the solutions to the 
shortcomings of management practices. Arguably, it would be treacherous for 
CMS to replace one sort of absolutism with another hence CMS embraces a 
plurality of theoretical perspectives. These include feminism, neo-Marxist 
theories, post-structuralism and post-modernism. Fournier and Grey (2000) 
argue that the unifying features of CMS which distinguish it from mainstream 
management theory are threefold: 
a) an anti-performance stance, 
b) a commitment to de-naturalization 
c) reflexivity. 
Non-critical management studies take the pursuit of efficiency as a given. 
Efficiency, effectiveness and profitability, the key concepts within orthodox 
management studies, contrast with the concepts of power, control and 
inequality which feature within CMS discourse. Where the "reality" of 
organisational life is promulgated as "natural" or unavoidable within orthodox 
management studies, CMS seeks to expose alternatives. CMS is a dynamic 
process of perpetual critique of the orthodox which strives to be 
philosophically and methodologically self-critical through reflexivity. The 
technical-rational 'solutions' proposed by modern management gurus such as, 
for example, Peters and Waterman (2004) are problematised because, it is 
argued, that the imposition of an organisational 'monoculture' is potentially 
totalitarian (Barley 1992; Willmott 1993) precisely because it attempts to stifle 
debate about alternatives (Parker 2004). The technical-rational, problem- 
solving approaches advocated within orthodox management theories 
effectively mask political agendas and perpetuate the status quo. Alvesson 
and Wilmott (1996) have proposed that the concerns of CMS include: 
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1. the "pathological consequences of 'progress"', namely the 
exploitation of natural resources, inequalities of wealth and 
opportunity and institutional discrimination 
2. the privileging of a scientific ethos over common sense reasoning 
and the resultant exclusion of particular voices 
3. the view that science is always akin to progress 
4. the capitalist exploitation of labour 
5. the negative impact of consumerism and commercialization 
6. the assumption that the promulgation of capitalism will result in a 
world that is more civilised, caring and just. 
From a review of the literature, Reynolds (1999) isolated four principles which 
appear to underpin CMS (table 2.3). 
Table 2.3: Underpinning Principles of Critical Management Studies (after 
Reynolds 1999) 
To question the assumptions and taken for granteds embodied in both theory 
and professional practice 
To foreground the processes of power and ideology subsumed within the 
social fabric of institutional structures, procedures and practices 
To confront spurious claims of rationality and objectivity and reveal the 
sectional interest which can be concealed by them 
To work towards an emancipatory ideal - the realization of a more just society 
based on fairness and democracy 
CMS is not an end in itself. A key principle is to work towards the realization of 
a more just society based on fairness and democracy. Through the 
questioning of assumptions and the foregrounding of power and ideology, a 
CMS perspective offers the potential for the development of alternative and 
creative courses of action. Alvesson and Deetz (2000) argue that a CMS 
perspective should both challenge current hegemonies and, at the same time, 
propose alternative interpretations. Like nursing, management is an applied 
discipline and proposals for action are an important element of CMS: 
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"... critical management.... research should ... have things to say to 
actors - managers and (other) employees - that is of relevance for 
their situation. " (Alvesson & Deetz 2000 p 208) 
The application of CMS approaches within the context of health and 
healthcare is relatively new in the UK. Learmonth and Harding (2004) were 
the first to publish an edited compendium of research which offered a critical 
analysis of health service management. Their motivation was their lack of faith 
in the prevailing discourse that "all the NHS really needed was better 
management". According to Learmonth (2001), contributions to CMS have 
demonstrated the capacity to provide a coherent challenge to the orthodoxy 
within the context of UK healthcare. 
Learmonth and Harding (2004) included in their compendium one contribution 
from nursing. Michael Traynor "unmasked" the uncritical adoption of 
managerialsim and evidence-based practice (EBP) within nursing. Traynor 
problematised the assumption that through managerialsim and EBP nurses 
and nursing could achieve greater influence. Nursing might achieve greater 
influence Traynor argued, through building an intellectual identity closer to the 
routes of nursing theory and nursing practice, based on feminism (Traynor 
1999). 
In order to offer a critical insight into the conditions in which innovations in the 
provision of services flourish, this study offers a contribution from a CMS 
perspective. It is, to the best of my knowledge, the first study to examine 
innovations in healthcare service delivery from this epistemological 
standpoint. 
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2.3 Case Study Methodology 
Case study is a strategy used in professional practice and education as well 
as in research. In the practice of, for example, the law, the testing of a 
particular case is used as a mechanism through which precedents are set and 
new laws or "case laws" are defined. In the clinical disciplines including 
medicine and nursing, case study is used for educational purposes. Here, the 
management of a patient or "a case" is examined so that lessons may be 
learned to inform future practice. This may involve the retrospective 
examination of an individual or cohort of patients presenting with similar 
symptoms with a discussion of interventions and outcomes achieved. In 
professional practice and education, the examination of the case is used as a 
means of taking a comprehensive look at the particular to inform future action, 
either through the setting of precedent or by learning through reflection about 
what did, and did not, work, with the opportunity to theorise as to why this was 
so. 
Case study is also recognised as a comprehensive research strategy (Jones 
& Lyons 2004; Yin 2003a). The two most frequently cited authorities on case 
study as a research methodology are Stake (1995; 1998) and Yin (2003a; 
2003b). According to Stake (1995), case study methodology as a research 
strategy is the study of the particularity and the complexity of a single case 
within its specific context. For Yin (2003b) it is an all-encompassing research 
method which allows complex phenomena to be examined in their natural 
setting, thus enabling the researcher to examine contextual conditions when 
they are considered to be pertinent to the phenomena under investigation. 
Examination of the context in which a case is situated is, therefore, 
fundamental to case study research. Yin (2003b) states that case study 
methodology has been used for exploratory, descriptive or explanatory 
purposes and, therefore, can be applied within a positivist, interpretivist or 
critical paradigm. For example, Yin argues that Graham Allison's (Allison & 
Zelikow 1999) examination of the Cuban missile crisis as a single case 
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"forcefully demonstrates how a single case study can be the basis for 
significant explanations and generalizations" (Yin 2003b p 4). 
This study is conducted within a critical paradigm. A case study research 
strategy has been applied to gain insight into the underlying socio-political 
processes and the conditions in which innovations in the provision of health 
services can flourish. 
A co-operative enquiry research methodology (Reason 1988; Reason & 
Rowan 1981) was considered as an alternative critical research strategy 
within this study. Had I employed this strategy, I would have explored 
opportunities to engage as a co-researcher with individuals participating in the 
development and implementation of an innovation in practice and learned 
experientially from our shared experiences. As co-researchers, we would 
have employed a range of methods as required to inform a cyclical process of 
data collection and analysis, change, reflection and theory development 
(Lewin 2000; Meyer & Batehup 1997; Titchen 1994; Webb 1989). I selected 
the case study methodology in preference to an action research strategy 
because, through an inductive, reflexive process of data collection and 
thematic analysis, the case study methodology allowed for the identification 
and examination of two discrete innovations in practice which could be 
compared and contrasted. The similarities and differences between the cases 
thus serve to illuminate the conditions in which these innovations have 
flourished and when they have failed. The next section discusses the research 
methods employed. 
2.3.1 Case selection, access negotiation and data collection 
This section describes how the cases were identified and how access was 
negotiated. 
Case study 1 
The first case study was selected for professional, philosophical and 
pragmatic reasons, The Farmers' Health project (FHP), an action research 
project, aimed to assess and improve the health of farming communities in 
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North Lancashire and South Cumbria. An outreach service provided by nurse 
practitioners was launched in July 1999. 
The project was brought to my attention when it was reported at professional 
conferences and in the professional nursing press (Walsh 2000a; Walsh 
2000b) as a nurse practitioner-led outreach service supported by nurse 
researchers. In addition, it was presented as an exemplar of an action 
research project on the MPhil in critical management programme I was 
undertaking within the Management School at Lancaster University. 
Researchers advised that the project arose from a shared concern about 
farmers' health amongst stakeholders coupled with compelling research 
evidence of high levels of accidents and general morbidity (Burnett et al. 
1998; Gerrard 1998). 
Within the context of her doctoral dissertation, Cath Gerrard, a nurse and 
farmer, had posed the question "Are farmers' health and safety needs being 
met? ' (Gerrard 1998). Her personal experience suggested that they were not. 
She demonstrated how statistics showed that farmers were a high risk group 
with high morbidity rates related to accidents and chronic illnesses including 
cardiovascular disease. There were also higher than average suicide rates 
within farming communities. Gerrard (1998) reported that farmers were 
isolated and were known for their reticence, stoicism and self-reliance. These 
traits, coupled with reported deficits in the knowledge and expertise of health 
professionals with regard to farmers' health issues, were thought to contribute 
to the under-utilisation of mainstream health services by farming communities. 
To answer her research question Gerrard conducted a telephone survey with 
a sample of 150 farmers drawn from three English counties. She concluded 
that the health and safety needs of farmers were not being met and 
recommended that alternative models of occupational health provision should 
be piloted and evaluated within the farming sector. She added that an action 
research approach would seem to be an appropriate way forward (Gerrard 
1998). The Farmers' Health action research project was funded through the 
NHS North West Regional R&D capacity and capability building programme. 
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Philosophically and professionally I considered this to be an interesting 
project. Firstly, it was presented as an innovative service development which 
appeared to have been brought about as the result of research findings and 
thus was consistent with the rational policy rhetoric that there is a logical linear 
order where research progresses through to development and on to 
innovation in practice. In addition, it was an action research project, where 
action research is recognised as a methodology which operates within a 
critical, emancipatory paradigm (see table 2.2). 
Secondly, the project was of interest to me in my professional role as the 
RCN's R&D adviser. It was reported as a nurse-led initiative (Walsh 2000a; 
Walsh 2000b), based on nurse-led research (Gerrard 1998), and it was 
contributing to a primary nursing R&D policy concern, namely the 
development of R&D capacity and capability within the nursing profession 
(Rafferty, Newell, & Traynor 2002). 
On a pragmatic level, as a result of my professional and academic association 
with the researchers involved in the FHP, negotiating access proved to be a 
relatively straightforward process. At that time, I was registered on the MPhil 
programme and had not converted to PhD studies. The Director of the 
programme was my initial research supervisor and was a member of the FHP 
steering group. Following preliminary discussion with my supervisor, I 
approached the principal investigator on the FHP based within the Lancaster 
University Institute for Health Research. She advised that access may be 
negotiated by liaising with the general practitioner (GP) who chaired the 
project steering committee. The GP proved to be very supportive and invited 
me to attend the next steering committee meeting (19/7/2000) to outline the 
aims of my research and answer any questions or respond to any concerns 
raised by committee members. This proved to be a straightforward process 
and steering committee members were wholly supportive of my intentions, 
The ethical considerations here are discussed within the context of the ethical 
considerations across the entire study in section 2.5 below. 
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In order to contrast and compare the themes emerging from the FHP case 
study, I had considered criteria for the identification of a second case. 
Farmers are classified by health professionals as 'hard to reach- they do not 
routinely access mainstream services. It became clear in the FHP that one of 
the reasons for this is that mainstream health services do not fit in with the 
demands of farming life. I, therefore, sought to identify a second case of an 
innovation seeking to address the healthcare needs of individuals who were 
considered "hard to reach" by professionals or who, as individuals 
themselves, felt that they had been let down by mainstream health services, 
Secondly, the multiple-agency input into the FHP added to its complexity. My 
second criterion, therefore, was that the innovation should be a complex multi- 
agency initiative. 
Through talking to colleagues in my professional and academic networks I 
scanned the horizon for a suitable match. A professional colleague was 
associated with the first "Healthy Living Centre" at Bromley by Bow in London. 
She advised me that this was an innovation which has been driven from 
outside the system. Community dissatisfaction with the quality of palliative 
care for a young woman in this socially deprived area of London was reported 
as the initial impetus for the innovation. The champion of the innovation, a 
local vicar, was reported to have "the ear" of the Prime Minister and, as a 
result, the innovation had a very high profile and had essentially achieved 
'celebrity status'. Consequently, access was very tightly controlled and I was 
advised that research access would be very difficult to negotiate. My 
colleague recommended strongly that I consider alternative cases. I felt that 
on ethical grounds this was the right thing to do. As Williamson (2007) points 
out, individuals have the right not to be over-researched. I, therefore, took my 
colleague's advice and started to look elsewhere. 
Case Study 2 
I became aware of The Corner young people's advice and information service 
when I was preparing for the RCN annual international nursing research 
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conference in 2001. In my role as RCN Research and Development Adviser, 
one of my responsibilities is to facilitate the scientific process of abstract 
review for inclusion in the conference programme. At this time, I was seeking 
to identify a second case when "Health outreach for socially excluded young 
people" (Elliott 2001) caught my attention. The Corner had commissioned the 
research that was to be presented at the conference 
The Corner is an information and advice centre for young people, situated in 
the centre of the city of Dundee on the east coast of Scotland. Morbidity 
amongst young people often goes unreported as they do not, as a rule, 
access mainstream NHS services. The birth rate, however, is recorded with a 
relatively high degree of accuracy. Dundee is reported to have the highest 
teenage pregnancy rate in Scotland and one of the highest rates in Europe. A 
local authority-led multi-agency initiative, The Corner, operated on a drop-in 
basis, where no appointment is required. Trained staff and volunteer young 
people offered an informal, free and totally confidential service in areas of 
concern to their clients. These included a wide range of health matters as well 
as pregnancy testing and contraception. The Corner sought to respond to the 
actual problems and issues experienced by its clients, in order to ensure that 
it remained responsive to the real needs and concerns of young people in the 
city of Dundee. A complex project, involving multiple stakeholders, The Comer 
matched my inclusion criteria. 
arranged to meet the author of the conference abstract to discuss his 
research, The Corner Project, and how I might negotiate access. From his 
perspective, he felt that access could be difficult to negotiate because, in his 
view the project team guarded against external scrutiny. I was given an e-mail 
contact address for the project coordinator and wished well in my endeavour. I 
constructed an email letter of introduction requesting a meeting to explore the 
potential of access to the project. However, my e-mail bounced back so I 
tracked down a telephone number for The Corner on the Internet. I rang up to 
speak to the project coordinator and explained to the woman who answered 
the phone why I was ringing. She asked me who I was and, when I explained, 
she said "I thought it was youl" It turned out to be one of my cousins who, 
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unbeknown to me, had recently taken up a clerical post on the project. I 
acknowledge here that having someone "on the inside" may have facilitated 
my request for access to the project. The project coordinator agreed to meet 
me the following week to discuss my proposal. Following our meeting he 
agreed to recommend to his senior manager, who had been the original 
project coordinator, and colleagues within the project, that they support my 
request. Access was agreed. The ethical considerations here are discussed 
within the context of the ethical considerations across the entire study in 
section 2.5. 
2.3.2 Data sources 
Methods of data collection and analysis are explained and critiqued in this 
section. Multiple sources of evidence were accessed in order to examine the 
cases: interviews, documents, participant and non-participant observation. 
The rationale for using multiple data sources in case study research is to 
facilitate data triangulation (Patton 1990), that is the corroboration or 
augmentation of one source of data with another. 
More specifically data collection included: 
1. semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and informants 
2. grey and published documentation including 
" administrative documents - project proposals and 
progress reports 
" formal evaluations of the cases 
" agendas, announcements and minutes of meetings and 
conference reports 
" communiques including letters and e-mails 
" published policy 
" peer-reviewed publications 
" media reports in the form of newspaper clippings 
3. observation of practice through shadowing, attendance at 
relevant meetings, conferences and workshops associated with the 
case studies 
Yin (2003b) argues that the interview is one of the most important sources of 
case study information. Here, the interview is a fluid process which, whilst 
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pursuing a consistent line of enquiry, appears more like a guided 
conversation. The strengths and weaknesses of interview data in case study 
research are presented in table 2.4. I was aware that my personal positional 
power as a professional adviser within the Royal College of Nursing, had the 
capacity to not only influence potential informants' willingness to speak to me 
but also to influence informants' responses to my questions. As Yin (2003b) 
points out, this is a potential weakness of the interview method (table 2.4). To 
minimise this potential and increase the quality of research interviews 
researchers must be self-aware at all times. According to Oakley (1981) the 
goal of interviewing is best achieved when the relationship between the 
interviewer and interviewee is non-hierarchical and when the interviewer is 
willing to invest something of their personal identity into the process. I 
endeavoured to achieve the former through reflexivity and sought continually 
to be self-aware throughout this study. With regard to the latter if I was ever in 
a position to offer any professional support to any of the people I interviewed I 
carefully followed this up. For example, I supported a nurse in the The Corner 
in her preparation of a paper for presentation at a professional conference 
several months after I had interviewed her. 
Over the two cases, 26 people were interviewed. All interviews were 
conducted face to face and an open-ended, semi-structured interview 
schedule was used to facilitate the process. With the verbal consent of 
informants, all but one of the interviews were tape-recorded. In the one case 
where consent for the use of a tape-recorder was withheld, consent was given 
for notes to be taken by me during the interview. A touch typist transcribed 
recorded data before I listened to each tape, at least twice, and edited the 
transcripts. 
Reviews of grey and published documentation and a limited degree of 
participant and non-participant observation facilitated methodological 
triangulation within each case. The strengths and weaknesses of 
documentary evidence and observation in case study research are listed in 
table 2.4. Warning of the limitations of documentary evidence, Yin 
recommends: 
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"For case studies, the most important use of documents is to 
corroborate and augment evidence from other sources. " (Yin 2003b p 
87) 
Table 2.4: Limitations of data sources (adapted from Yin (2003b page 
86)) 
Source of Strengths Weaknesses 
evidence 
Documentation stable - can be retrieved repeatedly retrievability - can be low 
unobtrusive - not created as a result of biased selectivity. If collection is 
the case study incomplete 
exact - contains exact names , reporting bias - reflects 
(unknown 
references and details of an event bias of author) 
broad coverage - long span of time , access - may be 
deliberately blocked 
many events and many settings 
Interviews targeted - focuses directly on case bias due to poorly constructed 
study topic question 
insightful - provides perceived causal response bias 
inferences 
Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
reflexivity - Interviewee gives what Interviewer wants to hear 
Direct Reality - covers events In real time time consuming 
observation 
Contextual -covers context of event selectivity - unless broad coverage 
reflexivity - event may proceed 
differently because It Is being 
observed 
cost - hours needed by human 
observers 
Participant (same as above for direct observation) (same as above for direct 
observation observation) 
insightful into interpersonal behaviour 
and motives bias due to investigator's 
manipulation of events 
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Case study I 
The first step in examining the FHP was the identification of stakeholders in 
the project who could be informants. A preliminary map of stakeholders was 
identified with the support of my initial primary supervisor at Lancaster 
University (R1) and the principal investigator for the project (R2), who was 
also located within the University. As I met with and interviewed those on my 
initial list of stakeholders, many of these informants would ask, "Have you 
spoken to (so and so) yet?.... 1 really think you should speak to 'xY ".. or.. "'y' 
will give you a very different perspective, " and thus the list of key informants 
was developed through this snowballing (Patton 1990) or network mapping 
(Procter & Allan 2006) mechanism. 
Whilst the snowballing technique can introduce bias in research that is 
seeking to ascertain statistical significance (Faugier & Sargeant 1997), when 
used in the context of a case study design, the mapping of networks can add 
to the richness of the data. I noted that informants were particularly keen that I 
spoke to others who may hold a perspective different to their own and so, 
arguably, informants themselves were seeking to illuminate their own personal 
bias within my data. Table 2.5 lists all the data sources which informed case 
study 1 including the stakeholders interviewed. R1 and R2 were interviewed in 
the first instance and, thereafter, I telephoned other stakeholders to ask them 
if they would be willing to be interviewed by me. I approached in total 18 
potential informants who all agreed in principle to be interviewed. With fifteen 
of these potential informants I was able to establish a mutually convenient 
date and venue to meet with them to conduct an interview. For three potential, 
informants the identification of a mutually convenient date and time proved too 
challenging, so wherever possible, I ensured that I spoke to someone who 
could offer a similar perspective. For example, the first community psychiatric 
nurse (CPN) I approached was one of the three potential informants that I was 
unable to arrange to meet. I was, however, able to fix up a meeting with the 
other CPN involved in the project. 
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Table 2.5: Case Study IData Sources 
(Rural) Mental Health Issues for Primary Care Working Group 
Minutes 
Letters / progress reports 
Improving access to healthcare for farming communities - Research Bid 
Farmers' Health Project 
Management Group Minutes 
Steering Group Minutes 
Project reports 
The Grange Team 
The Carnforth Team 
Telephone evaluation of the Farmers' Health Project 
Dissemination Developments 
Advertisement for Count side Agency funded Research Assistant 
Video: Taking Action in Rural Health: the case of farmers 
Information pack 
Seminars and Conferences 
Mental Health Issues for Rural Practices - Programme and Notes 
Rural Health Study Days 
Institute of Rural Health, 'Joined Up Countryside' Conference, Gre no , Wales Research Reports 
The organisation of primary care for mental'health services in East. Lancashire. & 
Morecambe Bay 
"The Farmers' Health project" 
Informants 
Academics 
Researcher R1 - Professor in Management) $ 
Researcher (R2 - Senior Lecturer / Sociologist) $* 
Researcher (R3- Reader in Nursing) $* 
Researcher (R4 - Research Assistant - em lo ed to work on the project 
Service Providers 
Community Psychiatric Nurse (CPN) $* 
Farmers' Nurse (FN employed to work on the project) $* 
General Practitioner GP1 $* 
General Practitioner (GP2) $ 
Healthcare Support Worker (HCSW employed to work on the project) $ 
Health Visitor (HV) $* 
Manager (Mental Health Services) M1 $* 
Manager (Nursing) (M2) $ 
Nurse Practitioner NP1 employed to work on the project) $* 
Nurse Practitioner (NP2 a local service provider) $ 
Service Users 
Farmers (Fl & F2) $ 
Key to level of involvement In the FHP 
$= member of project steering group (quarterly meetings) 
L* = member of ro'ect management group (monthly meetings) 
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I interviewed two farmers together. They were married to each other and both 
members of the multi-agency steering committee. Together they provided the 
consumer's voice on the committee. The husband had lost his arm through a 
farm accident and his wife was now the primary farmer within the 'team'. 
There is always a danger when interviewing two or more people at the same 
that a member or members of the group can dominate the proceedings 
effectively silencing other interviewees and thus masking any political 
agendas. As foregrounding the power dynamics within the innovation was part 
of my purpose, interviewing two or more people at the same time could have 
been problematic, however, I had no sense of that happening in this case. 
The two informants had clearly discussed, at length, their thoughts on the 
project and they 'bounced' their contributions off one another, effectively 
checking out their interpretations, thus adding depth to their collective 
contribution, throughout the interview. 
I interviewed all other informants on their own. Following an initial telephone 
call with an informant I sent a standard letter confirming the arrangements we 
had agreed and outlining six questions that would form the basis of a semi- 
structured interview schedule (see table 2.6). My purpose in providing my 
semi-structured interview schedule in advance of my interviews was twofold. 
Firstly, by making explicit the nature and purpose of my interview I hoped to 
allay any anxieties informants might have. Secondly, informants could reflect 
on my questions in advance of our meeting should they wish to do so. My 
letter also incorporated a formal request to tape-record our interview. Before 
beginning an interview, I verbally reiterated the purposes of my study and 
requested permission to record the interview. Informants were free to give 
their verbal consent or deny my request. 
As concerns of the sustainability of the FHP emerged, I interviewed three 
informants for a second time, in order to, further explore this issue. 
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Table 2.6: Semi-structured interview schedule used in case studies 
Your understanding of the genesis of the initiative, where it is now and how it 
got to this point 
How you got involved and why 
Your perceptions of the barriers that have hindered the initiative and factors 
that have enabled it to happen 
Any thoughts you might have on the process and the evaluation of the project 
Your thoughts on the future of the project, its dissemination and possible 
replication elsewhere 
Any other pertinent issues 
Case study 2 
Whilst negotiating access to The Corner with the project coordinator, potential 
informants were discussed. The project coordinator (PC2) made very useful 
recommendations about whom I might meet and interview. He even proposed 
to co-facilitate a focus group with some of the young people who accessed the 
service. 
As it turned out, PC2 was unable to set up a focus group interview with young 
people on the dates i gave him when I was available to come to the project. 
He did, however, arrange for me to meet with and talk to two of the young 
people who accessed the project on a one-to-one basis. In fact, PC2 offered 
to arrange all of my interviews for me. This support was greatly appreciated, 
as PC2 essentially acted as my advocate with the range of stakeholders that 
we identified I should interview. The concern I had with this approach, 
however, was that members of the project team, further down the managerial 
hierarchy, who were approached on my behalf by their line manager, may 
have felt coerced into participating in my study. This created an ethical 
concern which was validated when the first project worker I met with to 
interview, who was relatively new to the project, expressed some anxiety 
about what I might do with my data. Whilst she consented to talk to me about 
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the project, she declined my request for the interview to be recorded. I 
reassured her that only myself and my supervisors would have access to my 
raw data and that I would handle these data sensitively. I assured her of 
confidentiality and anonymity in any publications that may emerge from my 
research. In the light of this, she consented to continue with the interview, but 
not for it to be recorded. In addition, whilst it felt like the project coordinator 
was extremely facilitative, an alternative view could have been that he acted 
as a gatekeeper controlling the degree of access I was given to the project 
and thus introducing bias into my sample of informants . However, during the 
course of the analysis of the interview data collected, it became apparent 
within the emergent theoretical themes, that senior management support for 
the project had been instrumental in its success. In order to explore this 
further with senior managers associated with the project I had to negotiate 
access to them. Once again, the project co-ordinator was equally facilitative. 
He did offer to join me when I went to meet with one member of the 
management group, but did not seem in any way concerned when I declined 
the invitation. Indeed, at no time was I denied access to anyone or any of the 
resources within the project. Therefore, as in the FHP case study, a 
snowballing sampling technique was applied in this case. Table 2.7 lists the 
data sources which informed my analysis of case study 2 including the 
stakeholders interviewed. The letter sent to stakeholders confirming details of 
the interview incorporated details of the semi-structured interview schedule 
listed above in table 2.6. 
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Table 2.7: Case Study 2: data sources 
Project Reports 
Young Persons' Health Project 
Evaluation of The Corner Young People's Health and Information Project 1 April 
1995 - March 1997 
Challenging Myths, Workin with Realities: Principles and Policies 
Food for Thought 
Lochee Primary School and "The Corner": Facing the facts of life 
Guidelines for care and protection of children and young people 
Eye Opener: Annual Report 2000 - 2001 
The Traveller's Guide to Working with Vulnerable Young Men 
Trends, Myths, Realities, Eye Openers: The Corner Young People's Health and 
Information Project, Dundee 1996-2002 
Interviews 
Project Co-ordinator 1 PC1 appointed when PC2 promoted) 
Project Co-ordinator 2 (PC2 original project co-ordinator) 
Project Worker - Nurse 1 PW1 
Project Worker - Nurse 2 (PW2) 
Young Person 1 (YPI) 
Young Person 2 (YP2) 
Researcher R1 Commissioned to undertake a specific, discrete piece of research) 
Researcher (R2 Employed as the project evaluator) 
Local Authority Sponsor (LA) 
NHS Sponsor (NHS) 
Additional Information 
The Corner Press clippings. March 1996 - January 2003 
The Shore Update September 2002 
Have Your Say: patient focus, public involvement, public partnership. NHS 
Tayside 
2.3.3 Data analysis 
Whilst there are clear and accepted conventions for the analysis of 
quantitative data, there is no parallel convention when it comes to the analysis 
of qualitative data (Robson 1993). Neither should there be, according to Webb 
(1989), who argued that qualitative data analysis should not be treated as a 
reductionist, mechanistic process but as a creative endeavour. 
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Qualitative interview data collected in these cases were all transcribed 
verbatim. Through listening and re-listening to the tapes, I immersed myself in 
the data and annotated the transcriptions. I analysed these data using 
intuition and empathy by entering into the spirit of what Christine Webb has 
coined her "osmosis method": 
"I have found the intimacy gained by this process gives such a close 
'feeling' for and familiarity with what participants have said that it leads 
to a process of analysis that could appear almost to be automatic and 
even to have physical elements. It is as if the ideas almost literally flow 
up one's arm as one annotates transcripts and makes notes, enter 
one's brain, and flow back to the paper on which the analysis is written. 
I have coined the term Webb's osmosis method for this process of 
intuition... " (Webb 1989 p 329). 
Using different coloured pens, I highlighted within my data decisions and 
actions taken which I identified as "critical incidents". From the different 
perspectives of the stakeholders interviewed, these incidents appeared to 
shape the course of the innovation, whether through ongoing development or 
to the point of its demise. The critical incidents, therefore, served to illuminate 
the conditions in which the innovations flourished and the conditions in which 
they failed. In line with the principles of CMS (table 2.3), 1 examined these 
critical incidents through consideration of the questions I adapted from 
Angelides (2001) (table 2.8), in order to identify the underlying socio-political 
factors which militated for and against the development and sustainability of 
these innovations. 
Table 2.8: Probing questions used to analyse critical Incidents (adapted 
from Angelkies (2001)) 
Whose interests are served or denied by the actions of these critical 
incidents? 
What conditions sustain or preserve these incidents? 
What power relationships are expressed in them? 
What structural, organisational and cultural factors are likely to prevent actors from engaging in alternative ways? 
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The critical methodological question is, 'can my interpretation be trusted? ' 
Assessing the quality or trustworthiness of qualitative research is recognised 
as problematic, and Cutcliffe and McKenna (1999) have argued that criteria 
such as "valid" and "reliable" have been inappropriately imported or translated 
into assessments of the trustworthiness of qualitative research when 
researchers have endeavoured to assure readers and examiners of the 
quality of their work. According to Sandelowski (1993 p 8): 
"... we can preserve or kill the spirit of qualitative work; we can soften 
our notions of rigor to include the playfulness, soulfulness, imagination 
and technique we associate with more artistic endeavours, or we can 
further harden it by the uncritical application of rules. The choice is 
ours, rigor or rigor mortis. " 
Arguably, these are the potential pitfalls of the uncritical application of more 
formal, arguably technical-rational methods of qualitative data analysis offered 
by, for example, Miles and Huberman (1984). It seemed to me to be both 
illogical and counterintuitive to problematise the potential limitations of a 
technical-rational view of innovation and then to analyse case studies of 
innovation through the application of technical-rational methods. I decided, 
therefore, that in this context Webb's intuitive osmosis method was not only 
intuitively the right approach to take but also coherent with my epistemological 
standpoint. 
Drawing on Benner's theories of expert nursing practice (Benner 2001), 
Cutcliffe and McKenna (2004) juxtaposed the proposal that qualitative 
researchers should keep a rigorous audit trail of each step of their data 
analysis to ensure the trustworthiness of their conclusions with their notion of 
an expert qualitative researcher. They concluded that exaggerating the case 
for method did not necessarily establish the credibility of research findings. 
Instead, they argued from a pragmatic standpoint: 
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"If the theory explains, predicts and solves problems for the group for 
which it was produced, then it may be of less importance that it has 
little credibility vis a vis recognisable methodological patterns. " 
(Cutcliffe & McKenna 2004 p 132) 
The aim of this study is to increase understanding of the conditions in which 
innovations flourish. It seeks to inform healthcare policy and practice. To that 
end, I have avoided potentially reductionist, mechanistic methods of data 
analysis and have sought to demonstrate creativity and rigour through the 
internal / intrinsic logic and trustworthiness of my argument. My aim has been 
to provide a reflexive, creative, critical account with respect to the four 
principles Yin (2003b) states are required to assure a high quality of case 
study analysis : 
1. all the evidence should be attended to 
2. all rival interpretations should be considered 
3. the most significant aspect of the case study should be 
addressed 
4. the researcher should use their own prior expert knowledge 
Following initial analysis of these cases and the apparent significance that the 
policy context may have on an innovation's potential to flourish, I elected to 
incorporate a policy perspective into my study design. The data collected 
during the third phase of data collection (see table 2.1) served to augment 
what Yin describes as my 'prior expert knowledge' of innovation (discussed in 
chapter 1) and the context in which these innovations were talking place. The 
next section examines the methods applied to incorporate a policy perspective 
into the study design. 
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2.4 The Healthcare Policy Context 
Initial analysis of these two cases of innovation (which are presented in turn in 
chapters 5 and 6) indicated that the policy context had a significant bearing on 
the potential of these innovations to flourish. Healthcare policy clearly set out 
the UK Governments' intentions to support and enable an innovative culture in 
the NHS. However, evidence from the two cases examined suggested that, 
paradoxically, NHS policy had the capacity to stifle innovation "in the field". I, 
therefore, decided to incorporate a view from the world of policy into my study 
design in order to gain a greater insight into the complexity of the policy 
context in which these innovations were taking place. 
When considering potential sources of data, I acknowledged that I had ready 
access to published government policy. My cases, however, suggested that 
policy and policymakers may have a significant impact on whether an 
innovation can flourish or not. This suggested that policymakers themselves 
potentially played a part in the success or demise of an innovation. For the 
purposes of this study, I, therefore, sought to establish the perceptions and 
interpretations of innovation held by policy makers and decided to negotiate 
access to, and interview a sample of, policy makers, using a semi-structured 
interview schedule, to increase my insight and understanding of the context in 
which my case studies of innovation were taking place and what bearing that 
might have on their capacity to flourish. 
Reflecting on the focus of the research, the themes emerging from the cases, 
and through discussions with senior policymakers within my own profession, I 
was enabled to identify a, preliminary sample of policymakers. This sample 
was considered representative of the range of professional and managerial 
backgrounds of healthcare policy makers. As my first case study of an 
innovation was located in England and the second in Scotland, coupled with 
the acknowledged impact of political devolution on the NHS policy (Greer 
2004), policymakers in both Scotland and England were included in this initial 
sample. 
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I contacted potential informants identified within the initial sample by 
telephone in the first instance. I introduced myself in my professional and 
researcher capacities, advised that I was making contact on the 
recommendation of my professional colleagues (where appropriate) and 
asked if they would be willing to be interviewed. Everyone contacted agreed 
and a follow-up letter was sent confirming the date, time and venue for the 
interview. The proposed interview outline was also detailed in the letter and 
informants were advised that responses would not be attributable and treated 
as confidential. I cannot measure the impact of my professional role and 
networks and the bearing this may have had on my ability to access 
policymakers so freely, but I acknowledge that it may have been significant. 
Knowing someone 'on the inside' appeared to make a difference when it came 
to negotiating access in Case Study 2 and it may have in this instance as well. 
At interview, some policy makers in the initial sample recommended additional 
policymakers from whom they felt I should get a view. Once again, as in the 
cases described above, this led to the incorporation of a snowballing sampling 
technique, where a preliminary sample is further developed on the 
recommendation of respondents (Patton 1990). Access was, therefore, 
negotiated on the grounds of peer referral. 
All eleven policymakers interviewed had either a national responsibility for the 
development and/or implementation of policy or in offering a critique on policy 
developments. Five men and six women were interviewed. They came from a 
range of professional backgrounds including nursing (4), management and 
accountancy (3), medicine (2) science and social science. They all held senior 
positions within their respective organisations as illustrated in table 2.9. Five 
had a policy focus within the NHS in England, which is under the political 
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom (UK) Government, and six had a policy 
focus within Scotland, where 'health' is devolved to the Scottish Parliament. 
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Table 2.9: Policymakers interviewed 
Employing organ isations 
Scotland 
NHS Scotland 
Quality Improvement Scotland (QIS) 
Centre for Change and Innovation (CCI) 
England 
Department of Health 
Health Development Agency (HDA) 
NHS Modernisation Agency (MA) 
The Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health (PPI) 
NHS Confederation (NHSC) 
Range of Job Titles 
Chief 
" Executive (CEO) 
" Nursing Officer (CNO) 
" Medical Officer (CMO) 
Director 
" Executive 




As with the interviews in the cases studied, these interviews were guided by 
the use of a semi-structured interview schedule (table 2.10). 
Table 2.10: Semi-structured Interview schedule used with 
policymakers 
What does innovation in the provision of health services mean to you? 
What are your perceptions of the barriers to innovations in health service 
provision and the enabling factors? 
What is your view of the relationship between policy and innovations in 
health service provision? 
Are there any other issues you think are pertinent? 
Whenever it was logistically possible, interviews were held face to face 
because face to face interviews are believed to increase the potential of 
achieving a rapport with respondents when compared to telephone interviews 
(Robson 1993). Seven interviews were conducted face to face and three over 
the telephone. I had previously met face to face with two of these three 
respondents. The telephone interview with the third respondent, whom I had 
not met before, was conducted on a Sunday morning in order to fit in with his 
busy schedule. 
All interviews were recorded with the verbal permission of respondents and 
these data were also transcribed. In this case however, because I was 
engaging policymakers in discussion specifically to illuminate the policy 
context in which innovations were taking place, and the potential impact of 
policy on their trajectory, I elected to employ a more structured method of 
analysis commonly used within the field of policy analysis. Framework, a 
matrix-based method for ordering and synthesising qualitative data (Ritchie, 
Spencer, & O'Connor 2003), was applied specifically because of the 
congruence between these data and the context in which the method was 
developed and is applied. Framework was developed in an independent 
social research unit, Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR), 
where applied policy research was carried out (Ritchie & Spencer 1994). The 
key features of Framework are listed in table 2.11. 
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Table 2.11: The Key features of Framework (Ritchie & Spencer 
1994 p 176) 
Grounded or generative: it is heavily based on, and driven by, the 
original accounts and observations of the people it is about. 
Dynamic: it is open to change, addition and amendment throughout the 
analytic process 
Systematic: it allows methodical treatment of all similar units of analysis 
Comprehensive: it allows a full, and non partial or selective, review of the 
material collected 
Enables easy retrieval: it allows access to, and retrieval of, the original 
textual material 
Allows between- and within- case analysis: it enables comparisons 
between, and associations within, cases to be made. 
Accessible to others: the analytic process, and the interpretations 
derived from it, can be viewed and judged by people other than the 
primary analyst. 
The developers argue that Framework offers the qualitative researcher a 
means of making analytical tools accessible by providing an explicit audit trail 
from data collection through to research findings. Framework is, therefore, 
seen to increase the credibility of qualitative data analysis in the policy field 
where, traditionally, quantitative data analysis was the methodology of choice 
because of the apparent factual certainty it offered (Ritchie & Spencer 1994). 
With Framework the 'answers' to policy questions policy commissioners seek 
to address can be readily traced back to raw research data. Framework also 
makes it possible for teams of researchers to collaborate and provide a rapid 
response to policy questions. It involves a systematic process of sifting, 
charting and sorting data according to key issues and themes and 
incorporates five key stages illustrated in table 2.12. 
Table 2.12: The five key stages In Framework 
1. Familiarisation 
2. Identifying a thematic framework 
3. Indexing 
4. Charting 
5. Mapping and interpretation 
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The first phase, familiarisation, involves the researcher immersing herself in 
the data - listening to tapes, reading transcripts and reading observational 
notes - and listing key ideas and recurrent themes. From these observations, 
an initial index or thematic framework can be developed within which the data 
can be sifted and sorted. Ritchie and Spencer (1994) suggest that when 
developing a thematic framework the researcher draws on a priori and 
emergent issues and analytical themes: 
0a priori issues: those informed by the original research 
aims and introduced into the interviews via the topic guide 
0 emergent issues: raised by the respondents themselves 
0 analytical themes: arising from the recurrence, patterning 
of particular views and experiences. 
They suggest that the first version of a thematic framework or index 
incorporates, in the main, a priori issues and, through both logical and intuitive 
thinking, a thematic framework is refined and developed. 
Following familiarisation with the interview data collected in this part of this 
study, I developed an initial index of concepts. I then systematically re-read 
and mapped or'indexed' all of the transcribed interview data against this initial 
index. During this process I continued to refine and develop the index. The 
final index is listed in table 2.13. During the next phase, 'charting', I used 
Excel spreadsheets, copied data from their original transcripts and charted 
these according to the appropriate index. I carried out this analysis 
thematically and examined each theme across all respondents. 
Ritchie and Spencer (1994) recommend that charting involves abstraction and 
synthesis of the original data. Whilst charting in this manner would clearly be 
particularly useful with a very large data-set, data in this part of this study 
were limited to the transcripts of eleven interviews. As a result, in the main, I 
copied and pasted verbatim data chunks from the interview transcripts onto 
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the charts. Where I abstracted responses, I recorded them in blue italics on 
the charts. 
Analysis was a dynamic process of refinement. I highlighted data in the charts 
in turquoise, to signify where data were either imported from, or exported to, 
other themes during the process of refinement. Data, which offered insights 
such as linkages with other themes, I highlighted in yellow and I used red font 
to highlight specific points. I recorded my interpretations in a comments 
column at the end of each row. Table 3.1 provides an illustration of a section 
of a chart developed. 
During the process of charting, the framework continued to be refined and 
further developed. Table 2.14 illustrates the thematic framework ultimately 
developed through this process which is discussed in detail in chapter 6. It 
illustrates four overarching or 'meta-themes' namely innovation, stakeholders, 
power and control and paradoxes and tensions. Once this framework was 
realised, and all of the charts were examined collectively, mapping between 
themes and across respondents was possible. The charts were all re-read 
and, using pencil and paper, the linkages between the themes were, literally, 
mapped-out. 
The 'key objectives and features of qualitative research' described by Ritchie 
and Spencer (1994) were realised, namely: 
" defining concepts 
" mapping range and nature of phenomena 
" creating typologies 
" finding associations 
" providing explanations 
" developing strategies, etc 
This mapping process provided the outline for chapter 3 where the analysis 
and interpretation of these data are presented. 
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Definition / meaning of innovation 
Innovation problematised 
Drivers of innovation 
Legislation as a driver 
Policy as a driver and an inhibitor) 
Examples of innovation - policy-related 
Examples of innovation - role development 
Examples of innovation - service redesign 
Examples of innovation - new technology 
Dissemination 
Uptake 






Professional Associations / Trade Unions 




Size of the NHS 
Devolution (political and managedal) 
Evidence 
Standards and Regulation 
Risk 
Management Support 
Management Technologies tools and Techniques 
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2.5 Ethical Considerations 
As a researcher, I have a duty of care to safeguard the dignity, rights and well- 
being of any informants. With regard to the data collection phase, in Case Study 
1 and Policymakers I personally initiated a verbal invitation to potential informants 
to contribute to my research. I introduced myself in my professional capacity and 
as a postgraduate, at that time, at Lancaster University. 
If they agreed (consented) to contribute, I sent a letter: 
a) detailing the aims of my study 
b) outlining my proposed semi-structured interview schedule 
c) confirming the agreed date, time and venue for the interview 
d) requesting their permission to tape-record the interview. 
Before the interview formally commenced, I reiterated the aims of my research 
and I requested permission to tape-record the interview. None of my Case Study 
1 or Policymaker informants expressed any concerns with regard to being 
interviewed by me or with the interview being tape-recorded. On one occasion, a 
policymaker requested that the tape recorder be turned off at the end of the 
interview. She continued to offer a contribution "off the record" and additional 
information was recorded in field notes but not used in the analysis. 
In Case Study 2 this procedure was not followed and this raised ethical concerns. 
The project co-ordinator acted as a facilitator, negotiating access to potential 
informants on my behalf. As he was in a position of authority, I had to be extra 
vigilant, to ensure that potential informants did not feel coerced or obliged to talk 
to me, and that they were at ease with our terms of engagement. Because the 
project co-ordinator facilitated my access, I did not have the initial telephone 
introduction with these informants. Their first point of contact was through a (non- 
personalised) photocopy of my standard letter of introduction passed on to them 
by their line manager. I, therefore, took particular care, when I first met these 
potential informants, to try to ascertain whether they were participating of their 
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own volition or because their line manager had asked them to, as this could 
affect their responses. If they thought that I was acting on behalf of, or colluding 
with their line managers, they may be less likely to disclose their views if they felt 
critical of their management. As discussed above, in one instance, a relatively 
newly appointed member of staff was suspicious of my purpose, expressed 
concern about what I might do with the data and denied my request to record our 
interview. She did, however, agree to talk to me and I recorded aspects of our 
discussion, with her permission, as field notes. When it became apparent to me 
that I needed to talk to senior managers, I was able to negotiate that I would write 
to them personally prior to our meeting. 
The NHS research governance framework, which was first published in 2001, 
stipulates: 
"All research involving patients, service users, cares or care professionals 
and other staff, or their organs, tissue or data, is referred for independent 
ethical review to safeguard their dignity, rights, safety and well-being. " 
(Department of Health 2006) 
This study was not referred for independent ethical review for three reasons. 
Firstly, data collection began in 2000, prior to the introduction of the Research 
Governance Framework. Nevertheless, at this time, ethical approval from a Local 
Research Ethics Committee for studies conducted within the NHS was a 
requirement. However, the focus of local research ethics committees was, in the 
main, on research involving patients and service users directly and they did not 
routinely concern themselves with research that focused on healthcare 
professionals and other staff. 
Secondly, the case studies, whilst they involved some personnel whose contracts 
were held by the NHS, were multi-agency innovations which sat very much on 
the margins of the healthcare systems (rather like the client groups whose health 
needs they were seeking to address). Case study 1 was a university-led initiative 
and case study 2 was, in the end, led by personnel whose contracts were held by 
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their local authority. In response to the atrocities of Nazi Germany (Schmidt 
2007), the regulation of medical research and the governance of research ethics, 
in particular, have been a strong feature of research involving medical 
interventions since the Second World War. It is only within recent years that 
similar attention has been given to the ethics of social research (ESRC 2005). 
Thirdly, whilst many universities have their own internal research ethics 
committees, Lancaster does not (or at least did not at the time) and presumably 
holds research supervisors accountable for the ethical conduct of research 
carried out under the auspices of the university. Upon transfer to the University of 
Salford, all data collection had been completed thus negating a requirement to 
seek ethical approval to complete this study. 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have presented a rationale for the critical management 
epistemological standpoint underpinning this study. Following consideration of 
alternative critical methodologies a rationale was put forward for the selection of 
a case study approach. Two cases have been described and case selection and 
within-case sampling strategies presented. A rationale for augmenting these data 
with an inductive view from the world of policy-making has been offered with a 
justification for the sample selected and the methods used to collect and analyse 
these data. Ethical considerations have been discussed. 
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PART II 
THE POLICY CONTEXT 
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Chapter 3A view from the world of policy 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to explore the policy context in which the cases of innovations examined 
in Part III were developed, I elected to incorporate a view from the world of policy 
into my study design. The methods are detailed in chapter 2. In summary, eleven 
individuals in policy-related roles (referred to from here on as 'respondents') were 
interviewed. The organisations represented, the professional backgrounds, the 
gender and the job titles of respondents are listed in table 2.9. Interviews were 
carried out using a semi-structured interview schedule as a guide (table 2.10). All 
interviews were transcribed and analysed though the application of Ritchie and 
Spencer's (2003) Framework method for analysing qualitative data. 
Following the systematic process of sifting, charting and sorting data according to 
key issues and themes, a thematic framework was created (illustrated in table 
2.14). The synthesis and interpretation of these data through the mapping of the 
linkages between concepts and across the themes is presented in this chapter. 
The chapter is presented in three sections. The first describes the thematic 
framework and how data were synthesised and interpreted. The second section 
examines respondents' understanding of the drivers of innovation within the NHS 
and the policy response to those drivers. Respondents' interpretations of the 
meaning of innovation appeared to be confused and, it is suggested, somewhat 
ubiquitous. Perhaps, as a consequence, there was a range of views of what 
could legitimately be regarded as an innovation. From my analysis of these data, 
I develop and discuss a typology. In the third section of this chapter respondents' 
views of the stakeholders in health service innovation are explored. As well as 
the public, the actual and potential users of health services and those who 
provide the said services, the professionals, other staff, managers, Government 
and politicians and the media were identified as key stakeholders. Respondents' 
views on the relationships between stakeholders and their impact on innovation 
50 
are examined and discussed. Throughout the analysis, issues of power and 
control were constant themes and tensions and paradoxes emerged. These 
concepts are raised and discussed throughout the chapter. 
3.2 Thematic Framework 
I asked respondents "What does innovation in the provision of health services 
mean to you? " (see table 2.10) and whilst they described what innovation meant 
to them, I asked for examples to illustrate the points they were making. From the 
examples offered, I identified four categories of innovations, namely 'role 
development', 'service redesign', 'new technologies' and 'policy-related'. 
Examples of role development innovations included the introduction of nurse 
endoscopists, the development of community nurses as public health nurses and 
the piloting of the World Health Organisation's 'family health nurse' in Scotland 
(WHO 2007). Examples of service redesign offered by respondents ranged from 
primary to secondary care and from planned through to acute care services. 
They included the introduction of nurse-led dermatology outpatient services, the 
redesign of maternity services in response to a falling birth rate and a shortage of 
professionals, empowering optometrists to refer directly to ophthalmologists thus 
bypassing the general practitioner, the traditional gatekeeper of access to 
secondary services and the introduction of triage in Accident and Emergency 
departments. 
Whilst the identification of categories helped to make sense of these data, it is 
important to note that the emergent categories were not mutually exclusive. 
Some of the innovations described did not fit discretely into any one category, but 
mapped across a number of categories. For example, the Centre for Change and 
Innovation in Scotland was charged with reducing waiting times -a policy 
imperative. The Centre for Change and Innovation applied queuing science and 
established a call centre where they created a new role for 'schedulers' or 
booking clerks to manage waiting lists from a patient-centred perspective: 
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"The way people currently get an appointment is you go to your GP, they 
decide that you need an appointment, they send a letter to the hospital, 
the hospital eventually finds your letter at the top of the list, they write and 
tell you when you have to come and that is how it currently works. The net 
effect of that is that one in seven people don't come, a considerable 
number of the people who do come have actually had their problem 
disappear or get worse and be treated in the meantime and the way in 
which people are selected to come to a particular clinic is often done on 
the whim of a consultant. / will see this one, I'Il not see that one, this is 
urgent, this is not urgent. The science shows that if you wanted to, the 
science of queuing shows that if you want to see people and keep queues 
shorter, which should see people in date order of referral, apart from 
absolute emergencies which shouldn't be referred to an outpatient clinic 
anyway, that people should be seen in date order of referral. The other 
thing is that if people are allowed to negotiate the time they are much less 
likely to fail to attend. So you take away from doctors the right to pick and 
choose their holidays at the last minute, you take away from doctors the 
right to select who is coming to the clinic at whatever time. You put all that 
in a telephone centre where schedulers will actually negotiate with patients 
and say you know you can have an appointment in the next month is there 
a time you can and can't do and you then deliver to the patient choice; 
respect - you are not just told when to come, your life is respected; 
comfort - you are actually in the safety of your own home, you can ring 
that clinic and you can say I would rather not come on this particular day 
or if 1 am going to come on that day you are going to have to provide me 
with an ambulance because my son's in America. You are providing some 
of those aspects of a different way of looking after people which you don't 
if you just leave people in silence and ignorance for a long period of time 
and then summon them at a time not of their choosing to a clinic which 
may be cancelled at the last minute because of the whim of the person 
leading the clinic, who decides just not to turn up that week. " (CCI) 
This innovation was, therefore, policy-related because it was developed in 
response to a policy imperative. It involved a redesign of the means of accessing 
secondary healthcare services and it incorporated the development of a new role. 
Table 3.1 illustrates a section of the chart developed for the responses that I 
indexed as 'policy-related innovations'. Where responses were abstracted and I 
recorded these in blue italics. The CMO respondent, for example, offered a 
detailed account of how public expectation has a significant impact on policy- 
related innovations. A 9% incidence of hospital-acquired infections is 
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unacceptable to the general public. Consequently, public expectation drives 
innovations in this area: 
"Around about 9% of all patients coming into contact with NHS leave it as 
a result of that contact with an infection acquired during that contact. That 
is a figure which is actually not dramatically out of line with other 
healthcare systems around the world, but nonetheless it's a figure which 
most people find astonishing. You couldn't run an airline that way. The 
public expect us to take steps to manage that 9 down to as low a figure as 
we can possibly can get it....... " (CMO) 
During the process of refinement, data were either imported from or exported to 
other concepts or themes and cross-linkages were identified. These data I 
highlighted in turquoise and yellow in the charts. For example, the CEO's account 
of how policy was developed with stakeholders was seen to be linked to the 
stakeholder theme and 'public' and 'staff' in particular. I purposely did not cut and 
then paste these issues as the process of highlighting copied and pasted 
sections helped to illustrate linkages across the charts between concepts and 
themes. I used the right hand comments section to record the rationale for 
insights such as linkages with other themes. Red font was used to highlight 
specific points of interest, so, for example, I noted respondent CCI's emphasis on 
the focus of the Centre for Change and Innovation on practice and I linked this to 
her previous comments about the reform agenda as the purpose of the Centre for 
Change and Innovation. 
KEYto table 3.1 
Yellow highlight = where data offered insights such as linkages with other themes 
Red italics = to hi Night specific points 
= where data were either imported from or exported to other themes 
during the process of refinement 
Blue italics = abstraction and synthesis of original data as recommended by Ritchie and 
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A separate chart was prepared for each of the concepts within the thematic 
framework (Chapter 2, table 2.14). The charts provided a means of 
organising the interview data. They facilitated the process of synthesis and 
interpretation and the mapping of the linkages between concepts and across 
the themes. The charts also enabled the retrieval of the raw data within the 
presentation of my analysis. 
3.3 Innovation 
Innovation was predictably a key theme within my thematic framework. 
Synthesis and interpretation of respondents' views on innovation and cross- 
referencing with other concepts and themes in the framework led to the 
development of four key themes in relation to innovation, namely, the 
meaning of innovation, the legitimacy of an innovation, the drivers of 
innovation and the policy response to innovation. These themes are 
illustrated in figure 3.1 and each is discussed in turn. 
Figure 3.1: Respondents' views of innovation 





3.2.1 The meaning of innovation 
When asked what 'innovation' means to them, respondents offered a wide 
range of responses. The concepts of "reform", "modernisation", "change", 
"improvement" and "innovation" appeared to be used interchangeably by 
respondents. This suggested that, in practice, the meaning of innovation is 
confused and highly subjective. It was acknowledged that innovation: 
"is 
.... 
lots of different things (PPI) and "..... can mean lots of 
different things" (CCI). 
Through the interpretation and synthesis, I isolated five categories of 
responses which I have called the five "P's" of innovation in healthcare. 
These are illustrated in figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2: The 5 P's of innovation 
personified process 
progress potential 
Respondents suggested that the meaning of innovation was about human 
capacity, about the potential of people to think together and problem solve, 
to take risks, make mistakes and learn from them, for example: 
"... bringing people together so they can start to problem solve and 
come up with creative solutions across service boundaries" (HDA). 
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product 
It was proposed that innovation creates a culture which breeds further 
innovation, a culture where that potential is realised. The human genome 
project was cited as a potential source of innovation with the potential 
capacity to transform healthcare: 
"It is the science, that all the genome research and all this sort of 
thing is just transforming what potential, what ..... in twenty years' time we may be able to do, we may be able to treat cancer and it will 
no longer be the killer that it currently is, many of these things are 
possible" (QIS). 
As a process, innovation was described as meaning the introduction of 
something new, of trying new things out, reflecting and being more 
imaginative. Process innovations included the reorganisation of services 
which respondents described as "service-redesign", "streamlining" or "re- 
engineering": A 'classic' example of service redesign cited was the fast 
tracking of certain patients in Accident and Emergency departments through 
the application of, for example, "triage" where patients are rapidly assessed 
upon arrival and allocated into one of three groups according to their clinical 
need. Their allocation then impacts on where they are further assessed and 
treated and by whom. Their triage assessment also implies the degree of 
urgency in which they must receive clinical care (Mackway-Jones 2006): 
I think it was the Central Middlesex Hospital, where within their A&E 
department they decided, in advance of the stuff that was coming out 
nationally about changes, whereas as a team within the A&E they 
actually sat down and thought very hard about the ways that patients 
were seen and treated, and as a result of some quite small changes 
they actually made quite a big difference to things like waiting times. 
They were some of the early implementers around things like triage 
and so on" (NHSC). 
Nurse-led clinics were also cited as examples of process innovations. Here, 
nurses were providing assessment and intervention in outpatient clinics, 
such as rheumatology, which had previously been the sole domain of the 
medical profession. Enabling optometrists to refer patients directly to 
hospital-based ophthalmology services was cited as an innovation which 
streamlined healthcare processes: 
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"So previously the optometrist said to you, `I think you have got a 
cataract or said I know you have got a cataract, but you are to go to 
the GP' who says 'oh yes, I think that is probably right I will send to 
you to the consultant' who then confirmed you had a cataract, and 
what needed to be done. So they cut out some of these processes" 
(CNO). 
By missing out the general practitioner, who traditionally acted as the gate- 
keeper to services located in that which is known as 'secondary care', 
patients were offered speedier access to specialist care. Maternity services 
were another area cited where services were 'redesigned'. In this context, 
service-redesign appeared to be a euphemism for the rationalisation of 
maternity services. The rationale offered was a fall in the birth rate and a 
shortage of healthcare professionals trained in obstetrics and midwifery 
care. 
Innovation was seen as a process not just in areas of service provision but 
also within the policy arena itself. In Scotland, the policy development 
process had been redesigned to accommodate a philosophy of 'partnership 
working'. Traditionally, those who developed healthcare policy were 
somewhat removed from those responsible for implementing it. It was 
argued that an innovative approach to policy-making had been adopted in 
Scotland, where those who would ultimately be responsible for implementing 
Government policy were engaged in the process of its development (see 
table 3.1, yellow highlighted section). Such innovations were seen to go 
beyond policy-making in healthcare as the whole of the Civil Service was 
said to be being "modernised". 
Innovation as a product included reference to new technologies that it was 
argued had the capacity to fundamentally change the way healthcare was 
provided. The introduction of a new product, disposable syringes, was 
offered as an example from the past, that transformed healthcare practices 
by negating the hitherto requirement to sterilize all such equipment locally 
prior to its use. An example from medical / pharmaceutical research offered 
was a pharmaceutical discovery that negated a hitherto requirement for 
surgical Intervention. Histamine 2 (or H2) antagonists control the production 
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of stomach acid and prevent acid build up which can lead to the 
development of stomach and duodenal ulcers. Prior to the introduction of H2 
antagonists, patients who developed ulcers required invasive surgical 
intervention. Here, pharmaceutical product innovation transformed 
healthcare practices. 
More recent, new technologies were cited as currently transforming the way 
healthcare is provided, such as telemedicine: 
".... bring in new technology and allowing us to do things very 
differently; supporting rural communities; the concept of not always 
having to have someone with a white coat sitting next to the patient; 
actually getting treatment provided in very different ways... "(CEO). 
In the context of clinical care, the aim of telemedicine is to provide patients 
living in rural areas, and the health professional caring for them, with access 
to specialist practitioners, through the application of information and 
communication technologies, negating the need to travel long distances to 
access expert assessment and care (Wooton 2006). 
Policy-led structural innovations were also cited and categorized as 
products. In Scotland, the Centre for Change and Innovation was a policy- 
led initiative established to drive forward innovation and change. In England 
an organisation set up with a similar remit was the Modernisation Agency. 
Other policy-led structural innovations cited included: call centres for 
managing elective hospital appointment processes; Health Action Zones to 
facilitate community-focused health improvement; Primary Care Trusts to 
enable commissioning of holistic healthcare provision, based on assessment 
of local need, through meaningful engagement with local communities and 
health service providers; the devolution of central power to Foundation 
Hospital Trusts with local management autonomy to manage their resources 
creatively and provide services based on a combination of professional 
expertise and assessment of need and clinical networks to encourage the 
promulgation of "best practice". This 'shopping list' of structural innovations 
cited by respondents serves to highlight the relentless stream of policy 
initiatives that have impacted on the NHS in recent years. Whilst 
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respondents were able to offer them as policy innovations and articulate 
their potential, there was a degree of cynicism as to whether the people 
involved have in the past, and would in the future, be 'allowed' to carry out 
the functions these new structures were set up to do. The interference of 
Government, as a major stakeholder in healthcare, was considered likely 
and problematical in the light of the highly politicised nature of the healthcare 
agenda: 
"... there will be shift over time, in theory at least towards the Primary 
Care Trusts with a more local community focus that they are being 
encouraged to look at much more holistic approaches, the health, 
looking at things like social inclusion and the generation and engaging 
with more creative partnerships and looking at how they deliver things 
differently and so on and becoming much more of a kind of health 
umbrella, a local political sort of organisation than they have been 
traditionally. And that also offers lots of opportunities for local people 
and primary care practitioners to feed through the system, to create 
innovation or to demand innovation from other providers, and again 
that has lots of opportunities. The issue is the extent to which they will 
be allowed to do it, because if people like Rosie Winterton 
[Government Minister], who I see on a semi regular basis, very 
eloquent about these things, and I think probably believes in them, 
but the problem is whether, in the next 18 months, the most important 
thing that is happening about the Health Service is the General 
Election will take place because the consequences are for change are 
that we will, there will be no encouragement for any risk-taking at all 
over the next 18 months that can't be presented as an unremittingly 
positive thing that makes people want to vote for the government. So 
that is always the dilemma between the kind of need to unfetter 
people, let them be creative, let them work at local solutions with local 
people, which there is a lot of good will to do, particularly in primary 
care, and this underlying concern of the government that the Health 
Service is just too important to be left to the people to run it". (PPI) 
The meaning of innovation was personified through the introduction of new 
roles such as "Modern Matrons". Created in England to "improve the patient 
experience", modern matrons were believed to have the power to redesign 
care and services by putting patients at the centre (NHS 2003). In Scotland, 
access to services was seen to be hindered by archaic practices in the 
management of waiting lists for secondary care, which had hitherto been 
controlled by individual clinicians, some of whose practices were regarded 
by one respondent as rather idiosyncratic. As discussed above, a new call 
centre with dedicated booking clerks was established in order to involve 
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patients in the process of arranging hospital appointments. It was argued 
that from the patients' perspective this humanised the process and put them 
in the driving seat, which in turn improved attendance and productivity. 
Whilst there may be merits in making health services more accessible for 
patients, the consequence of increasing productivity and the concomitant 
work intensification may paradoxically reduce the innovative capacity of an 
organisation. Respondents suggested that the ability and the time to think 
differently were requirements for developing innovative capacity. Work 
intensification arguably further eroded individuals' capacity to stand back 
from what they are doing and think differently about it. 
The fifth "P" suggests that innovation is synonymous with progress and that 
progress is both essential and desirable - an economic imperative. The 
assumption that "innovation is (inevitably) a good thing" was, however, 
recognised as problematic by one respondent who argued that any 
innovation should be assessed on its own merits: 
".... People, especially at Government and political level, certainly 
they know that it is a good thing, I mean innovation does carry with it 
the idea that this is a good thing, I think it is patently not....... It is a 
change, it is something new but I would always judge it on its merits 
rat her than just accept because it is new, it has to be good" (QIS2) 
This assertion is itself problematic when another respondent argued that 
what may be perceived as innovative to one may be assessed as quite 
ordinary by another. 
"I suppose if there were ten of us in a room, we would probably all 
think different things were innovative, and we might discount 
something because it seems pretty ordinary to us but actually it was 
pretty innovative" (CNO). 
This conundrum illustrates the connections between an innovation and its 
stakeholders and sets the scene for the following discussion on 
policymakers' perspectives on what constitutes the legitimacy of an 
innovation. 
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3.3.2 Legitimacy of innovation 
The use of the language of 'reform', 'change', 'modernisation', 'improvement' 
and 'innovation' interchangeably by respondents gave the impression that 
innovation was `nowhere, and everywhere'. In practical terms, this meant 
that the legitimacy of any given innovation was not without controversy. The 
value of an innovation appeared to be a subjective assessment and 
innovation a relative concept. For some, the sustainability of an innovation 
was considered particularly important. It was argued that an innovation that 
was small and sustainable was more valuable than one that was high profile 
and yet unsustainable. The size of an innovation did not seem to matter 
because a very tiny change could have a profound impact. 
Through interpretation and synthesis of the opinions expressed by 
respondents, I isolated five categories of perspective from which the 
legitimacy of an innovation may be assessed. These are represented as a 
typology in figure 3.3: 




No one individual offered a unilateral perspective, but each perhaps had one 
or more leaning(s) in a particular direction. For example, I labelled some 
responses from CCI and MA as predominately 'purist' as they drew a clear 
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distinction between what they regarded as 'innovation' and that which they 
considered to be 'traditional improvement', where the latter was deemed to 
be of a lesser order than the former. The promulgation of what was 
considered "good practice", that is practice "already known about" whether 
"based on research and development" or "tried and tested elsewhere" was 
considered to be just' improvement. Innovation was regarded as "brand 
new", as something considerably more radical than traditional improvement: 
" It is a good question for me because 1 run something called the 
Centre for Change and Innovation and I think the title is going to have 
to change because we have innovated nothing. All we have done is 
change and implementation because nothing that we are doing is 
something that people didn't know about or isn't based on research or 
hasn't been tried before ............... "What is innovation? I get asked 
a lot what it is that we are doing that's new and we could provide a list 
of the things that we are doing and everything that we list people say 
"well that's not new, that's not new, we have been doing that in the 
Western Isles for years, been doing that in Glasgow, we have always 
done that before, that's what we used to do". so very little of what we 
say, there is very little that is brand new" (CCI). 
and 
"I think my thinking has changed since I started this work and / know 
more about innovation and the potential of innovation because when I 
first started I thought it would have potential in really moving things 
further perhaps than improvement traditional, what we now call 
traditional improvement had, but the more I understand about it and 
the more I understand about what other people are doing with 
innovation the more I understand what the potential is and the more I 
understand is that actually we have got a lot of people out there in the 
Health Service who with a little bit of help could really think very 
differently so that they come up with more innovative em, not 
solutions but ideas about healthcare provision and I think....., you 
know where in terms of the model we use the first order second order 
change model where we describe the first order changes more or less 
of the same thing really so you might see more patients in an Out 
Patients Department because you have reduced the DNAs' and that 
will bring the waiting time down and that's fantastic and that is really 
really good improvement but second order changes really thinking 
very differently, standing back and re-framing the picture and saying 
well why do we need Out Patients at all and do we need Out 
Patients? All the patients who are currently going there and are there 
other ways that we could communicate with these patients like 
' When a patient does not turn up at the time when they have been offered a scheduled 
hospital appointment, the appointment is recorded in their file and in hospital statistics as a 
'DNA' because they'Did Not Attend'. 
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telephone conferencing and things or email consultations or just give 
patients good information and let them self-manage to a degree. So I 
think the potential is much greater than I originally thought it would be 
and I think it is down to really, it does have the potential to 
fundamentally change the way health services are delivered in 
comparison with the last 50 years really" (MA). 
This 'purist' leaning was apparent in respondents who could be regarded as 
"innovation professionals" and whose primary focus was on innovation within 
the NHS. These respondents held key roles within the NHS and carried a 
responsibility for speeding up the reform process and developing an 
innovative culture. They appeared to be familiar with the literature in the 
field. 
I considered some responses from QIS1 and CMO, for example, to be 
leaning towards a 'scientific' perspective. CMO defined innovation through a 
series of scientific and technological developments including plastic 
syringes, H2 antagonists and laparoscopic surgery: 
Who does vagotomy and pyloroplasty anymore? You know at one 
time in my life I was a part-time anaesthetist at the West Highland 
Hospital up in Oban and there would be a vagotomy and pyloplasty 
on every list. Did we have some sort of policy document about new 
gastroenterology? Of course we didn't, we just, suddenly we had H2 
antagonists and suddenly there wasn't any vagotomy and 
pyloroplasty going on, you know" (CMO), 
Similarly, QIS1 insisted that all innovations should have improved patient 
outcomes as their ultimate objective, His focus was on the core business of 
the organisation he leads which is to move towards a health service based 
on the best available evidence. Achieving a standards-based service was 
recognised as a challenging task: 
I think what we have all learned through bitter experience, although 
staff in the NHS are very committed to their work, they are human 
beings, under very considerable pressure and therefore innovation 
just doesn't happen, and particularly those of us, most of the things 
that my organisation produces are guidelines, reports of various 
kinds, standards and this sort of thing, just the production of um.. a 
set of standards, a document whether it is on paper or whether it is 
electronic doesn't produce the change in behaviour, it doesn't 
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produce the innovation that one is looking for. One has got to think 
about how one follows that up. It can be through education and 
training. It can be through other support mechanisms.... " (QIS1). 
These respondents indicated that it was highly desirable for an innovation to 
be based on sound scientific evidence. However, it was recognised that this 
was not always the case, especially with regard to policy innovations and 
when experimentation, in a relatively controlled environment, was 
considered to be a pre-requisite to the development of this evidence. The 
CMO, a policymaker and a professional lead within the field of medicine 
argued: 
"I think there is a spectrum of, need for, you have to make a choice 
between the balance between waiting for evidence which is so good 
and so overwhelming that it brooks no argument and the time which 
would be required to get that evidence. The simple fact is that the 
world isn't made to wait forever for things and so there is a spectrum 
of innovations which are, as I have said take the innovation around 
out of hours, that is an innovation which is going to be new and 
exciting and different but not evidence-based we just have to 
recognise that. Doesn't meant to say we shouldn't evaluate the 
process, evaluate it post hoc, study its effects, but it will not be an 
evaluation of evidence-based innovation and that's just the way it is" 
(CMO). 
Additionally, QIS1, Director of QIS with a scientific background, advised: 
".. today ... we are announcing ... something called `The Intervention 
of Procedures Programme' which used to be called 'SERVIT' that was 
run by the colleges and is now run by NICE. NICE took it over but it 
has only been in England and Wales but it is now coming to Scotland 
and this is recognising that in-mainly in surgery, but surgeons will be 
introducing new and relatively untested procedures. This is all about 
advancement of science, you can't wait until you have got all the 
evidence, you do need to experiment, but there needs to be 
safeguards in terms of .. to make sure that the person who is introducing the new technique has had appropriate training in it and 
he or she is not just doing it at their own will but they have got 
clearance from, in this case, their clinical governance committee 
which is what we are proposing and they are telling patients what they 
are doing in the same, the same as clinical trials generally. But one 
has to accept first of all there are risks in all healthcare procedures 
and if we are going to push forward the frontiers then we have got to 
have trials and that means that one is doing things and involving 
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patients in treatments when we don't know what the outcome is going 
to be" (QISI ). 
Those with a leaning towards a scientific perspective of innovation, where 
innovation is at best based on scientific evidence, would appear to hold a 
view in opposition to those who argued that 'true' innovation involved trying 
out brand new and radical ways of doing things. 
Within this typology, a 'professional' perspective of what constituted a 
legitimate innovation suggested that the pursuit of innovation can be for 
professional (and personal) ends, such as recognition and career 
progression. One respondent suggested that engaging in innovation 
provided a discipline the opportunity to professionalize their field: 
if we want to convince Chief Execs. etc. that these are effective, 
efficient, cost effective ways to be deploying their staff in the culture 
we have today you need to have the evidence that they work, so you 
have the hard evidence that they work. So ......., it's professionalising the field, you know, its just not anybody out there you know doing 
whatever they think is appropriate, and so it is about being able to tell 
quite clearly that we do know that these things work because we have 
got a research base for it, but also we know how to put them into 
practice and we know how to help your staff locally make those 
changes happen and we know how to help you make your 
organisation perform better" (HDA). 
Another respondent suggested that a professional perspective could be 
construed as self-serving, if it was not clear how it contributed to health 
service policy priorities and patient benefit. In this case it was argued an 
innovation would be self-indulgent and, therefore, not a legitimate pursuit: 
"Right, well innovation for its own sake em is is welcome because we 
want people to try things out, but I think what you need to have is not 
innovation for its own sake solely you want some purposes to how it 
can be measured against what you want the health service to do in 
improvement. So a lot of people do all sorts of fancy things, brought in 
by clinical research and any models of working, but they are not 
always very cost effective or necessarily make that much difference to 
the betterment of our patients. So / think the first task is you have to 
have some template what ever you call it, against which you want to 
measure yourself, and I think the one thing the health service has 
been keen to push in the last few years is how does this make a 
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difference to patients, and we have measurements like access 
because patients rate that highly......... So, if you're looking at where 
innovation should be going it should be measured against how does 
this measure against what patients want from the service and value 
from the service, and / think otherwise it's a little bit self indulgent" 
(DPC). 
Those with a 'professional' perspective may, in the eyes of those with a 
'scientific' perspective, put patients at risk if they were pursuing an 
innovation that was not underpinned by a strong, scientific evidence base. 
One respondent argued that patients could also be put at risk if an 
innovation was promulgated through professional networks without due 
regard to the requisite education and training. Laparoscopic surgery was 
offered as an example. Also known as 'key-hole' or minimally invasive 
surgery the application of this technology effectively required surgeons to be 
retrained in novel surgical techniques. However, the application of this 
innovation spread in advance of the necessary training which led to 
unforeseen, detrimental effects on patients: 
"Great idea, but something which had a rocky start because individual 
surgeons, and in fact, people who weren't surgeons sometimes, 
quickly, almost too quickly, grasped the idea that this was the shape 
of the future and they could do this just like any other single operator 
innovation that they have previously done. Get one, or watch one, or 
see one do one, teach one, that is what we used to say, that is the 
way innovations were brought in, see one, do one, teach one and ! 
think not unnaturally thought oh we will just do it like this with 
laparoscopy and of course it turned out to be a bit difficult because 
laparoscopy as a technique is something which requires actually 
much more careful training, much more careful preparation, a 
different set of skills from those required for open surgery, and there 
have been some worries about laparoscopic surgery, its speed of 
spread, its safety, its efficacy and so on, and there have been, you 
know we have had to sort of go back to the start in some respects 
and now codify entry to laparoscopic surgery in a way that we didn't in 
the past" (CMO). 
This example highlights a potential dichotomy between the desires to speed 
up the diffusion of innovations and, at the same time, control the process. 
Those with a 'corporate' perspective appeared to be the biggest critics of 
those perceived to be pursuing a professional / personal agenda. From a 
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'corporate' perspective, an innovation had to clearly "be measured against 
what you want the health service to do in improvement" (DPC) which I 
interpret to mean, to "deliver" on Government policy, as articulated by this 
respondent: 
"The purpose of the Centre for Change and Innovation is to drive 
change in key areas within the NHS in Scotland. Those key areas 
are to arise from government policy, and those key areas within the 
wide spectrum of government policy to be selected because they are 
particularly problematic" (CC I). 
In addition, from a corporate perspective there would be an expectation that 
an innovation would be proven to be cost effective and improve patient care 
before it could be considered legitimate. 
The legitimacy of an innovation might also be contested on ethical grounds. 
For example, ethical concerns were raised when an innovation was seen to 
reduce mortality, but in turn, have a detrimental effect on morbidity. Here, 
the provision of neonatal care for younger and younger babies was cited as 
an example of innovation raising an ethical dilemma: 
"... let me give you one example that immediately pops into my mind 
there and that is the benefit and dis-benefit associated with the 
innovations which have let us deal effectively with smaller and smaller 
babies to the extent that we are now dealing successfully with babies 
which are very tiny indeed below 1 kg. 1 am not an expert on this 1 
wouldn't be surprised if it was significantly lower that 1 kg., but the 
point is that although you can achieve success at that end at that 
small baby end, the risk of less than 100% success goes up, so yes 
you do achieve some benefit and you do manage to get some 
children who are extremely small at birth who make it through to a 
normal happy chance of a fulfilling life, but you have a higher 
proportion at that innovative end of practice of babies who do not..... / 
think ....... the question is, the issue that there is a relative definition 
of success. If success is a live baby as opposed to a dead baby then 
yes it is success, but success is defined as an entire whole and fully 
functioning human being then it's not success because we have 
created more live babies but we have more children who have more 
disabilities because these very very tiny babies sadly with the state of 
technology, innovative though it is, there is a price to be paid in that 
we know that although they are alive more of them will have 
disabilities and will require more support, that price is accepted by 
society as a reasonable cost in fact, in the face of the fact that you 
68 
don't know until you try which one is going to make it through. And I 
guess, we are all aware of the very difficult ethical choices that have 
to be made here and the way that we have increasingly had to 
regulate practice in this respect" (CMO). 
The dilemma here appears to arise when innovations are applied uncritically, 
or the context in which they are applied may not be reviewed on a case- by- 
case basis, or periodically on a societal basis. 
These different and sometimes competing perspectives of what might be 
regarded as a legitimate innovation clearly have the capacity to create 
considerable tension within the system. New Labour's policies became 
known as "The Third Way" (Finlayson 1999). Grounded in pragmatism, the 
slogan of "The Third Way" politics soon became "What counts is what 
works". The ethical dilemma cited above serves to illustrate the glibness of 
this sound bite and the reality of the complexity of assessing 'what works' in 
a clinical context. The political ideology of old Labour was replaced by the 
ideology of managerialism, based on the premise that the ends justify the 
means (Klein & Rafferty 1999). This, perhaps, offers an explanation as to 
why the Government appears to have invested considerably in what are 
potentially competing agendas. For example, substantial resources were 
invested in the Modernisation Agency (£230 million was cited by 
policymakers) where, in part, a 'purist' innovation agenda was being 
developed. Equally, considerable sums were, and continue to be, invested in 
the generation of national standards and guidelines - the 'corporate' agenda 
based on the type of evidence valued from a scientific perspective, that is: 
"clinically relevant research, often from the basic sciences of 
medicine, but especially from patient centred clinical research into the 
accuracy and precision of diagnostic tests (including the clinical 
examination), the power of prognostic markers, and the efficacy of the 
safety of therapeutic, rehabilitative, and preventative regimes... (it) 
both invalidates previously accepted diagnostic tests and treatments 
and replaces them with new ones that are more powerful, more 
accurate, more efficacious, and safer" (Sackett et at. 1996). 
Evidence which may, paradoxically, have been initially generated, not as a 
consequence of a rationale scientific endeavour as R&D is constructed in 
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NHS R&D policy, but through the creative instinct of a serendipitous 
professional (Le Fanu 1999). 
Some respondents offered contributions embracing multiple perspectives. 
The elements of my typology (figure 3.3) are, therefore, not mutually 
exclusive. It simply serves as a heuristic device to interpret the complexity of 
the context in which healthcare innovations are driven and developed. 
3.3.3 Drivers of innovation 
Through analysis of interview data, I identified four key drivers of innovation. 
One respondent cited Government policy and expressed the view that 
innovation was a political imperative. Other drivers cited by respondents 
included the ever increasing demand for health services, external factors 
which impact on the supply of health services and the slow uptake of 
innovations which have proven health and / or fiscal benefits. The latter, 
which may at first appear somewhat paradoxical, was recognised as a driver 
of process innovations, so that the gains of the innovations with proven 
health and / or fiscal benefits could be realised. Each of these is now 
examined in turn. 
3.3.3.1 Innovation as a political Imperative 
The UK Governments were cited as major drivers of health service 
innovations. One respondent, personally responsible for innovation and 
improvement within the NHS in Scotland, cited the: 
"...... things that are keeping the minister awake at night" (CCI) 
as a driver of innovation. According to another respondent, with similar 
responsibilities in England, a central driver for innovation within Government 
appears to rest within the Cabinet Office and the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI): 
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N...... there has been a quite interesting Cabinet Office report into 
innovation in the public sector which came out in the summer as a 
discussion document really, and you know, and also there has been a 
report from Department of Trade & Industry that came out just before 
Christmas. ..... what they are saying in there is actually there 
is a lot 
of innovation going in the public sector, it's mainly, particularly Health 
Service, but it is mainly around devices like widgets on scalpels or 
pharmaceuticals or areas like that and increasingly it is about 
technology. Where all the reports, when they talking about health, 
but also some of the public sector industries, where they say we have 
a lack of creativity and innovation is in processes ........ " (MA). 
Innovation would therefore appear to be driven from within the heart of 
Government and regarded as an economic imperative. Guinet and Pilat 
(1999) have described innovation as the heartbeat of global market 
economies. They describe innovation as imperative for the development of 
new products, services and processes, which in turn are essential to 
increase market share, reduce costs and increase profits. They dramatically 
argue that if the pulse of innovation is missing within a company, it will die. 
'Innovate or die' is the mantra within capitalist market economies such as the 
UK. The DTI describes innovation as: 
"the motor of the modern economy turning ideas and knowledge into 
products and services" (DTI 2000 p 3). 
Innovation is seen as a means of increasing productivity in order to realize 
the Government's central economic objective, which is to achieve high and 
sustainable levels of growth and employment through 
0 the exploitation of new science and technology (or research 
and development) 
0 changes in skills or business processes 
0 the exploitation of new markets (DTI 2002). 
Respondent MA cited the appointment of a Minister for Innovation as a 
measure of the level of importance the Government places on innovation: 
"There is a lot of interest in innovation at the moment, and it is sort of 
climbing up the ladder of importance and you know we even have 
lord Warnock who is the Minister, we have a Minister for innovation, 
that means it must be important" (MA). 
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The UK Governments have publicly committed themselves to reform of the 
public services (discussed in chapter 4). As they see it, they too must 
'innovate or die'. 
3.3.3.2 Innovation as a consequence of Increasing demand for 
healthcare 
Demand for healthcare provision 'free at the point of delivery' has continued 
to outstrip the resources available since the inception of the NHS in 1946. 
Financed through a compulsory national insurance scheme, the aim of the 
NHS was to provide a comprehensive range of health services to all in need. 
One of the assumptions underpinning the establishment of the NHS was that 
supply would quickly outstrip demand as the health of the nation dramatically 
improved. This soon proved erroneous. The fact that a health service was 
available and 'free at the point of delivery' actually increased demand, as 
those who had hitherto been unable to afford healthcare made good use of 
the service (Klein 2001). 
Respondents suggested that current demand pressures are a result of 
previous underinvestment in the NHS which is further exacerbated by four 
key drivers, namely demographic changes, scientific developments, 
globalisation and public expectations. A Chief Executive view was that: 
"The status quo isn't an option. We have an ageing population, we 
have the ability to treat more and more new conditions; we are driving 
standards up through Quality Improvement Scotland, all of that puts 
extra demand on the Service so what we need to do is to provide the 
Service differently... " (CEO). 
Demographic changes, and the ageing population, in particular, were seen 
to place increasing demands on the UK's health services. Scientific 
developments, with the potential to treat more and more conditions, also 
increase demand. A Director, with a science training stated: 
"lt is the science, that all the genome research and all this sort of 
thing is just transforming what potential, what thinking what again in 
twenty years' time we may be able to do, we may be able to treat 
cancer and it will no longer be the killer that it currently is, many of 
these things are possible" (QIS). 
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One respondent argued that scientific developments which appeared 'left 
field' were potentially problematic as they made it difficult for policy makers 
to plan for their consequences. A policymaker from the medical profession 
offered a hypothetical scenario: 
"Think of the possibility, for example, of treating osteoarthritis which is 
really a disease of cartilage. How do we treat this disease of cartilage 
weight bearing circumstances largely? What we do is we whack out 
the entire load bearing circus on both sides of the joint and we 
replace them with some kind of steel prosthesis. Think of the 
possibility of doing it a different way. It is the cartilage which is 
diseased and degenerating, why don't they just replace the cartilage? 
So instead we inject into the joint some kind of genetically engineered 
new cartilage solution containing new bright viable cartilage cells 
which latch onto the damaged surface and recoat it. Now are we 
planning for large scale redundancies in theatre staff? No of course 
we are not because that kind of technology is there to do I 
think........... Yes, sometimes, there is technology which comes from 
left field. " (CMO). 
Within a global market economy, such scientific innovation is seen as an 
economic imperative. However, it also increases demand for health services 
that in turn acts as a driver for service innovation. There is a potential for an 
innovation to be seen here as part of the solution from a scientific 
perspective, and at the same time, potentially part of the problem, from a 
corporate, fiscal, perspective if a new technology does not 'fit in' with current 
Government policy priorities. This tension links to the discussion above as to 
whether an innovation is considered legitimate or not, and by whom. 
The globalisation of healthcare knowledge and information through the 
media, and the internet in particular, has enabled some sections of the 
public to benchmark health service provision internationally. This in turn has 
increased demand for health services: 
"... patient expectation is a big driver as well. It Is not unusual for 
people wandering into GP surgeries now with the Internet diagnosis, 
so people have a big expectation of what the service can do quite 
quickly. " (CEO). 
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Benchmarking is a tool used to drive up standards within the NHS. For 
example, the Department of Health Essence of Care initiative: 
".. helps practitioners to take a structured approach to sharing and 
comparing practice, enabling them to identify the best and to develop 
action plans to remedy poor practice. " (Department of Health 2007c) 
External benchmarking by members of the public, who can access the global 
market through the internet, arguably has the capacity to place the publicly- 
funded NHS at the mercy of the healthcare market. Respondents argued 
that access to the internet and higher levels of general education have led to 
a much more discerning public, who no longer look up to highly educated 
health professionals whom they consider best placed to make autonomous 
decisions about their healthcare requirements. An expert in public and 
patient involvement argued: 
"Unquestionably there are also lots of people now who see the doctor 
much more as an equal, much more inclined to ask questions and 
their expectations of how they will respond to them.... " (PPI). 
Increasingly "lots of people" regard health professionals as their equals and 
partners in their healthcare. Arguably these are, in the main, knowledgeable, 
articulate, users of health services. They are likely to be people who vote 
and people the Governments have to listen to and respond to if they want to 
remain in office. 
Respondents argued that, as a result of the Government's public 
commitment to reform of the health services, 'public' concerns regarding 
their health services rapidly become political concerns. For example: 
"My observation is that ministers are most driven to introduce, 
admittedly arbitrary targets, in situations where there isn't any 
evidence, where all they have got is a weight of public opinion, where 
the only evidence is the evidence shows that the public wants it this 
way... " (CMO). 
and political concerns, in turn, rapidly become managerial imperatives: 
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"Tony Blair is not going to win the next election is he if he doesn't 
reach the targets so there is a lot of political pressure and the 
Government has invested a lot of money. They really have more than 
any other Government that / know since I have been in nursing which 
is since 1977. And so the Government have stuck their neck out and 
Tony Blair says if the NHS doesn't improve by the time of the election 
7 will stand down. So obviously he is putting, you know there is 
pressure coming down the line on that" (MA) 
and 
"That culture is now there in the Health Service isn't it so sometimes 
what happens is that Chief Execs and Boards focus on the things that 
have to be changed because they have got a target that they have to 
make and some other things that perhaps would be as well to be 
changed they don't quite get round to those because they are not the 
imperatives, they are not the "'must do's" the things that they 
absolutely have to do" (NHSC). 
These quotes suggest that the legitimacy of politically-driven 'innovations' 
are contested. Thus, from the perspectives of the respondents in this study, 
demographic changes, scientific developments, globalisation and public 
expectations, all have the potential to become political priorities, and have 
the capacity to increase demand for healthcare, which in turn has the 
capacity to drive forward innovation. 
3.3.3.3 Innovation as a result of factors which impact on the 
supply of health services 
Respondents cited European Union (EU) legislation as an external driver for 
innovation. The 1993 EU Working Time Directive (Department of Health 
2007a) which limits the number of hours any individual can legitimately be 
expected to work in a given week to a maximum of 48, was cited as a major 
force for innovation and change in the health service. For example: 
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At the Royal College of Nursing I campaigned for ages to have 
nurse-led things. My reason quite often was both the interests of 
patients and also the social and economic well-being of nurses, more 
jobs, better jobs for nurses, and I beat at the doors of the 
dermatologists and they all said 'no no no no, if your girls wanted to 
be doctors they should have gone to university for 7 years. In reality 
now they are queuing at my door saying can we have a nurse working 
in our clinic, can we have a nurse-led clinic, and the reason why they 
want to do that is much more to do with the European working time 
directive and the fact that those consultants can't get a junior. It's to 
do with the consultant contract and the fact that they can't do all their 
work now without a junior in ten sessions a week and they are not 
going to get paid for more than ten sessions a week, and so now they 
are looking round at other possibilities and they are seeing that you 
might get a nurse to be able to do it" (CCI). 
Introduced for health and safety reasons, the legislation, somewhat 
ironically, originally exempted doctors in training. However, they, and other 
exempted workers, were brought into line in 2000. EU member states were 
required to ensure that no doctor in training worked more than 48 hours a 
week from 1st August 2004. Hitherto, doctors in training were known to work 
80 hours or more per week as a result of the on-call cover they were 
required to provide. Patients who are ill in hospital have no regard for the 
time of day and being on-call often meant actively working for most of the 
night and throughout the following day. Training in this way arguably 
exposed junior doctors to a wide range of clinical conditions and symptoms 
and this rationale for long working hours was strongly embedded within the 
tradition of medical training. The capacity of junior doctors to function 
effectively in such conditions was not challenged from within the medical 
establishment but imposed by EU legislation. Respondents cited the EU 
directive as a driver for innovation, particularly with respect to new nursing 
roles, which often provided services in areas which hitherto had been the 
protected domain of medicine. Nurse-led clinics and new roles for nurses 
such as nurse endoscopists were offered as examples. 
Professional evidence was also cited as a factor with the capacity to impact 
on the supply side of health services and serve as a driver for innovation. A 
number of respondents cited the redesign of maternity services as an 
example: 
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"......... all of the evidence, all of the professional evidence suggests 
that we need to change dramatically how maternity services are 
delivered; falling birth rate, shortage of professional staff. So we need 
to do it differently; need to get value for money.... " (CEO). 
However, professional evidence, as evidenced in this example, can sit in 
opposition to public opinion. This is discussed further in section 3.4.1. 
3.3.3.4 The slow uptake of Innovations as a driver of Innovation 
As discussed above, this category appears to be self-contradictory. 
However, respondents cited the slow uptake of innovations as a driver of 
innovation when these innovations were known to have proven health and / 
or fiscal benefits. Indeed, the rationale for establishing the Centre for 
Change and Innovation in Scotland and the Modernisation Agency in 
England, which themselves were arguably policy innovations, were to speed 
up the reform processes and the uptake of innovations and improvements 
across the NHS. 
There appeared to be a general recognition by respondents that systematic 
approaches to the promulgation of innovations were lacking. For example: 
"when you think about putting money in place around an innovation 
strand you need to think very hard about how you will then ensure 
that learning is taken up more systematically and I think that is one of 
the weaknesses of the way we fund innovation or seek to stimulate 
innovation more formally in the NHS" (PPI). 
The spread of innovations was considered to be too slow and as a result 
resources were potentially wasted and patient care potentially compromised. 
This situation was regarded as a threat to the efficiency and / or 
effectiveness of the health service and hence a driver for process 
innovations. 
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3.3.4 The policy response 
Healthcare policy in both England and Scotland stresses the importance of 
innovation (discussed in Chapter 4). Government Adviser, former NatWest 
Group chief executive and current non-Executive Director of the Northern 
Rock Bank, Sir Derek Wanless was cited by respondents as a man who had 
had a significant impact on the direction of travel within the NHS. For 
example, in terms of investment in information management and technology: 
"Derek Wanless, when he reviewed the UK health services, estimated 
that we under-invest by a factor of 10 in IM&T based on his 
experience in the finance sector, so we have a big agenda to catch up 
and take hold" (CEO) 
and in terms of pubic health: 
"Obviously clear government drive on getting the problems in the 
Health Service sorted out. Public Health an add-on, add-on to the 
NHS Plan ...... then a bit in Shifting the Balance of Power it became 
more central to that policy. But in the process of the funding going into 
the modernising the NHS, the structure of DH continued to parallel, 
you know, public health group and the rest sort of thing, that's sort of 
how it feels anyway, and the lack of integration across, Now what we 
are seeing, now is the rest, if you like, of the NHS, waking up through 
the Wanless reports, to the need to actually address prevention 
across the whole, not as an add-on or just a.... yeh... " (H DA). 
It would appear that the impact of Wanless was not to be underestimated. 
Within this wider policy context, three specific areas were identified as a 
policy response to the reform agenda. These included pay modernisation, 
structural developments and the setting and monitoring of national targets 
and standards. 
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3.3.4.1 Pay modernisation 
Pay Modernisation was cited by respondents as a policy development which 
created a vehicle for increasing flexibility within the workforce (containing 
cost) and driving forward innovation and improvement. 
According to the Department of Health, the Agenda for Change policy has 
led to the biggest overhaul of NHS-wide pay, terms and conditions in over 50 
years (Department of Health 2004a). It has involved all NHS staff, with the 
exception of medical staff, who negotiated separate, and, arguably, much 
better pay, terms and conditions packages for consultants, junior doctors 
and GP's. Agenda for Change was implemented in the NHS, across the UK, 
on 1 December 2004. It involves a complex process of job evaluation carried 
out in partnerships between NHS Managers and Trade Union 
representatives. Job evaluation is coupled with a compulsory annual 
appraisal system where 'performance' is linked to annual increments in pay 
(Department of Health 2004b). The stated purpose is to ensure that the NHS 
workforce has the knowledge and skill to achieve the aims of the NHS. 
Consultant contracts aim to increase hospital consultants' commitment to the 
NHS through locally negotiated annual job plans developed within the 
context of nationally agreed criteria. New contracts for junior doctors 
embraced the European Union legislation (discussed above) and reduced 
the number of hours worked by hospital doctors, thus creating the 
opportunity for role substitution. The new General Medical Services (GMS) 
Contract has not only provided general practitioners with the option of opting 
out of on-call work, it has also linked their income to the achievement of 
performance targets aimed at improving productivity and the quality of 
services provided. 
With reference to the GMS contract, respondents argued: 
"We are about to introduce a new General Medical Services Contract. 
It is going to fundamentally change access to care by GP's out of 
hours. It will be extremely innovative and some very innovative 
thinking is going into how you maintain a primary care service 24 
hours a day" (CMO) 
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".... the new GMS contract is the largest quality based contract 
attempted with professionals anywhere in the world, because a third 
of the money of GP practices will come from achieving quality targets, 
and the quality targets were developed by professionals mainly 
doctors because it was a GP contract initially... " (DPC). 
3.3.4.2 Structural developments 
NHS policy in both Scotland and England announced innovative structural 
developments to speed up the processes of reform, innovation and 
improvement. Respondents cited the Modernisation Agency (MA) in 
England: 
"But also energetic change agents of that nature, the innovators, 
aren't naturally good teachers and spreaders, it's often a different 
skill. And the MA recognize that and say 'we will pick up the good 
ideas and we'll help spread it. Now I've no idea whether it's going to 
be that successful, but since it's our best shot that we have ever tried 
because no one has ever tried that developmental approach 
systematically in the past in the health service. " (DPC). 
"... I have been very interested to see the sorts of techniques and 
ways in which the Modernisation Agency has been attempting to 
harness innovation but often in very clear ways. You know we would 
have a very clear goal to reduce waiting times or you know increase 
access, whatever the particular targets are, how innovatively can we 
approach that? And they have used all sorts of really interesting 
techniques. I mean I think that you know a legacy, whatever happens 
to the Modernisation Agency, a legacy would be probably be the 
skilled people they have got round the country now who are much 
more familiar with improvement techniques and how you can innovate 
in a systematic and controlled sort of way which again is almost like a 
paradox" (HDA). 
The Centre for Change and Innovation in Scotland (CCI) was also cited by 
respondents: 
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"I guess the other thing, talking of innovation, we have created The 
Centre for Change and Innovation' as the central resource that the 
Service can use to help that, to help the change happen. " (CEO) 
"There are masses of guidelines there are masses of good practice 
there is masses of people inventing stuff but the real thing that never 
happens is it never gets put into practice, so we (CCI) are utterly 
focused on putting things into practice, and if that in itself is innovative 
to have a practice focused organisation then that's the innovation part 
of it" (CCI). 
As indicated in these responses, the Modernisation Agency and the Centre 
for Change and Innovation were policy responses to a political imperative. 
Subsequently, the Modernisation Agency has itself been 'modernised' 
suggesting that it did not prove to be as (cost) effective as originally 
anticipated. It has been considerably downsized and the NHS Institute for 
Innovation and Improvement is now located within the University of Warwick. 
The challenges of evaluating the impact of such a structural developments 
did not go unnoticed: 
"One of the questions I was frequently asked is how I would evaluate 
the effectiveness of the Centre for Change and Innovation and that's 
an embarrassing question for me because I think it is very very 
difficult to evaluate it and I think the problem is complexity because 
the situation we are working in is so complex when you are deciding 
how to evaluate it what you are actually doing is simplifying, you are 
simplifying, you are saying of the possible reasons why this change 
might have taken place we are going to focus on one or two of the 
ones that actually relate to our interaction in this incredibly complex 
system. So what you do is you make a simplistic analysis of what it 
was that happened, you try and attribute some of the change to the 
intervention that you are particularly interested in you add a dose of 
20/20 hindsight and see that this was or was not a successful change. 
In fact the success or the lack of success of any of the changes that 
we try to implement are quite often dependent on things that are 
completely outside of our control because you can't control a system" 
(CCI). 
These developments highlight a dissonance between the rhetoric of 
Government policy and the reality of Government policy-making, It is clearly 
considered legitimate for the Government to invest considerable sums of tax 
payers' monies into structural developments like the Modernisation Agency 
and the Centre for Change and Innovation. However, this is done In the 
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absence of either an evidence base to justify the investment or an evaluation 
strategy to demonstrate accountability for a return on that investment, 
irrespective of how difficult this might prove to be in practice. It would be 
difficult to imagine anyone receiving Government monies to invest in 
innovating and improving patient care under these terms. 
Other structural developments cited by policymakers included the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in England:. 
"Well I always, because I am boring, I always like when I give 
presentations to flag up the Prime Minister's four principles about 
public service reform. And what he has enunciated, and ! think it is a 
good framework, is 1) that in any national organisation we need to 
have national standards, that's how we got national service 
framework that's how we got NICE....... " (DPC) 
and Quality Improvement Scotland (QIS): 
"........ we are driving standards up through Quality Improvement 
Scotland" (CEO). 
In England and Wales, the Government established the Healthcare 
Commission (HC) (Healthcare Commission 2005) to assesses local 
compliance with national guidance. In Scotland, the two functions of 
producing national guidance and monitoring compliance are incorporated 
into one national organisation - Quality Improvement Scotland (QIS). 
3.3.4.3 National targets and standards 
With NICE and QIS established to develop national clinical standards and 
guidance, and QIS and the HC monitoring compliance, other developments 
were cited by respondents as additional policy initiated innovations to drive 
forward innovation in service provision. These included the setting of 
national targets and the development of National Service Frameworks 
(NSFs). 
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Respondents acknowledged the legitimacy and the significant contribution of 
national standards: 
"evidence about evidence should come centre, I don't think people 
should have to go about rooting that out on their own and that can be 
the lever for change that is exerted from the top" (QIS2) 
"... I think that in many ways a lot of the changes in the Health 
Service would not have happened without there being the national 
standard that then people were required to implement" (NHSC) 
and the inherent challenges were acknowledged: 
"We are able to populate frameworks and targets with evidence- 
based targets and part of the move over the last five years to a 
standards driven health service is a very bold one, and it is a very 
testing one, not least because actually the evidence is a bit thin in 
places" (CMO). 
However, the centralisation of standard setting and the subsequent 
monitoring of these standards through national 'performance management' 
systems were regarded as problematic, when the methods were too 
prescriptive and did not allow for local freedom to address local priorities or 
determine the means of implementation: 
"I think what the target culture does is set, it sets an atmosphere in an 
environment that perhaps says that one bit of innovation is more 
important than another from a Government perspective or a national 
perspective but that might not actually be the local perspective, so it 
distorts what is seen as local priorities and perhaps local innovations 
that could happen because you have got to do a certain thing 
because there is a national target for it ............. you might get a bit of policy that is perceived to be the thing to implement on a national 
basis and it doesn't fit the local circumstances and that therefore 
stops what might be a jolly good way that people were actually 
developing something or doing something different because they are 
told they can't do that because they have got to do it a certain way. 
Now I think a really good example of that is the mental health NSF. 
Whereas some of the things in that were quite appropriate for some 
areas but they didn't quite fit others, yet everybody had to have a 
crisis resolution team, they had to have an assertive outreach team 
because that is what the NSF said and that's the policy that was 
going to be implemented on a national basis. Whereas what they 
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were doing locally was perfectly appropriate and was meeting the 
need and was dealing with the thing that the piece of policy wanted 
to, was set in place to deal with. Yet they had to change it all 
because the policy said no you have got to do it this way. So I think 
that's sort of balance between policy being developed in a way that 
reflects innovation but doesn't then impose, it's back to the targets 
thing, it doesn't say that everybody has got to do it exactly the same 
way.. ." (N HSC). 
There was a sense that 'one solution does not fit all' and that, whilst there 
was recognition of the value of setting standards nationally, there was a view 
that the means of implementation should be determined locally. As one 
respondent put it: 
"The assumption inherent within the evidence-based standards 
agenda is that healthcare is controlled and predictable - it is in 
practice much more chaotic" (H DA). 
However, the setting and monitoring of standards nationally creates a 
paradox within an NHS that is required to be innovative, if it is to survive. 
The monitoring of national standards appears to require centralised 
'command and control' methods of performance management. These were 
the very managerial methods that New Labour berated the previous 
Conservative Government for adopting and stifling innovation as a 
consequence (see chapter 4). On the one hand, the Government were 
calling for innovation within the health service and on the other they were 
commanding and controlling a standardised service from the centre with the 
latter, respondents argued, having the capacity to stifle innovation. 
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3.4 Stakeholders 
Analysis of interviews suggests that there is a wide range of people who 
may be considered stakeholders in innovation within the NHS. Synthesis of 
these data led me to cluster those who were reported to have a stake in 
NHS innovations into five overarching groups of stakeholders. These are 
illustrated in figure 3.4 and are each discussed in the following sections. 
Figure 3.4: Groups of stakeholders in innovation 





3.4.1 The public as stakeholders 
Respondents argued that society as a whole was more litigious and this was 
a factor of the development of a widespread questioning culture. Within this 
context, (sections of) the public were far more informed about health matters 
than they had been in the past and, as Wanless (2000) had urged, sections 
of the public were considered to be "fully engaged" in their personal health 
agenda. The increasingly articulate public were more vocal about the 
direction of their health services. It was stated that public opinion influenced 
political targets. For example, as a result of analysis of complaints about the 
health service, it was argued that access to healthcare (or waiting times) 
was the key concern raised by the public. There did not appear to be any 
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deeper analysis as to whether 'complainers' were representative of the 
population, but they were clearly vocal, and in this instance demonstrating a 
greater capacity to influence political agendas than their silent neighbours, 
whether they be content, inarticulate or disaffected or any combination of 
these possibilities. 
In this instance, the public are seen by respondents as enablers of change 
and innovation. The establishment of call centres in Scotland to manage 
waiting lists and reduce waiting times, was arguably a direct response to 
public opinion. It was suggested that public opinion was a driver for 
healthcare reform and the setting of standards. For instance, the public were 
described as increasingly risk averse and were seen to have low levels of 
tolerance when it came to patient safety issues such as hospital acquired 
infection. As a consequence, management of risk was considered a priority: 
"Openness, accountability, transparency, reveals to the public that 
there is a level of dis-benefit or harm associated with a certain 
procedure, up with which they will no longer put. There is an 
expectation that steps will be taken to minimise the risk of harm and 
maximise the possibility of benefit, so you have to put in place 
procedures to make sure that that happens" (WO). 
In addition, the public were seen to have the capacity to influence the 
establishment of new services such as the provision of complementary 
therapies by the NHS (QIS). 
The public were also seen as resistors to change and innovation. The public 
voice arguing to 'save our local hospital' was cited as a resistance to 
change, even in the face of 'evidence' of 'better patient outcomes' if services 
were centralised: 
"People love the institutions they are used to around the NHS, a much 
loved hospital.. even though it maybe out of date, not fit for purpose 
any more, but try closing one! " (CEO) 
and 
"So quite often and in ways that we don't predict the public are 
resistant to change and obviously particularly when that change 
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involves removal of services from localities, like through investment 
we are able to provide what is a clinically more effective service from 
a smaller number of locations. This is something that, as you will 
know in Glasgow at the moment these issues are very controversial 
indeed" (QIS). 
The dichotomy of patients calling for national standards based on scientific 
evidence, to end the so called postcode lottery, on the one hand, and then 
arguing against the recommendations of NICE on the other hand, was cited 
as a barrier to innovation and improvement and as an example of the impact 
of public opinion. Patients expecting to see a doctor, and not a nurse, was 
also cited as a resistor to role substitution: 
"... there are many cases where the public can actually be an 
inhibiting factor in this....... and / think there is evidence both ways, 
but the public expect to see a doctor rather than a nurse, and if they 
don't see a doctor, some people feel they have been short changed" 
(QIS). 
and patients' resistance to the use of information technology (IT) during 
healthcare consultations because IT was seen to dehumanise healthcare: 
17 was reading something relatively recently in a different context 
about all sorts of electronic prompts that are now available to GPs, 
but I gather this has a mixed reaction from members of the public, 
partly because people feel that for the doctor to have his attention 
divided between them and the computer screen is not good; but also 
they felt well the doctor ought to know all these things, he shouldn't 
need to have the assistance of the computer to enable him to do it" 
(QIS). 
Whilst Wanless (2000) argued that public engagement in healthcare was of 
fundamental importance to both the nation's health and the longer term 
affordability of the NHS, respondents in this study acknowledged that 
recognition of the public as stakeholders created considerable tension within 
the healthcare system. On the one hand, patient expectation was cited as a 
key driver for healthcare reform and, on the other, it was argued that the 
public generally do not like, and will resist, change. The relocation and 
centralisation of Glasgow maternity services was cited as a public relations 
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disaster (QIS2) and policymakers argued that public and patient involvement 
in healthcare had to be 'managed better' (CEO). 
3.4.2 The media as stakeholders 
The media were seen to be instrumental in keeping 'health' high on the 
public and, therefore, the political agenda. They were seen to be driven by 
anecdote (PPI) and portray a very negative perspective, which it was 
suggested, did not reflect the experience of the majority: 
"I was recently looking at these surveys that show that people's 
personal view of the Health Service is 60-65% but their perception of 
the national situation of the Health Service is 50% sort of thing. You 
think, how does that work? And it is because, you know, everybody 
seems to be having a reasonably good time with the Health Service 
as individuals when we have conversations, when we read stuff in the 
media the news isn't good, we think oh l must be wrong then, I must 
have been lucky" (PPI). 
3.4.3 The UK Governments and politicians as stakeholders 
Not only because of concerns that demand continues to outstrip supply, but 
also because the public are active stakeholders in health, the government 
and politicians in general are recognised as stakeholders themselves. 
Indeed, one respondent proposed that "the Government will stand or fall by 
what happens within the health service" (CEO). Because of the public 
interest in health, it was recognised as a key election issue. Respondents in 
Scotland argued that the political interest in health had intensified as a 
consequence of political devolution. 
New Labour claimed they would end the command and control, top-down 
management of the NHS which they argued had been the hallmark of the 
previous Conservative administration. Perhaps because political careers 
were at stake, New Labour's rhetoric did not appear to be borne out in 
practice. It was suggested that an underlying concern within Government 
was that "the NHS was too important to be left to those who deliver services 
to run them" (PPI) The UK and the devolved Governments have committed 
themselves to improving the health of the nation and the NHS in particular. 
They have to demonstrate improvement and, in order to do that, have set a 
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series of political targets including, for example, improved access to 
healthcare and reduced waiting times. 
Respondents offered that the UK Government and politicians were 
influenced by their political advisors, who, it was suggested, were the 
architects of some of the most radical proposals: 
"some of the more radical ideas come from political leadership and 
political advisors but sometimes I think as it transmits itself through 
the health service, it gets bureaucratised out of existence and 
therefore the original idea lessens its usefulness" (DPC). 
The Prime Minister's staff located within the 'No. 10 Delivery Unit', was also 
cited as key people policymakers sought to influence, because they in turn 
could influence Government thinking and Government policy: 
"Yes, well what our role is, is to act if you like as spokespeople for 
people within healthcare organisations ............. we are going to try 
and raise the issue, well we are not going to try, we are going to raise 
the issue with policy makers and also with the No. 10 Delivery Unit" 
(MA). 
The fact that the Prime Minister (PM) himself has a framework for improving 
the NHS illustrates the size of the stake the Government has in the future of 
the NHS. The PM's Framework was cited by one respondent (DPC) as a 
blueprint for achieving the NHS reforms and for fostering innovation. There 
are four elements to the PM's framework namely, national standards, 
devolution, flexible contracts and choice and contestability. Presenting these 
concepts as a framework implies a sense of internal cohesion. However, the 
tensions raised within this chapter are embedded within this "framework". 
The setting and monitoring of national targets and standards appear to re- 
enforce command and control centralisation making the rhetoric of 
devolution in England a distant reality in spite of the development of new 
NHS structures such as Foundation Hospitals. In addition, flexible contracts 
might be seen as a means of controlling the workforce to achieve national 
targets and standards, but they are also seen to increase work intensity and 
limit innovative capacity and patient choice. The assumption is that 
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contestability (or benchmarking for competition) has the capacity to both 
raise standards and reduce costs and, therefore, increase efficiency. One 
respondent (NHSC) argued that being recognised as having a good star 
rating (the mechanism used to performance manage and benchmark the 
NHS in England) should encourage innovation, but thought that, 
paradoxically, it may stifle it because innovation was a risky business and 
nobody wanted to risk losing a high rating. An organisation with a low star 
rating may think they have nothing to lose and, therefore, be willing to take 
risks. However, when careers are at stake, innovation and risk-taking may 
be very low on the agenda. 
One respondent (CEO) also advised that politicians were sometimes 
inappropriately influenced by what they saw working in other countries, 
which they had an annoying tendency of imposing within the UK, out of 
context. In Scotland, where political devolution is a reality, health is a 
devolved responsibility. In a relatively new parliament, it was suggested that 
ministers were influenced mostly by their Civil Servants. 
The PM's framework, coupled with the fact that one respondent indicated 
that they have to influence the PM's staff to bring about a change in 
healthcare policy, appears to imply that the Government, and the PM in 
particular, is personally attempting to command and control the NHS. 
Paradoxically, on New Labour's own admission, command and control limits 
the capacity to innovate. Perversely, the Government's 'hands on approach' 
to the management of the NHS is seen to act as a barrier to achieving the 
innovation they are advocating in their policies. In addition, it was noted that 
political sensitivity gave rise to an aversion to risk-taking, "especially within 
sight of a General Election" (PPI). Innovations which break the mould were 
considered risky. An aversion to risk-taking was cited as a barrier to 
innovation. Conversely, Ministerial endorsement of an innovation in Scotland 
was alluded to as an enabler of an initiative that was recognised as 
professionally sensitive. 
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3.4.4 Managers as stakeholders 
Respondents argued that public and political interest in the NHS made 
managing the NHS particularly challenging. NHS management was 
described as a balancing act. Managers had to balance the sometimes 
competing agendas of public opinion, political imperatives and scientific 
evidence. Managers were responsible for supporting reform of the NHS and 
bringing innovation into the NHS. They were required to meet targets and 
modernise the service whilst under the gaze of the media, the public and 
their political masters. 
Targets were thought of as a 'quick fix' (QIS) ,a 'sound bite' for politicians 
who wanted to be seen to be improving the health service. Respondents 
considered some political targets as problematic because of their 
reductionist nature. Managers were forced to focus on specific issues at the 
expense of others. It was suggested that managers were not given 
permission (NHSC) to think about or respond to local need. The burgeoning 
number of political targets, referred to as 'targetitis' (QIS), was seen as more 
of a problem than a solution, stifling the potential for any meaningful 
innovation. Managers know that they are "performance managed" and if 
targets are not seen to be met they are 'named and shamed' through the 
Star Rating of NHS Providers and they are likely to lose their job: 
"We have seen it time and time again, if they don't meet their targets 
they get the sack" (NHSC). 
These practices make managers risk averse. You cannot afford to get it 
wrong" (CEO). Consequently, managers who supported innovation were 
recognized as exceptional and willing to take a personal risk. 
One informant described the gulf between the Government rhetoric and the 
behaviour of ministers in their dealings with NHS managers as a 
fundamental barrier to managers' capacity to support innovation. He 
reported hearing a Government Minister extol the virtues of localism and 
how this thinking had underpinned the development of policy around 
creating Foundation Hospital Trusts. However, the same minister was known 
91 
to personally telephone NHS Chief Executives to berate them if they did not 
meet all of the national targets: 
"Alan Milburn talks eloquently about localism and mutuality and the 
need to engage the public and finding more and more effective ways 
to do that, but this same Alan Milburn, when he was Secretary of 
State for Health, used to 'phone up friends of mine who are Chief 
Executives of Trusts or Health Authorities as they were then, and 
when didn't have good news and would harangue them personally 
over the 'phone, ask "What the fuck they were doing" that kind of 
thing. It is quite difficult to see how you could, have the fairly fragile 
social entrepreneurial approach working really well for the Health 
Service if there is still this stonking great command and control voice 
at the end of the 'phone demanding to know what the hell you are up 
to. That squashes innovation, innovation is of course about the 
capacity to make mistakes and learn as well as to be very successful 
and get lots of you know plaudits for so being. So there is a difficulty, 
but because of the high level of public and political scrutiny of the 
Health Service and the kind of fear that governments will stand or fall 
by what happens inside the Health Service that they won't relinquish 
the command and control grip and therefore they won't get their 
innovation because innovation is far too risky. " (PPI) 
This illustrated a perceived dissonance between the rhetoric of Government 
philosophy and the daily reality of those managing the NHS. The rhetoric of 
innovation was, in reality, counterintuitive in a culture which focused on 
national standards and politically-driven targets, which respondents reported 
were sometimes at odds with clinical priorities and if not met, led to 
managers losing their jobs. One respondent, however, (DPC) argued that 
managers who were not able to manage national targets and support local 
innovation were simply lazy and lacked the capacity to conflate agendas. 
This particular policymaker had a medical background and I Interpreted his 
responses to indicate a strong 'corporate' perspective on innovation (figure 
3.3). He was very critical of middle managers for upholding a bureaucratic 
culture within the NHS and for being risk averse. He accused them of being 
silo thinkers, lacking in imagination, unable to conflate targets and In need of 
leadership developmentl 
Whilst managers themselves were regarded as stakeholders in innovation, 
management support was recognized as a key factor if the potential of an 
innovation was to be realized. Managers were seen to be capable of making 
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or breaking an innovation proposed by any one other than the most 
tenacious innovator. It was suggested that the support of management for 
anything that was not seen to be a managerial imperative was virtually 
negligible. The rhetoric of devolution within the PM's framework for reform of 
the NHS was reported to be the experience of those working in the NHS in 
England. Where political power had been devolved in Scotland, the rhetoric 
of empowerment and partnership working was perhaps more of a reality. 
3.4.5 NHS staff as stakeholders 
NHS staff were also seen to have a stake in innovation which they might 
approach from a number of perspectives depending on the context in which 
they found themselves (see figure 3.5). By creating this typology my 
intention is not to imply that stakeholders held unitary interests. I 
acknowledge that all actors have multiple interests which can be conflicting. 
My intention here is simply to offer this typology as a device for making 
sense of these data. 




Staff Enablers & 
Legitimators 
Consumers 
One respondent acknowledged that NHS staff could themselves be 
consumers of healthcare. They were, therefore, arguably able to offer a 
perspective on innovation from this standpoint albeit one that was influenced 
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by their NHS role. NHS staff was also recognized as having the potential to 
innovate, to be social entrepreneurs and the architects of local innovation. 
The capacity of NHS staff to innovate was thought to be enabled when they 
were given the requisite "space and time to see the bigger picture" (HDA) 
and this potential was enhanced when these opportunities were afforded to 
teams. It was suggested that engaging in innovations can be professionally 
beneficial as it helps to "professionalize a field" (HDA). 
Innovation potential was thought to be dependent upon organisational 
culture and management support, and inhibited by national targets. One 
respondent suggested, however, that the approach of local innovators 
"would probably not be very scientific" (QIS). This particular respondent had 
a scientific background who I considered to have a strong leaning towards a 
'scientific' perspective of innovation (figure 3.3). Staff representative bodies 
were identified as partners in policy-led innovations such as pay and career 
modernisation and NHS staff were seen to have a stake in the legitimisation 
of innovations. One person's assessment of a positive innovation may be 
perceived by another as catastrophic if, for example, they lose their job as a 
consequence. In this regard, one respondent (PPI) highlighted the role of 
professional associations such as the Royal College of Nursing in the 
legitimisation and promulgation of health service innovations. Another, 
however, suggested that professional associations were too bureaucratic 
and, therefore, too slow to respond and engage meaningfully in times of 
rapid change (CCI). 
Professional education and training was identified as an enabler of 
innovation. Professional qualifications and standards were seen to provide a 
safety net for the promulgation of innovations as they offered assurances 
that practitioners were skilled and competent. It was no longer "see one, do 
one, teach one" (CMO). 
Policymakers noted that within some professional groups any innovation 
which fell short of their 'Gold Standard' of evidence of effectiveness was 
dismissed as irrelevant. It was also noted that an innovation is more likely to 
94 
be promulgated within a professional group if it recognized as "invented by 
one of their own" (CMO). "Professional buy-in" (CMO) to an innovation was 
considered an important enabling factor - especially when all concerned felt 
that they had a part to play in the success of an innovation. Other enabling 
factors cited were external factors beyond the immediate control of 
professional groups, such as EU legislation and the 'incentivising' (DPC, 
CMO) of professional groups through, for example, the GMS contract. 
Health professionals were seen, in the main, to be conservative, sceptical 
and resistant to change. Any innovation, which threatens professional 
autonomy or status, erodes a power base, puts jobs in jeopardy or impacts 
significantly on productivity, will inevitably meet some resistance from staff 
and their representative bodies. Tribal loyalties were seen to come into play 
if a professional group felt threatened by an innovation. Examples offered 
here included medical resistance to innovations, which they may have 
regarded as an erosion of their professional autonomy, such as nurse- 
prescribing and midwifery-led care. 
From this analysis of stakeholders, it would seem that there is considerable 
vested interest in the NHS. There would appear to be strong evidence of 
central command and control through national targets and it has been 
suggested that the Prime Minister himself was trying to 'manage' the NHS. 
Sensemaking of these data is complex because of the inherent 
contradictions and paradoxes. The Government itself seems at best 
confused and at worst duplicitous in both its words and its deeds with reports 
of a government minister berating Chief Executives for not meeting national 
targets and, at the same time, extolling the virtues of localism. There is a 
policy push for greater flexibility within the system, which should allow for 
and enable innovation, through the modernisation of pay and terms and 
conditions of employment. At the same time, endeavours to increase 
efficiency lead to work intensification which, arguably, squeezes out the 
space and the capacity to think and do things differently. Perhaps, ironically, 
"targetitits" has intensified the work of NHS managers to the point where it 
has squeezed out management's capacity to offer much needed support to 
enable local innovation to address local need. 
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3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, a thematic framework constructed from analysis of interviews 
with policymakers has offered insight into the wide range of policymakers' 
interpretations of the concept of innovation in healthcare. Through analysis 
of their responses, I have developed and discussed a typology of 
innovations. I have also categorised policymakers' interpretations of the 
conditions in which they consider innovation to be a legitimate pursuit and 
highlighted the tensions inherent within these, sometimes, competing 
perspectives. Four key drivers of innovation in healthcare are identified and 
the policy response to these drivers, namely pay modernisation, structural 
developments and the setting and monitoring of national targets and 
standards, discussed. In addition, five groupings of stakeholders in 
healthcare innovations have been identified, namely the public, the media, 
the UK governments, healthcare managers and NHS staff. Through analysis 
of policymakers' views of the impact these stakeholder groupings have on 
innovation, the dynamic between this complex array of stakeholders has 
further illuminated the tensions and paradoxes surrounding innovations in 
healthcare. 
In chapter four I discuss this analysis by examining the political and historical 
context in which these interviews with policymakers took place. This in turn 
sets the scene for the examination of the cases of innovations in healthcare 
in part three. 
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Chapter 4 Discussion of Policymakers' Perspectives 
4.1 Introduction 
The concept of innovation appeared with the mainstream of NHS policy 
when New Labour came into power in 1997. The interviews with policy 
makers in this study were conducted close to the end of Tony Blair's New 
Labour Government's second term of office (see table 2.1). Prior to New 
Labour's reforms, innovation had only featured within the context of R&D 
health policy, where, as stated in chapter 1, from a technical, rational 
perspective, R&D was regarded to be the natural precursor to innovation. 
New Labour came into power with a landslide majority following three 
consecutive terms of Conservative (Tory) administration. The Tories had 
been led by the UK's first female Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from 
1979 through to 1990 and then by John Major from 1990 through to 1997. 
Prior to securing election victory, the elite within the Labour party had argued 
that the world had changed dramatically during 18 years of Conservative 
rule. They argued that these changes included the globalisation of markets 
and culture, the decline of traditional British industries and Trades Union 
membership, the emergence of new technology, service and information 
based industries, the transformation of the role of women, the rise of 
consumerism and disaffection with distant political institutions (Finlayson 
1999; Klein 2001). Not only had the world changed, but so too had the 
electorate. Class-based politics was to be confined to the history books. 
Labour, according to the elite, had to acknowledge these 'social facts' and 
'modernise'. If Labour was to get elected, they argued, Labour had to be 
pragmatic. It had to abandon the values which reflected the past, which 
essentially made Labour unelectable: 
"... Blair's New labour rhetoric requires that an ideological wedge is 
driven between the past and the future. Distance between "old" and 
"new" is achieved by denigrating the past and praising the present... " 
(Klein & Rafferty 1999) 
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The Labour modernisers argued that the only way that a Labour 
Government could ever come to power would be if Labour changed too. 
"New" Labour, therefore, emerged as distinctly different from "Old" Labour. 
Most importantly, Clause 4 of the Labour constitution was revoked and 
Labour's traditional commitment to public ownership of the means of 
production abandoned. New Labour sought to resolve the conflicts inherent 
in "the old" political ideologies of the left and the right by working in 
partnership with key stakeholders. 
New Labour's policies, based on sociological analysis (Giddens 1998) rather 
than political philosophy, became known as "The Third Way" after Giddens. 
Third Way policies, like those of the previous Conservative administration, 
promoted individual responsibility (Leadbeater 1988) and they embraced the 
market, not on ideological grounds but as a tool to achieve the fixed values 
and goals of New Labour. Grounded in pragmatism, the slogan of The Third 
Way soon became 'What counts is what works'. The aim was to achieve 
social justice within the context of a dynamic market economy (Klein 2001), 
by whatever methods were available, based on the assumption that the ends 
justify the means. Klein (2001) argued that the key word was 'new' and a 
twin of new is 'modernisation' or 'permanent revisionism'. 
Part of New Labour's election manifesto stated: "We want to save and 
modernise the NHS" (Labour Party 1997), This was particularly poignant in 
the light of the fact that New Labour were to inherit an NHS which, under 
the Conservative regime, had undergone some of the most far-reaching 
reforms since its inception (Klein 2001). A short account of the NHS New 
Labour inherited is necessary to explain the context of the New Labour 
reforms which, in turn, explain the context in which the policymakers 
interviewed, responded to the questions I posed. The discussion of the 
policymakers' perspectives serve to illuminate the policy context in which the 
case studies of innovation examined in this study took place and further 
illuminate the conditions in which innovations both flourish and perish. 
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4.2 A Short History of the NHS Policy Context (1948- 
1997) 
The UK's National Health Service (NHS) was a post war policy innovation 
financed through a compulsory National Insurance Scheme. The aim of the 
NHS was to provide a comprehensive range of health services to all in need. 
Introduced on 5th July 1948, the NHS was, for more than 20 years, the only 
comprehensive nationalised health service in the Western world. It was built 
on political compromise and fraught with controversy from inception, with 
"conflict within consensus" a common theme running throughout its political 
history (Klein 2001). 
Despite political differences at the outset, there was a collective faith in the 
past achievements and the future potential of medical science to triumph 
over disease and illness (Klein 2001). Thus, medicine, and medical 
"scientific knowledge" in particular, was reified. This put the medical 
profession in a very strong negotiating position when the NHS was in the 
process of being established. Consequently, a number of concessions were 
achieved: 
" GPs retained their independent contractor status 
0 hospital consultants retained the option of engaging in private 
practice and they were afforded access to'pay beds' in NHS 
hospitals 
0a system of 'distinction awards' was introduced for consultants 
to be awarded on a peer review basis which enabled those in 
receipt of an award to gain a significant increase in their salary 
0 doctors secured a major role for themselves in the 
administration of the new Health Service at all levels 
0 proposals to put the control of local health services into the 
hands of local Government was successfully resisted (Ham 
1999) 
The then Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, was reported to have said that 
he stuffed the mouths of hospital consultants with gold (Abel-Smith 1964)! 
Not only did hospital consultants secure financial privilege, but all doctors 
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maintained professional autonomy and the medical profession was assured 
substantial power and influence in the future running of the service. 
The assumption that medical science would triumph over disease was 
coupled with the assumption that a comprehensive health service, free at the 
point of delivery, would over time become less of a burden on the public 
purse as the health of the nation systematically improved (Klein 2001). 
Despite the regular injection of resources into the NHS, demand has 
continuously outstripped supply. Advances in medical science and 
technology have made new, hitherto unthinkable, interventions possible. 
New interventions have the capacity to create new demand and reduce 
morbidity (a stated goal of the NHS). People, in turn, live longer and place 
more and often complex (and, therefore, expensive) demands on the health 
services as they grow older. Nature has at times responded or adapted to 
new interventions in unanticipated ways. New morbidities, some, arguably 
iatrogenic, have appeared or mutated in response to the use (or abuse) of 
medico-scientific technological interventions (a point I elaborate upon in 
Chapter 7). Thus, history has shown that the assumption that a National 
Health Service, free at the point of delivery, could effectively socially 
engineer improvements in the health and economic productivity of the nation 
and, as a consequence, gradually become less of a burden on the public 
purse, was fundamentally flawed. 
The NHS has, therefore, been high on the political agenda throughout its 
history (Greer 2004). Klein (2001) has proposed three main reasons for this. 
Firstly, there is a general consensus amongst the population that "free" 
medical care for the entire population is a good thing. In that sense, the NHS 
has become an important British institution and, thus, a central political Issue 
for those in power and those aspiring to positions of power within the UK 
polity. Secondly "free" medical care is in truth a myth. It has to be paid for 
somehow and any state-owned institution with a track record where demand 
outstrips supply, that is dependent upon the Treasury purse, is inevitably 
high on the political agenda. Thirdly, the diversity of the NHS workforce, with 
multiple professional, semi-professional and ancillary groups and sub- 
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groups, each with their own interests and representative organisations, adds 
significantly to the complexity and the politics of the NHS. Consequently, the 
NHS has undergone serial reforms since its inception. 
Throughout the first thirty years of the NHS, the authority of the medical 
establishment, based on the normative privileging of medical scientific 
knowledge, remained effectively unchallenged. For this reason, Klein (2001) 
refers to the reforms which began under Margaret Thatcher's Conservative 
administration as the 'big bang' reforms. These reforms (Secretaries of State 
for Health 1989a; Secretaries of State for Health 1989b) both in content and 
through their mode of conception, fundamentally challenged the hitherto 
normative assumption that the medical establishment should, based on the 
primacy of their professional knowledge, dominate NHS decision-making. 
Fuelled by the oil crisis of the mid-1970's, many Conservatives were 
reported to have regarded the NHS as a manifestation of a "post war 
malaise". The NHS was considered to be over-bureaucratized, dominated by 
powerful professions, lacking in both consumer choice and incentives for 
innovation and efficiency and hugely demanding on the public purse (Butler 
1992). Margaret Thatcher turned to the profit-orientated private sector to 
provide the solution to the ills of the NHS. Based on the assumption that the 
cure for all the countries ills, including the perceived problems within the 
National Health Service (NHS), lay within 'better management', this ideology, 
known as 'managerialism', was initially expressed unequivocally in 1980 by 
Michael Heseltine when he was Secretary of State for the Environment: 
"Efficient management is the key to (national) revival... And the 
management ethos must run right through our national life - private 
and public companies, civil service, nationalised industries, local 
government, the National Health Service. " (Michael Heseltine, British 
Secretary of State for the Environment 1980, cited by Pollitt (1993)) 
Many of the publicly-funded utilities which were viewed in the same light 
were sold off to the private sector during the 1970's. The privatization of the 
NHS, viewed by the public as a national institution, was considered politically 
a step too far. A middle ground approach was adopted where private sector 
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values were introduced into the NHS. This, it was argued, would increase 
efficiency and make the NHS more "consumer orientated". The key to 
achieving efficiency within the NHS was to import private sector 
management methods (and personnel) into the public sector (Griffiths 1983). 
Sir Roy Griffiths, the then Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive of the food 
retailer Sainsbury's, and his team were invited by the Secretary of State to 
assess the quality of management within the NHS. In their report, they were 
critical of the NHS's lack of ability to provide a service which focused on the 
needs of its users. To make the NHS more efficient and more responsive to 
service users the government's private sector advisers prescribed an 
injection of managerialism. Professional managers should be introduced into 
the NHS and made accountable for reducing costs and increasing efficiency. 
The majority of Griffiths' recommendations were accepted and 'General 
Management' was introduced in the NHS in 1983, thus creating a whole new 
health service occupation and hierarchy (Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd S, & Walker 
2005). This was to become known as "The New Public Sector Management" 
(NPM) (Clarke & Newman 1997). The managerialist goal of the New Public 
Sector Management (NPM) Managers initially manifest through a series of 
initiatives which were arguably 'soft targets', inasmuch as they focused on 
areas where managers' authority to make decisions, was relatively easy to 
exercise. Under the guidance of Marks and Spencer chief Sir Derek Raynor, 
NHS managers were charged with scrutinising areas for potential savings, 
such as transport services, recruitment advertising and residential 
accommodation for NHS staff. Through the application of management 
techniques, it was controversially estimated that the NHS could save a 
potential £750M from the sale of NHS staff residential accommodation (Ham 
1999), with little or no regard for staff who 'lived in'. In 1983 NHS managers 
were also charged with the commercial tendering of their laundry, catering 
and domestic services in order to "purchase" the most cost effective service 
and test the cost effectiveness of the current NHS provision within the 
marketplace. Whilst the majority of contracts were awarded to NHS 
providers, costs were pared down significantly, which yielded an estimated 
saving of £110M in the first round of contracting (Ham 1999). These 
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initiatives were closely followed in 1984 by efficiency drives known as "cost 
improvement programmes", which were to release cash for service 
developments through greater efficiency. It is reported that these initiatives 
yielded approx £1 B per annum in the first ten years of implementation (Ham 
1999). The "income generation initiative" was launched in 1988 and an 
estimated £10M was generated through the introduction of car park 
charging, the leasing of retail premises and the provision of services for 
private patients. Thus, the new breed of NPM managers were able to 
introduce some cost savings by addressing issues that were relatively 
peripheral to the concerns of the powerful medical establishment, but quite 
fundamental to those lower in the organisational pecking order. 
Once fiscal efficiency was increased in the areas where the NHS already 
had bureaucratic control before the introduction of General Management, the 
Conservative Government aimed to tackle the powerful professions who 
effectively had an unfettered reign over NHS expenditure. In 1987, the 
Government introduced the first of a series of reforms of the NHS which 
focused on primary care provision (Secretaries of State for Social Services 
and others 1987). The policy aims were to raise standards of health and 
healthcare, increase the emphasis on health promotion and health education 
activities and offer wider choice and information to patients. More 
importantly, it heralded the introduction of a new contract for GPs and 
dentists, which essentially incentivised conformity to Government policy with 
additional payments when centrally-defined targets were met. More mouths 
were being stuffed with more gold, but this time it was GPs and dentists and 
this time there was a catch. 
The introduction of private sector 'General Management' Into the NHS was 
just one aspect of the wholesale import of 'managerialism' Into the UK public 
sector. Coupled with internal efficiency drives within the NHS, the 
Government also encouraged the development of private provision and 
insurance schemes and there was a notable increase in their take up as a 
consequence. By 1989, it was estimated that approximately 15% of all UK 
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hospital-based treatment and care was provided by private and voluntary 
hospitals and nursing homes (Laing 1990). 
In the late 1980's, those at the sharp end endeavouring to deliver healthcare 
claimed that the service was in a state of crisis. In an unprecedented move, 
the Presidents of the Medical Royal Colleges sent a joint letter to the Prime 
Minister outlining their concerns (Ham 1999). These powerful professional 
voices of dissent had the potential to embarrass the Government 
considerably so the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, herself intervened. 
Determined not to be undermined by the professions, in January 1988 the 
Prime Minister made a public announcement on the BBC Television 
programme Panorama that there would be an immediate injection of £101 M 
into the NHS and that she would personally oversee a review of the service 
(Ham 1999). This Ministerial review was like none previous. In this case, the 
professions, who had hitherto been central to the decision-making 
processes, were kept at arm's length. Thatcher marginalised the powerful 
dissenting voices and then oversaw the development of far-reaching policy 
changes, which endeavoured to force the hand of the dissenters by 
transforming them into business men and women within the context of an 
internal market. Here, where classical authoritarian hierarchical 
management was unlikely to work, policies aimed to colonise the 
professions with the managerial ethos, in order to contain the spiralling costs 
of the NHS, brought about in part by the unfettered demands of doctors 
making decisions based on their clinical expertise, which had been hitherto 
unchallenged because of their protected clinical autonomy (Harrison 1999). 
An internal market was to create a sense of competition between health 
service providers in order to increase their efficiency, to increase 
professional involvement in the management of the NHS (i. e. in difficult 
decisions regarding the allocation of finite resources) and to increase the 
public responsiveness of the service. 
The reforms also challenged the professional autonomy of medicine and 
sought to increase medical practitioners' accountability for their performance 
and activities through systems of medical audit. At this stage, however, 
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these initiatives focused on increasing the accountability of professionals to 
one another. Systems of confidential peer review were introduced for 
'educational purposes' as an optional activity with a resource incentive to 
participate (Harding & Learmonth 2000). 
In practical terms, the internal market led to the separation of the 
management of the provision of health services from a newly-created 
responsibility of purchasing or commissioning healthcare under contractual 
arrangements. The theory was that hospitals and other service providers 
would be commissioned by District Health Authorities (DHAs) to provide 
services based on local need. The White Paper also signalled the 
introduction of NHS self-governing trusts and GP fund holding schemes. 
Both initiatives aimed to increase the financial autonomy of the respective 
organisations. However, in the first instance, Trust or Fund holding status 
was only awarded to organisations that met certain criteria and could 
demonstrate competence in the management of their finances. NHS Trust 
status was to allow organisations to look at more creative forms of income 
generation that had not hitherto been deemed acceptable. GP fund holders 
enjoyed devolved budgets which enabled them, alongside their local DHA, to 
commission inpatient services for their own patients through contracts that 
they negotiated with other service providers. Contracts between 
commissioners and providers detailed the cost, quality and quantity of care 
that was to be purchased. Over time, as policy was made on the hoof, the 
criteria for Trust and Fund holder status was softened (Ham 1997). 
The implementation of these NHS reforms was facilitated through post- 
bureaucratic modes of managerialism (Ferlie et at. 1996). 'Changing the 
organisational culture' was seen as the key to addressing the perceived 
problems of the NHS (Parker & Dent 1996). NPM practitioners applied the 
tools of their trade, Total Quality Management became everybody's business 
and organisational mission statements appeared in hospital foyers. In order 
to prevent the internal market from creating a level of disruption that could 
have been politically embarrassing to the government, planning sat 
alongside competition and the Internal market became a managed market. 
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This tendency for political intervention, which led to management from the 
centre, was completely at odds with the Griffiths recommendation that 
responsibility should be discharged to the Units (Griffiths 1983) and clearly 
impacted on the direction of the NHS (Ham 1999). 
Following the reviews of primary (Secretaries of State for Social Services 
and others 1987) and acute care provision (Secretaries of State for Health 
1989b), attention focused on community care. Once again, the Government 
called upon the expertise of Sir Roy Griffiths for advice and once again his 
recommendations (Griffiths 1988) were accepted and translated into 
legislation (Secretaries of State for Health 1989a). This put local authorities 
in the driving seat for planning, co-ordinating and purchasing community 
care. The aim was not only to manage resources more effectively, but also 
to increase patient choice and provide means tested, tailored packages of 
care in people's own homes as an alternative to residential care, if desired. 
The implementation of the Community Care Act was, however, delayed until 
1993 due to concerns over the implications of the replacement of domestic 
rates with the community charge and the unknown effect this might have on 
local government finances (Ham 1999). 
In 1990, John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher as the leader of the 
Conservative Party and Prime Minister, and the focus on making the NHS 
more accountable to patients and tax payers grew sharper. According to the 
ideology of the market "the consumer is king", therefore consumerism, which 
Kelleher et al (1994) have argued is a de-professionalizing strategy, was 
considered the means of increasing efficiency by the Major Government 
(Bolton 2004). Against a background of Individualism, coupled with declining 
public trust and antagonism towards the professions and the state, the 
consumer discourse was mobilised in an effort to reshape medicine and 
bureaucracies (Henderson & Peterson 2002). The following year saw the 
publication of The Patient's Charter (Department of Health 1991 b) which set 
out a series of rights and standards for patients. The Patient's Charter also 
provided the foundations for the development of performance league tables 
which would, it was argued, enable the public to see how NHS Trusts 
106 
compared with each other, in relation to crude measures of hospital waiting 
times and numbers of cancelled operations, thus creating a mechanism 
through which the managerialist discourse could penetrate the authority of 
the professions (Henderson & Peterson 2002). 
Hoggett (1996) argued that the Conservative Government's endeavours to 
take control of the NHS did not lead to the replacement of a bureaucratic 
hierarchy with markets but to a "plural mode of governance". The policy and 
strategy function was centralized and the delivery function decentralized 
through operational units where business was conducted through 
competition, contracts and markets. To ensure that the Government's ends 
were achieved, decentralized units were increasingly monitored and their 
performance managed as normative managerial control strategies, such as 
"shared values", proved ineffective when perceived as empty rhetoric in the 
face of labour process intensification and staff shortages: 
"... for many staff, the talk of a shared organisational mission, 
commitment to quality and customer responsiveness flies in the face 
of their experience of... inadequate nursing cover. " (Hoggett 1996) 
In summary, the Conservative reforms of what was hitherto characterised as 
an overly bureaucratic, inefficient, unresponsive NHS, were driven by a 
capitalist, neo-liberal ideology. Because outright privatisation of the NHS 
was considered politically too risky, the Conservative administration 
compromised. The values and practices of the free market were introduced 
into the NHS in the belief that they would increase efficiency (and thus 
reduce costs) and make the NHS more responsive to its users. Thus, a 
traditionally bureaucratic, professionally dominated organisation was to be 
transformed through the introduction of General Management and 
competition and market mechanisms. However, counter to the ideology of 
the free market, new modes of central control entered the public sector as a 
consequence of the reforms. In 1996, Hoggett articulated the views of many 
working in the public sector when he contemplated whether a change of 
Government, with a different ideological perspective, would address these 
mounting concerns: 
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"Would a Blair led government arrive with a mandate to restore 
commitment and reduce the exploitation of the public sector 
workforce and dismantle the massive centralization of state power 
which has accumulated in the last decade and a half? " (Hoggett 
1996) 
4.3 The Blair Years (1997 - 2007) 
When New Labour came to power in 1997 they proposed a 'far reaching 
reform programme for the NHS'. Just as they were modernising the Labour 
Party, they sought to 'modernize' or transform the NHS, from a traditional, 
historically evolved institution, into an organisation that was deemed fit for 
purpose within the context of a modern global economy. In line with Third 
Way principles, they developed their first wave of reforms within a spirit of 
reconciliation (Delamothe 1995), in partnership with the professions, who in 
turn, fully endorsed the reforms (Department of Health 1997). A part of New 
Labour's reform agenda was to dismantle the Thatcher policy innovation, the 
internal market. It is arguable as to whether this intent was more about 
political gesturing than a substantial shift in policy. Apart from this one, 
arguably symbolic act, to distance New Labour's health polices from those of 
the previous administration, there was little to distinguish between them. The 
policies of both administrations appeared to follow similar trajectories and 
there is evidence that command and control managerialism intensified in the 
NHS under the New Labour regime in their endeavours to realise their high 
profile modernization agenda (Klein & Rafferty 1999). For example, there 
was a marked increase in the numbers of centrally defined performance 
targets and structures were put in place to performance manage the 
organisations responsible for delivering them. Performance league tables 
were published and ratings for individual consultants and NHS organisations 
were developed. A national initiative, developed in partnership with complicit 
Trade Unions, has standardized non-medical job roles and put systems in 
place to monitor individual performance. The Agenda for Change policy 
(Department of Health 2004a) has led to the biggest overhaul of NHS-wide 
pay, terms and conditions since the NHS was established. It involved a 
complex process of job evaluation carried out in partnerships between NHS 
Managers and Trade Union representatives. Job evaluation was coupled 
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with a compulsory annual appraisal system where performance was linked 
to annual increments in pay (Department of Health 2004b). The stated aim 
was to ensure that the NHS workforce had the knowledge and skills to 
achieve the aims of the NHS. This policy innovation appeared to bring Trade 
Unions and Professional Bodies into partnership with the Government, thus 
ensuring normative control, and securing the ongoing performative control of 
the NHS workforce through a compulsory annual appraisal process. 
Arguably the most fundamental change under New Labour, was the 
introduction of managerialism at the very heart of professional practice. 
Where under the Conservative administration, NHS Trusts were given 
corporate fiscal responsibility, under New Labour they were also given 
corporate clinical responsibility with the new 'Clinical Governance' 
arrangements (NHS Executive 1999; Secretaries of State for Health1989b). 
Under the Conservative administration, medical audit was conducted as a 
system of confidential peer review, whereas under New Labour, participation 
in national speciality-based audit programmes became a requirement for 
hospital doctors. The hitherto 'black box' of medical practice was opened to 
public scrutiny. 
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was established to 
provide authoritative guidance to the Health Service on the clinical and cost 
effectiveness of both new and existing technologies, including 
pharmaceuticals, diagnostic tests, surgical procedures and other treatments. 
Initially, NICE was established to cover both physical and mental illness. In 
2004, NICE merged with another body, the Heath Development Agency, 
which previously held the remit for developing evidence to Inform public 
health practice. This new alliance formed the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Effectiveness and the original acronym, NICE, was retained. 
New Labour's political rationale for establishing NICE was to rid the NHS of 
the so called "postcode lottery" which, they argued, had resulted from the 
introduction of an internal market into the NHS by the previous Conservative 
administration. The internal market led to local commissioning. Local 
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commissioning meant that decisions about how the NHS budgets should be 
spent were taken locally. Local decision-making meant that one 
commissioning authority might fund, for example, in-vitro fertilization (IVF) 
whilst a neighboring authority might not. Access to IVF was thus seen to 
depend on an individual's postcode rather than on clinical need. New 
Labour's response to this was to centralize the production of national 
guidance on where the NHS should and should not spend its finite 
resources. NICE guidance would be developed in partnership with the 
professional elite and ensure value for money in NHS decision-making 
through the provision of high-quality research evidence from an objective 
source. The argument was that a truly national health service should offer a 
universal service, based on national, universal standards, founded on a 
sound evidence base. The NHS should be "modern and dependable" 
(Department of Health 1997). 
In addition to NICE and the clinical guidelines they produce, other 
Government initiatives to universalise or standardise clinical care included 
the development and publication of National Service Frameworks (NSFs). 
NSFs were to set national standards and identify key interventions for a 
defined service or care group, put in place strategies to support 
implementation and establish ways to ensure progress within an agreed time 
scale. NSFs were developed in areas of high diagnostic morbidity and 
mortality such as Cancer, Mental Health, Diabetes, Renal Disease and 
Coronary Heart Disease, in areas of public concern, for example paediatric 
intensive care, and in other specialties including Older People, Children and 
Long-term care conditions. Healthcare providers were "performance 
managed" centrally by the Healthcare Commission (HC) in England and 
Wales, to assess local compliance with national targets and standards. In 
Scotland, the functions of producing national guidance and monitoring 
compliance were undertaken by one organisation - Quality Improvement 
Scotland (QIS). 
In order to intensify the processes of Modernisation, the Modernisation 
Agency (MA) was established in England and the Centre for Change and 
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Innovation (CCI) in Scotland. The MA website stated that innovation was a 
strategic imperative for the NHS and the CCI website claimed that change 
and innovation had become normalised within the healthcare system. 
The stated purpose of the CCI was to: 
"... provide practical support and innovative expertise to help local 
NHS systems deliver on national priorities. It will build the capacity to 
achieve transformational change to help NHS Scotland close the gap 
between policy and delivery" (Centre for Change and Innovation 
2002). 
and the MA website stated: 
"Developing a climate of innovation in healthcare has become a 
strategic imperative for the acceleration of modernisation enabling 
organisations to move beyond 'improvement' to 
'innovation"'(Knowledge and Innovation Group 2004). 
A sub-Group within the MA, the Innovation and Knowledge Group, was set 
up to support local NHS organisations and modernisation programmes 
across the Agency to explore and develop tools and techniques and 
innovative approaches to change. Even the Modernisation Agency itself was 
subsequently 'modernised'. A considerably downsized MA was established 
as the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement at the University of 
Warwick. 
The Conservatives adopted a consumerist project in order to raise public 
awareness of their rights as a means of improving the performance and the 
public accountability of NHS professionals. New Labour furthered the 
consumerist project whilst embracing the notion that rights are accompanied 
by responsibilities. Consumers of healthcare were encouraged to consider 
their personal responsibilities for their own health. The ideal, rational, 
mythical consumer of healthcare was portrayed as an individual who 
exhibited appropriate information-seeking behaviour, consulted relevant 
expertise, took the right medicine and engaged in personal risk management 
(Henderson & Peterson 2002). 
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To add to this complexity, in 1997 New Labour began a process of political 
devolution. The 'paradox of devolution' was that, whilst Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland were, to varying degrees, afforded devolved powers to 
manage their own health services, there was increasing centralization of 
power in England (Klein & Rafferty 1999). Greer (2004) has argued that the 
extent of policy divergence was greater as a result of political devolution 
than initially anticipated and suggested that four distinct models emerged. 
Market managerialism was seen to have had the greatest impact in England 
whilst in Scotland, for example, the professions appeared to have retained a 
much stronger voice in decision-making (table 4.1) 
Table 4.1: Models of healthcare in the UK post devolution (after Greer 
2004) 
Country Focus of Implications 
Governance 
Scotland Professionalism A reduction In management layers and 
development of clinical networks. Increased 
role of professionals in rationing and 
resource allocation 
England Markets Independent trusts, similar to private firms, 
contracting with each other for care. Approx. 
30 regulatory organisations ensuring quality. 
Competition, management and regulation 
seen as key to assuring value from health 
spending and distancing the Minister from 
front line services 
Wales Localism Integrated health and local government in 
order to coordinate care and focus on 
underlying health determinants rather then 
treating the sick. 
Northern Ireland Permissive Focused on keeping services going in tough 
managerialism conditions. Produces little overall policy and 
enforces less. Benefits can be local 
experimentation and variation 
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4.4 Innovation: the Policy Context 
4.4.1 The meaning of innovation 
The interpretation of the meaning of innovation by respondents in this study 
appeared to be both confused and highly subjective. This would appear to 
be the norm. For example, after undertaking a systematic review of the 
literature on the diffusion of innovations, Greenhalgh et al (2005) noted there 
was not, nor would there ever be, a consensus on terminology as people are 
influenced by different professional, disciplinary and sociocultural traditions. 
Where there appeared to be greater clarity from respondents, a very 
deliberate distinction was drawn between "traditional improvement" and 
"innovation". Within the management literature, Christensen et al (2000), for 
example, label the former incremental or sustaining change and the latter 
disruptive change. Arguing that these two types of innovation should be 
viewed as ends of a continuum, commissioned by the Knowledge and 
Innovation group within the MA, Buchanan (2003) developed table 4.2 to 
illustrate their most common features: 
Table 4.2: Types of Innovations (Buchanan 2003) 
Adaptations: type 1 Breakthroughs: type 2 
Innovation Innovation 
Sustaining Innovations Disruptive innovations 
Improving the familiar Inventing the new 
Lower risk of failure Higher risk of failure 
More readily acceptable to Harder to attract 
others supporters 
Potentially modest Potentially strategic 
benefits benefits 
Established as a New Labour policy innovation, The Knowledge and 
Innovation Group within the Modernisation Agency sought to influence the 
conditions in which type 2 innovations could flourish in the NHS, initially by 
working with a small number of self-selecting organisations and ultimately 
through the production of a toolkit for widespread use (Plesk et al. 2003). 
The MA itself, however, had a primary focus facilitating the spread of type 1 
innovations across the NHS in England. 
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4.4.2 The innovation imperative 
The 'innovation imperative' would appear to be driven by the ideology of the 
market, where innovation is considered imperative for survival: 
"Innovation is the heartbeat of OECD economies. Without it firms 
cannot introduce new products, services and processes. They find it 
hard, if not impossible, to gain market share, reduce costs or increase 
profits. In effect, if the pulse of innovation is missing, firms quite 
simply die. " (Guinet & Pilat 1999). 
Based on Darwin's theory that only the strongest within a species survives 
(Darwin 1872) the argument here is that within a global market, only the 
strongest, that is those most effective at introducing new products, services 
and processes, survive. This ideology underpins the rationale for regarding 
modernisation as an imperative. If New Labour did not modernise it would 
remain unelectable. If the NHS is not modernised it will perish along with 
those whose political careers rest on 'delivering' a modernised service. 
According to Klein and Rafferty (1999), New Labour's modernisation 
programme led to the abandonment of political ideology which left a vacuum 
which was effectively filled by the ideology of managerialism, based on the 
premise that the ends justify the means. They also suggest that, however 
politically expedient "Third Way" interventions may appear to be, they may 
lack any inherent intellectual or moral justification, as means do not always 
result in the ends intended. 
The innovation imperative within the ideology of the market is located at the 
very heart of Government, where the central economic objective is to 
achieve high and sustainable levels of economic growth and employment 
throughout the UK. Innovation Is seen to include the exploitation of new 
science and technology, changes in skills or business processes and the 
exploitation of new markets (DTI 2002) and is identified as an essential 
mechanism for realising the Government's economic objectives. To this end, 
the Government has put policies in place to support innovation, including, for 
example, tax credits for firms investing in R&D (HM Treasury, Department of 
Trade and Industry, & HM Customs 2005). 
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Whilst innovation has for a considerable time been regarded as an 
imperative within the private sector its prominence within public sector policy 
is, as stated earlier, a relatively new phenomenon. Within the context of the 
New Labour modernisation project, innovation would appear to be regarded 
as a vehicle for speeding up the processes of reform of the NHS. New 
Labour policy innovations, from the monitoring of performance targets and 
the publication of league tables through to the creation of Foundation Trusts 
and the contracting out of NHS provision to the private sector in England, 
seek to increase the level of competition within the NHS. Within this context, 
Government advisers have advocated that innovation is an imperative within 
the public sector. They argue: 
"In the past many successful innovations have been generated 
internally, and, as a rule, those organisations and sectors that fail to 
generate new possibilities will be vulnerable to stagnation" (Mulgan & 
Albury D 2003 p 13). 
In essence, the New Labour modernisation project will fail if the NHS lacks 
the capacity to be innovative. It is incumbent upon the NPM managers, 
introduced by the Thatcher Government and retained by New Labour to 
reform the NHS, to ensure that the NHS has the capacity to innovate. 
With perhaps the exception of the 'product' innovations, which I discuss later 
in this chapter, the innovations cited by respondents in this study appear to 
support this interpretation. For example, role substitution reduces costs and 
redesign or re-engineering of services aim to increase throughput. These 
innovations are managerial initiatives which draw on orthodox management 
theories to increase efficiency and, at the same time, improve patients' 
experiences of the NHS and contribute towards better health outcomes. 
When the latter are achieved, and innovations are portrayed with a positive 
spin, it can be difficult to question their merit, even when there is strong 
evidence of work intensification. However, this creates a paradox in a 
system that openly claims a desire to foster innovation. Respondents cited 
'time to reflect' as an enabler of innovation and this is echoed within the 
literature (Ekvall 1996). When work is intensified in order to increase 
efficiency, 'idea time' may be squeezed out of the system. Focussing on and 
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rewarding the NHS through, for example, star ratings, or Indeed, failing to 
punish Chief Executives, by allowing them to keep their jobs if they achieve 
single issues such as efficiency savings or waiting time targets, has the 
capacity to lead to a reductionist mindset and behaviour which creates an 
imbalance in the system. There have been reports of fiddles and the 
orchestration of results through the deployment of additional staff whilst the 
monitoring of targets was in progress, because, as respondents stated, 
failing to meet them was known to be at best career limiting and at worst, a 
sackable offence (Gulland 2003). In addition, critics have claimed that 
politically-driven, centrally-defined, performance targets have the capacity to 
undermine clinical priorities (Young & Heymann 2003). The assumption that 
a narrow rational managerial indicator like 'waiting time' can be 
unproblematically privileged and measured within an organisation as 
complex as the NHS, without creating unintended consequences, would 
appear to be fundamentally flawed. 
4.4.3 The problem with orthodox managerialism 
Thus NPM and its use of orthodox, reductionist managerial methods is not 
without their critics. The history of managerialism can be traced back to the 
beginning of the 19th Century and the work of Frederick W. Taylor (1911). 
Taylor was the author of 'scientific management'. His aim was to transform 
the act of management into a scientific process and he is particularly well- 
known as the founder of the 'time and motion' study. Here, work activity was 
broken down into segments and the time taken to undertake each segment 
of work recorded. Taylor also introduced a reward system to control the 
consciousness and thus increase the performance of workers (Kanigel 
1997). Armed with this knowledge, it was argued, the manager could ensure 
that the workforce was as efficient and as productive as possible by 
managing and controlling the performance of each and every worker. Bolton 
(2004) has suggested that such performative control mechanisms within the 
NHS are "reinvigorated Taylorism" Performative control mechanisms cited 
by respondents included the monitoring of centrally defined targets. 
Reflecting on organisational behaviour during a week in March 2004 when 
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trolley waits in A&E at the Leeds Teaching Hospital were audited Lynch 
concluded: 
"The trust achieved the target holy grail, but did so by employing a 
tayloristic scientific style of management. There was little dialogue or 
discussion. Decisions were cascaded in a top-down manner. I for one 
felt as if I was working in a factory. " (Lynch 2004 p 130) 
The 'No. 10 Delivery Unit', established at the start of Blair's second term of 
office, was a direct response to concerns at the centre that reform of the 
public services was not happening quickly enough across the board. Having 
convinced Blair of the potential of targets to improve literacy and numeracy 
in schools, whilst working under David Blunkett during New Labour's first 
term, Michael Barber, a man passionate about equality of opportunity, was 
appointment as the units Director. In a candid account of Government during 
this period, Barber demonstrated how the Delivery Unit embraced and 
developed its own brand of managerialism which was labelled 'deliverology' 
(Barber 2007). Delivering reform of the public services was seen to be so 
important that failure to meet targets put the Government into crisis mode. 
For example, failure to demonstrate a reduction in street crime was 
classified as a national crisis and a civil contingencies committee, or 
'COBRA', meeting was convened. Chaired by the Prime Minister himself, all 
key Government stakeholders met in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room in the 
bowels of Downing Street. Previously COBRA meetings had been convened 
for the 7th July London bombings, the fuel protests and 11th September 
attack on the twin towers in New York, thus illustrating the importance the 
Government placed on the achievement of centrally set targets for the 
improvement of the public services. 
Respondents suggested that some of the targets set nationally were 
politically motivated measures of performance rather than clinically relevant 
assessments of patients' experiences and their health outcomes. This 
rationalist discourse, arguably, had the capacity to be an ideological 
oxymoron within the NHS, which is recognised as a politically-charged, 
socially-complex enterprise (Buchanan & Badham 1999; Klein 2001), in a 
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complex, constantly changing society, outside of the control of the NPM 
managers. Despite the development of alternative discourses within 
management which I discuss in chapter 7, these data would indicate that the 
orthodox remains dominant within management practices within the United 
Kingdom's (UK) National Health Service (NHS). Learmonth (2001) has 
argued that they also dominate health services' management literature. 
From this perspective, it would appear that there is a dissonance between 
the desire of Governments to modernise the UK Health Service and their 
use of traditional command and control management methods, from the very 
centre of Government, to achieve this end. 
For nearly three decades, successive Governments have relentlessly 
pursued the ethos that the key to containing the costs of the NHS was to be 
found through better management. Doctors, who had hitherto been at liberty 
to commit resources based on their relatively autonomous estimation of 
clinical need, are now required to account for their demands to NHS 
managers. From the standpoint of a healthcare professional employed within 
the NHS prior to the introduction of NPM, it is understandable why Pollitt 
(1993) argued that the imposition of uncritical private sector managerialism 
was akin to injecting an 'ideological foreign body' into the public sector. 
Taylor's principles may well have increased the productivity of uneducated 
manual workers within a manufacturing context: 
"the science which underlies each workman's act is so great and 
amounts to so much that the workman who is best suited actually to 
do the work is incapable (either through lack of education or through 
insufficient mental capacity) to understand the science. " (Taylor 1911) 
The suggestion that the educated professions within the NHS should be 
managed in such a manner unsurprisingly met with a great deal of 
resistance (Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd S, & Walker 2005). 
To drive forward the efficiency agenda and overcome the dissonance 
between professional and managerial discourses concerted efforts have 
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been made to colonise professional practice with the ideology of market 
managerialism. Doctors and nurses are amongst the healthcare 
professionals who were actively encouraged to embrace managerialism, 
with the rationalist argument that professional engagement in management 
is a mechanism for professional empowerment. A mainstream analysis of 
these measures is that they were introduced to contain the spiralling costs of 
the NHS, brought about, in part, by the unfettered demands of doctors, 
making decisions based on their clinical expertise which had been hitherto 
unchallenged because of their protected clinical autonomy (Harrison 1999). 
An alternative interpretation is that professional engagement in these 
management processes is a means of achieving normative control (Traynor 
1999). 
4.4.4 The rhetoric of partnership 
Partnership was identified by respondents as an enabler of innovation and, 
as discussed above, was integral to the Third Way methodology for 
achieving New Labour's modernisation agenda. However, as one 
respondent pointed out, innovation can give rise to losers as well as winners. 
If a nurse is substituted for a doctor, for example, the service may be seen to 
be more efficient as it will cost less. From a managerial perspective this is a 
positive outcome. The nursing profession may readily embrace such an 
innovation if it is seen to contribute to a professionalizing strategy. However, 
it may be perceived as an exploitation of labour if the nurse is paid less for 
doing essentially the same as the doctor. The modernisation of careers 
within the Health Service may have addressed this inequity if the medical 
profession had been included in the process, but they were not. Once again 
they negotiated separate, far more lucrative, deals. Professional resistance 
to undertake new roles on the grounds of inequity or indeed on the grounds 
that it may result in an erosion of expertise within medicine, for example, 
may lead to the punitive marginalisation of the professional group that does 
not 'dance to the tune' of the economic imperative. Nevertheless, as Hull 
and Kaghan (2000) acknowledge, all people involved in innovation 
processes have some ability and power to act to change, or to resist change, 
in their circumstances. 
119 
Despite the rhetoric of innovation and the appearance of investment in 
innovation through the establishment of the MA and the CCI, evidence from 
the respondents interviewed within this study would indicate that unless an 
innovation clearly contributes to the achievement of centrally defined 
Government targets, it is unlikely to be considered a legitimate pursuit. It is 
equally unlikely that managers, focused on meeting Government targets 
because their job depends on delivery, will risk diverting time and effort to 
support a locally grown innovation, developed to support a locally identified 
need. 
The Agenda for Change (Department of Health 2004a) careers 
modernisation programme, developed in partnership with the Trades Union, 
incorporates a compulsory annual appraisal system and performance is 
linked to annual increments in pay. Whilst the stated aim of this initiative is to 
foster self-motivation and autonomy amongst the workforce, Traynor (1999) 
has argued: 
"The managerial talk of self-motivation, autonomy, excellence and 
closeness to the customer can be understood as a rhetorical mask for 
... deep and penetrating control of 
the workforce by management (and 
ultimately by government). " (Traynor 1999) 
4.4.4.1 Medical science and Innovation 
Some stakeholders in healthcare would argue that the NHS has embraced 
innovation since its inception. Health professionals and medicine, in 
particular, grounded their professional standing on the basis of medical 
science and innovation. The rather tired examples of product innovations 
offered by the CMO interviewed serve to illustrate this point. The fact that 
innovations in medical science can lead to improvements in health and, at 
the same time, have a significant cost implication illustrates the tension that 
has existed between stakeholders since the inception of the NHS. 
Currently, the professional agenda to ensure that medical practice is, 
wherever possible, underpinned by the best available scientific research 
evidence, is progressed under the label of evidence-based medicine (EBM). 
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New Labour's commitment to partnership working has brought the 
Government and the proponents of the EBM into close alliance through the 
work of NICE. Sheldon and colleagues (2004) have described NICE as the 
policy embodiment of EBM. 
NICE, the Healthcare Commission and QIS were policy innovations 
designed to work collaboratively to eradicate the politically maligned 
postcode lottery of health service provision. Kirkpatrick et al (2005) argue 
that NICE and the Health Commission are amongst a series of quangos and 
agencies established to support management in achieving the Government's 
aims of 'modernising' the Health Service. Their work, and the other 
manifestations of the New Labour's efforts to standardise the NHS in 
partnership with the professional elite, is based on the assumption that It is 
both possible, and desirable, to centrally standardize, or commodify, 
healthcare and monitor local compliance with its delivery. 
4.4.4.2 Support for innovation 
The local implementation of a national standard would, according to table 
4.2, be classified as a type 1 innovation. It is possible that the conditions in 
which a type I innovation might thrive may be very different to the conditions 
in which a type two innovation can flourish. For example, one respondent 
suggested that, from a policy perspective, type 2 innovations could be 
problematic if they appeared 'left field'. This point was raised, not in relation 
to the legitimacy of an innovation, but with regard to the need to prepare the 
system, if an innovation had associated staff training needs and required 
resources for implementation. Another respondent, however, quite explicitly 
suggested that innovations were only legitimate if they clearly served the 
interests of policy. Whilst criteria to identify which innovations would be 
supported by an organisation with finite resources, may be inevitable, the 
commercial sector has already recognised that the application of such 
criteria can be problematic. Xerox, for example, recognised that many good 
ideas, whose potential was not initially seen by their Board, ended up as 
serious money-making ventures - for their competitors. In order to address 
this they established a technology ventures business unit which essentially 
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supplied in-house venture capital for 'good ideas'. Their initiative proved so 
successful that other companies have since followed their lead (Vallery 
1999). 
Whilst there is a strong rhetoric for supporting innovation within Government 
health policy, it would appear that the very methods employed to modernise 
the NHS perversely stifle the NHS's innovative capacity. Their very own 
methods appear to create what Kanter (1992) describes as a segmentalist 
organisation where innovation is stifled. 
Kanter has contrasted segmentalist with integrative organisational structures 
and cultures and suggests that the former are innovation smothering and the 
latter stimulate innovation. She suggested that the characteristics of 
segmentalist structures where innovation is smothered include: 
- Compartmentalised problem solving 
- Over-occupation with hierarchy 
- Efficiency-orientation 
- Rules orientation 
The Government's focus on specific targets would appear to have led to 
compartmentalised problem solving. The rules of the game were very clear - 
targets had to be met, at all costs. One respondent suggested, 
disparagingly, that the problem was that NHS managers lacked the 
capability to conflate targets or engage with the Government to identify more 
appropriate targets. The centralised monitoring of targets appears to 
strengthen an over-occupation with hierarchy and the primary purpose of 
NPM is to focus on efficiency. From a managerial perspective, NPM should 
have a greater capacity to facilitate innovation than the previous, much 
maligned, bureaucratic, NHS administration and NPM should have a greater 
capacity to effectively (and, of course, efficiently) implement new policy and 
legislation. However, where there are competing demands and competing 
discourses, NPM appears to struggle with the complexity. Carter (2000), for 
example, found policy innovation on equal opportunities gave rise to tension 
between competing discourses, namely NHS Equal Opportunities and NPM. 
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Carters' research illustrated how managerialism served to reinforce rather 
than diminish ethnic inequality within the health service. 
The characteristics of integrative structures where type 2 innovation is 
stimulated include: 
- Team orientation 
- Co-operative environment 
- Mechanisms for ideas generation and exchange 
- Holistic problem solving 
- Sense of purpose and direction 
- Ability to overthrow history and precedent 
- Use of internal and external networks 
- Person and creation centred 
- Results orientated 
Ironically, there appeared to be a strong rhetoric from the Government that 
they wanted to create an integrative culture within the NHS. Respondents 
spoke of ministers espousing the values of localism and cited policy 
innovations with that very intent. Policy commentators Klein and Maynard 
(1998) argued that one of the purposes of creating an internal market in the 
NHS was to facilitate the diffusion of blame for the ills of the NHS away from 
central Government to the decentralized operational units, where general 
managers, doctors and nurses were formally responsible and accountable 
for the operational management of the service. Because of the centralising 
tendencies of the Conservative regime, this was only achieved to a limited 
degree. Dismantling the internal market, however, brought the spotlight 
firmly back to the centre as the New Labour Government played a more 
visibly active role in the NHS: 
"Command and control concentrate blame and conflict, which is why 
the white paper may lead ministers to a political Calvary" (Klein & 
Maynard 1998). 
The establishment of Foundation Trusts in England in 2004 (Department of 
Health 2003) may have been a strategy the New Labour Government 
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employed to politically distance themselves from the service. The stated 
purpose of establishing Foundation Trusts was to decentralise and 
democratise the NHS (Klein 2004). The attainment of these ambitions would 
be dependent upon the degree of autonomy that the Trusts actually realised, 
coupled with the volition and capability of local communities to assume the 
new social ownership of their NHS. Hoque et al (2004) argued that the 
success of Foundation Trusts would not only be dependent upon Trust 
Managers perceiving greater autonomy as realistic, but also upon them 
considering it desirable. If the Governments top-down targets are the only 
means NPM managers have of influencing entrenched professional interest, 
they would not necessarily be motivated to earn greater autonomy. The 
desire of the government to shift responsibility for the NHS away from 
central Government in the run-up to a General Election could be interpreted 
as more about politics than policy. However, there was an overwhelming 
sense of cynicism that, particularly at a time so close to a General Election, 
the NHS was too politically sensitive and the Government were too risk 
averse to follow through. 
4.4.4.3 The efficacy of the commodificatlon strategy 
If type 2 innovations were ideal in theory but too risky in reality, then it is 
important, perhaps, to consider the efficacy of the Government's endeavours 
to modernise the NHS through the introduction of type 1 innovations. Some 
five years since the launch of NICE, a national evaluation of the extent to 
which national guidance had been implemented in the NHS was 
commissioned. Sheldon et al (2004) assessed twelve pieces of tracer NICE 
guidance. In table 4.3, I categorised these as surgical, prosthetics and 
pharmaceutical interventions. My traffic light colour coding indicates where 
NICE guidance broadly speaking recommended: 
1. interventions should be stopped (red) 
2. interventions should be administered under specific conditions 
(orange) 
3. interventions should be fully implemented (green). 
Using time series analysis, audit of patient records, survey and interviews, 
the researchers found that the Implementation of NICE guidance varied by 
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NHS Trust and by topic. Of the three surgical interventions, the only change 
observed was in the extraction of wisdom teeth. However, it was noted that 
there had already been a downward trend in the numbers of extractions and 
so it was impossible to conclude whether the NICE guidance had in fact any 
significant impact 
Table 4.3: NICE guidance and recommendations 
Surgical Prosthetics Pharmaceutical 
interventions 
Removal of wisdom 
teeth atment c 
Cell . Laparoscopic Hearing aids Taxanes for 




surgery for the carioverter 
treatment of defibrillators for 








There had been no change in laparoscopic surgery, despite NICE 
recommendations that it should, in the main, be stopped in these instances. 
It was acknowledged that most laparoscopic surgery was concentrated in a 
few Trusts. The rationale for these practices was that: 
"some local expert surgeons had the support of managers and 
commissioners to continue the use of laparoscopic surgery for 
primary repair. It was also claimed that some patients often requested 
laparoscopic procedures.. " (Sheldon et al. 2004 p 1005). 
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This rationale arguably serves to illustrate the prevailing decision-making 
power of surgeons at a local level. 
There was no change recorded in the use of any of the prosthetics since the 
NICE guidance was produced. The rationale provided for the lack of 
implementation of NICE guidance on analogue hearing aids was that 
technological innovation, that is, digital hearing aids, had superseded the 
guidance. In the case of implantable cardioverter defibrillators, cost and 
skills were considered to be limiting factors and, in terms of the 
recommendations for hip prosthesis, orthopaedic surgeons essentially did 
not agree with the recommendations arguing that that they did not 
acknowledge the complexity of hip surgery. 
Where NICE guidance did appear to impact was with regard to 
pharmaceuticals. There was a high level of compliance in the appropriate 
use of Taxanes for breast cancer. One argument put forward to explain this 
compliance was that NICE guidance had made funding easier to obtain. In 
this instance, therefore, the guidance appeared to reduce the incidence of 
postcode prescribing. The level of compliance with regard to ovarian cancer 
was less impressive, however, and it was reported that oncologists felt that 
the NICE guidance had overstated the effectiveness of these drugs in this 
instance. The guidance was subsequently amended by NICE as a result. 
Whilst crude statistics showed an increase in the use of Orlistat for obesity 
which seemed to concur with NICE guidance, closer inspection of case 
notes revealed (where data was available) that a rise in the prescribing of 
the drug did not necessarily mean that the drug was being prescribed 
appropriately. 
The audit for Zanamivir in influenza indicated little inappropriate prescribing. 
However, the growth in the prescription of drugs for Alzheimer's disease was 
noted to be similar to the case of wisdom teeth extraction, inasmuch as the 
trend had started prior to the guidance being formally issued. 
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From analysis of their interview data, they identify five factors which 
appeared to impact on compliance with NICE guidance. These are Trust 
culture; locality decisions; systems for managing guidance; funding and 
consultant buy-in. The researchers concluded that, whilst the establishment 
of NICE was a unique initiative, it alone is not sufficient to secure "the rapid 
and universal implementation" of evidence-based healthcare. This would 
suggest that the achievement of type I innovations may also be relatively 
limited. Ironically, in a system so evidently focused on efficiency, the cost 
effectiveness of guideline development is unknown due to insufficient 
evidence to assess the financial costs: 
"owing to the poor quality of reporting of the economic evaluation, 
data on resource use and costs of guideline development, 
dissemination and implementation, were not available for most of the 
studies... " (Grimshaw et al. 2004). 
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4.5 Summary 
At face value, from a policy perspective, as successive Governments have 
imposed private sector values and management practices upon the NHS, 
innovation in healthcare would appear to be a Government priority. Indeed, 
the Governments in both Scotland and England invested in infrastructures to 
support innovation in healthcare. One might therefore assume that 
innovations would flourish within the context of UK health services. 
Upon closer inspection, however, through analysis of interviews with 
policymakers and discussion of these findings within the context of UK 
Government policy, there would appear to be considerable tensions within 
the system, which may militate against endeavours to innovate. There were 
multiple interpretations of the meaning of innovation and a diversity of 
opinion over what constituted a legitimate Innovation. The wide range of 
stakeholders in healthcare harbouring these multiple perspectives appeared 
to add to this complexity. For instance, Governments' attempts to control 
powerful professionals by empowering and marshalling public opinion was 
seen to have the capacity to backfire, when the public did not agree with 
policymakers endeavours' to, for example, centralise health services. 
Policymakers recognised the healthcare context as a highly politicised 
environment where there was a strong rhetoric of innovation. However, 
paradoxically, this rhetoric was coupled with centralised command and 
control managerialism, totally focused on 'delivering' reform of the public 
services and standardising healthcare provision, in the name of equality. The 
strength of these centralising tendencies may make local endeavours to 
develop innovative health services a considerable challenge. I examined two 
cases off innovation in health within this context and these are reported in 
the next section of this thesis. 
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PART III 
THE CASE STUDIES 
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Chapter 5 Case Study I- The Farmers' Health Project 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the analysis of Case study 1: The Farmers' Health 
Project (FHP). The case was introduced in chapter 2 where the methods 
deployed to investigate the case were set out. Types and sources of 
evidence examined were listed in table 2.5 and the semi-structured interview 
schedule used was presented in table 2.6. In analysing and interpreting 
these data, I identified fifteen critical decisions or incidents which appeared 
to me to have had a significant impact on the trajectory of this particular 
case. Critical analysis of these incidents, through the consideration of the 
probing questions set out in table 2.8, offers insight into the conditions where 
innovations, which endeavour to enable access to a group of people who do 
not routinely access mainstream health services, can flourish. 
In 1999, the FHP, a research project employing an action research 
methodology, was launched. The Project aimed to improve the health of 
farmers in North Lancashire and South Cumbria through the introduction of 
an innovative nurse practitioner (NP)-led outreach service. 
Action research is a research strategy located within the critical paradigm. 
The dual aims of action research are to change practice and develop theory. 
Action research is most often undertaken as a co-operative enquiry in a 
social setting, where actors collaborate as co-researchers in a project where 
together they gather, analyse and reflect on research evidence to inform and 
evaluate their change processes (Lewin 2000). 
A NP is a registered nurse who has undertaken post-registration, graduate- 
level training with mentorship and supervision to prepare her to operate 
independently at an advanced level of practice. The definition of a NP 
endorsed by the Royal College of Nursing Is in table 5.1. The duration of a 
NP course, on a part-time basis, is usually between 2 and 6 years and leads 
to an Honours or a Masters degree. In the UK, the NP qualification is not 
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currently a recordable qualification. Consequently, there is no national 
register of qualified NPs in the UK. Maclaine (2007) advises that the NP 
movement began in the USA and developments in the UK began in the early 
1990's. From then, through to 2002, there was a slow but steady growth in 
the numbers of NPs. Since 2002, there has been a rapid increase in the 
numbers. There are currently thought to be approximately 4000 qualified 
NPs in the UK. 
Table 5.1: Definition of a Nurse Practitioner (Royal College of Nursing 
2002) 
A Nurse Practitioner is a registered nurse who has undertaken a specific 
course of study of at least first degree (Honours) level and who: 
1. makes professionally autonomous decisions, for which he or she is 
accountable 
2. receives patients with undifferentiated and undiagnosed problems 
and makes an assessment of their healthcare needs, based on highly 
developed nursing knowledge and skills, including skills not exercised 
by nurses such as physical examination 
3. screens patients for disease risk factors and early signs of illness 
4. makes differential diagnosis using decision-making and problem- 
solving skills 
5. develops with the patient an ongoing nursing care plan for health, with 
an emphasis on preventative measures 
6. orders necessary investigations, and provides treatment and care 
both individually, as part of a team, and through referral to other 
agencies 
7. has a supportive role in helping people to manage and live with illness 
8. provides counselling and health education 
9. has the authority to admit or discharge patients from their caseload, 
and refer patients to other healthcare providers as appropriate 
10. works collaboratively with other healthcare professionals 
11. provides a leadership and consultancy function as required 
The seven stated aims of the FHP are set out in table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Alms of the Farmers' Health Project: 
1. to gain understanding of the particular health needs of the farming 
community of the MBHA (Morecambe Bay Health Authority) area. 
2. to address the problem of the exclusion of many farmers from the 
main stream healthcare. 
3. to examine whether creating new pathways for healthcare can 
address rural health inequalities 
4. to explore the interface of primary and secondary care in rural 
settings 
5. to explore opportunities for joint working/collaboration between 
physical and mental health services and between 
health/social/welfare agencies in rural areas. 
6. to evaluate any emerging differences in practice between two 
different rural locations 
7. to evaluate the development of the Nurse Practitioner role in rural 
settings 
The FHP was financed through a mixed portfolio of funding, which included 
the Rural Development Commission (RDC), the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (MAAF), the Foundation of Nursing Studies (FONS) and the North 
West Regional NHS Executive R&D Directorate (Burnett, Mort, Walsh, & 
Easterlow 1998). The latter was sourced from a regional NHS Research & 
Development capacity-building, funding stream and provided the largest 
single funding source (65%). The project was located within a large 
geographical area, which was divided in two by local authority boundaries, 
namely South Cumbria and North Lancashire. The named principal 
investigator of the project was a local general practitioner based In a semi- 
rural practice. He worked closely with a full-time academic. The academic 
was a medical sociologist, with a background in journalism, whose previous 
experience may have helped significantly In the marketing of the initiative. A 
press conference was called when the project was launched and press 
releases were issued. Two farms, one in each of the project areas, 
participated in the launch. The team was briefed that there were three key 
messages to convey. The project was about mental health, farm accidents 
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and chronic health problems (Management Group Meeting Minutes 21 July 
1999). 
The media launch and subsequent profile of the project led to considerable 
demand for information about the initiative: 
"We have had enormous interest in this project because it is the only 
one of its kind, with all the issue around agriculture even before foot 
and mouth we have been in almost every version of the media you 
can imagine including Radio 4, the national Guardian, BBC...., we 
have been inundated with media requests. Also requests from other 
people who wanted to set up something similar" (Manager 2) 
The initial pro-active approach to marketing and dissemination turned into a 
reactive one as the team became inundated with enquiries. Indeed, the 
professional and media interest in the initiative became so onerous that the 
project team began to be concerned that the time spent on dissemination 
activity was taking them away from developing the core aims of the project. 
However, as a result of the high profile achieved, the Countryside Agency 
(CA) invested in the project in order to support further dissemination so that 
lessons learned from the initiative could be promulgated across the country. 
CA funding was a critical incident in the project, which enabled the project 
team to appoint a research assistant to co-ordinate dissemination activities. 
Her work included the development and dissemination of an information 
pack and the co-ordination of the development and dissemination of a video 
about the project, which was also funded by the CA. In addition, members of 
the project team published articles in their professional press to raise 
awareness of the project and disseminate some of the findings, including for 
example Burnett (2000) and Walsh (1997; 2000a; 2000a; 2000c; 2000b). 
The experiences here would indicate that there is a delicate balance to be 
found between the time and energy invested in the marketing and 
dissemination of an innovation in service delivery with the imperatives of 
implementing and evaluating the innovation itself. 
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5.2 Stakeholder Analysis 
Through the process of analysing these data, the complexity of the 
relationships between the multiple actors and agencies involved in this 
project became apparent. Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the range of 
stakeholders I identified within the FHP. It implies that farmers themselves 
are the focal point, at the centre of the project. The project was steered by a 
wide range of stakeholders, which included farmers, a range of healthcare 
professionals, healthcare managers, academics and representatives from 
the project funding bodies. Each of these stakeholders reported to, and was 
accountable to, a wider constituency, so, for example, through their 
professional regulatory frameworks, healthcare professionals are ultimately 
accountable to the public. Academics, on the other hand, are accountable to 
those who fund their activities. Traditionally, academic activity has, in the 
main, been funded through the public purse. However, this pattern is 
changing as other investors, including the commercial sector, seek to work 
in partnership with the academic community, to their mutual advantage. The 
portfolio of funding underpinning the FHP serves to illustrate this trend. 
Irrespective of the source of academic funding, academic performance, and 
research activity in particular, is currently assessed according to research 
outputs, the majority of which appear within peer-reviewed academic 
journals. Managers within a national publicly funded health service are 
ultimately accountable to the Government of the day. Any institution such as 
the NHS, which has the public interest at its core, and is dependent upon the 
public purse, is constantly under the scrutiny of the media. As discussed 
above, this project purposefully engaged the media as a marketing strategy. 
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Figure 5.1: Farmers' Health Project stakeholder analysis 
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5.2.1 Farmers as the focus? 
As outlined in table 5.2, one aim of this project was to identify the health 
needs of farmers and address their exclusion from mainstream service 
provision. It has been argued that farmers' exclusion from mainstream 
services is in-keeping with their culture. According to Gerrard (1998), 
farmers are known for their reticence, stoicism, self-reliance and isolation 
and, therefore, unlikely to seek external assistance on any issue, let alone 
health matters. One informant, herself a healthcare professional from a 
farming background, described the farming culture and suggested that it was 
under considerable strain. She argued farmers are: 
"... a breed of their own, it's a culture, it's like the Incas, it's nothing to 
do with being British or Australian or anything, it's a breed of us, we 
are self sufficient really. But in the political-social climate that self- 
sufficiency is being eroded ..., the community is eroding, the families 
are eroding, and so is the whole culture, our culture, my culture is 
altering.. ". (Nurse Practitioner 2) 
The decision to make farmers a focus of this project is, in itself, interesting 
because, however compelling the evidence that farmers have unmet health 
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needs (Gerrard 1998), this concern was not the issue that Initially drew 
people together. The original driver appeared to be a shared concern about 
mental health within rural communities and the urban focus within local 
research into mental health services. 
In 1996, a research team from Lancaster University secured funding from 
the North West Regional NHS Executive R&D Directorate to research the 
organisation of primary care for mental health. This research was: 
"designed to focus on the complex nature of service provision and to 
use a research methodology which would allow a degree of 
collaboration and involvement, by stakeholders in the system" 
(Davies, Mort, & Stead 2000 p 5). 
Collaboration and involvement were facilitated through the establishment of 
a research steering committee made up of local stakeholders. This research 
consisted of five discreet projects. One steering committee member, a local 
general practitioner from a rural practice, noted that the first two projects had 
a predominantly urban focus. She shared her experiences as a rural GP and 
cited clinical case studies to illustrate the difficulties in supporting people 
with mental health problems in rural communities. "... getting access early 
on" was highlighted as particularly problematic. 
This GPs "story" was heard and recounted by other informants. For 
example: 
"she told us of anecdotal evidence of (well it is not anecdotal in the 
sense that it wasn't true) but it was a sort of personal case-study ... of 
a young man ..... eventually the police got involved because he took a 
gun to himself in ... in a multi-storey car park .... and she traced it back..., if in a sense he was so isolated from the health service and a 
lot of the rural problems came up. Well we said well yes this seems 
to be quite a considerable problem but what we will do is we will... 
look and see whether we could gather a rural advisory group" 
(Researcher 1) 
Thus, the sharing of a "real" life and death case study, coupled with this GP's 
account of her personal frustration with the challenges of supporting people 
with mental health problems in rural communities, shaped the focus of the 
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third project funded by the North West Regional NHS Executive R&D 
Directorate, to research the organisation of primary care for mental health 
(Davies, Mort, & Stead 2000). 
With collaboration and involvement a key aim, the research team organised 
an awareness-raising conference. "Mental Health Issues for Rural 
Practices" was held on 26th February 1998 at Westmoreland General 
Hospital in Cumbria. Designed primarily for local GPs the event was 
promoted widely in order to try to attract lay, voluntary and professional 
organisations and individuals interested in rural health issues and mental 
health in particular. Organisations approached included Rural MIND and the 
Citizens' Advice Bureau. 
To facilitate discussion, conference delegates were offered three 
anonymised case studies, about a mechanic, a farmer and a teacher, to 
explore the problems experienced by rural practices when caring for patients 
with mental health needs. Although the researchers knew that the primary 
focus was on the mental health of the individuals within the case studies, 
they advised me that they had anticipated the discussion would raise 
infrastructure issues associated with isolation such as transportation. 
However, such issues were not identified as concerns by the conference 
participants. 
All of the issues raised were captured on flip-charts and conference 
participants were invited to join a Rural Mental Health Working Group to 
explore solutions to the problems raised at the conference. Attendance at 
the awareness-raising conference and the establishment of the Rural Health 
Working Group appeared to suggest that there was a critical mass of people 
with a shared concern about the mental health of rural communities. 
The critical question is how, and perhaps more insightfully why, did a 
collective desire to improve the mental health of rural communities result in a 
NP-led farmers' health outreach project? 
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The Rural Mental Health Working Group met on a number of occasions to 
discuss the issues raised at the conference. One informant advised that, 
over time, some of the self-selected members of the working group "fell 
away" (R1). It was suggested that that some 'voices' were more dominant 
than others at these meetings. 
".. the people who were not in professional roles dropped out very 
quickly including .. um.. peopie from MIND who we had invited 
sometimes extra-specially who would say something and then the 
professionals would continue to talk and ignore them" (Researcher 1) 
Therefore, despite the intention of giving lay participants, members of these 
rural communities and their representatives, a voice, according to this 
informant, the professional members of the groups dominated the 
proceedings and marginalised the lay participants. 
This informant suggested that two camps emerged within the working group. 
The first camp was comfortable and relaxed at having a wide-ranging and 
inclusive exploration of the issues. They knew that, in the end, they would do 
'something'. The second camp appeared to be uncomfortable with this 
approach. They appeared to be more anxious to get on and 'do something'. 
Were members of this second group eager that 'something', or 'anything' 
should be done because of a sense of urgency about the issue? Did they 
have a particular solution in mind that they were anxious to realise, and if so, 
what was the solution and why were they so keen to make it a reality? 
Three months after the initial conference, the rural mental health working 
group had identified three possible "rural research initiatives". These are 
presented in table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: Possible Rural Research Initiatives (18.05.98) 
1. Bid for £50,000 over 3 years to NHS region for a Nurse Practitioner to 
work peripatetically across a number of practices i. e. Kirkby Lonsdale, 
Sedbergh, Ambleside, Kirkby in Furness, addressing farmers' and 
their families' health. 
2. A rural 'expert' i. e. National Farmer's Union (NFU) (or other) 
representative to set up a regular (e. g. monthly? ) session in the 
general practice, which GPs can make use of to refer patients for 
advice on farming and related issues. 
3. A primary care support worker for rural health via Morecambe Bay 
Health Authority (MBHA) - this role to be defined after further 
discussion with MBHA 
Davies, Mort and Stead (2000) reported that it was decided very early on to 
focus on the physical and mental health needs of farmers and their families. 
It appears that the general practitioners (G. Ps) in the group had significant 
influence: 
".. there were a couple of GPs there who said very urgently we have this 
population which we think are highly at risk and their industry is in crisis 
and we know that...... they called it a "storm warning", we have had a 
"storm warning" about these people and we actually have a responsibility 
to do something about it" (Researcher 2). 
One GP informant suggested that the decision to focus on the healthcare 
needs of farmers was politically expedient as a result of the high public and 
media profile of the issues of concern within rural communities championed 
by lobby groups such as the Countryside Alliance: 
"... it has been a political "hot potato" ... rural issues... Countryside Alliance and all the protests about one problem after another hitting 
the farmers from milk, BSE, sheep you name it, as well as the 
agricultural policy and drop in farming incomes all this has hit farmers 
really hard ... It is a national priority, it is highly politicised now which it 
wouldn't have been five years' ago, and it is sort of, there is like a 
groundswell, there is a like a whole movement about rural issues 
(General Practitioner 2). 
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The concerns expressed by the G. Ps. when coupled with academic research 
was described as compelling evidence: 
"... as soon as I read this piece by Gerrard I realised that those two 
things came together and that what you have got is a group 
identifying need and saying that action has to be taken and you have 
got academic research evidence and when you put the two together it 
is so compelling that I could just see immediately that we would get 
some money. " (Researcher 2) 
The decision to focus on the physical and mental health of farmers shifted 
the scope of the project from the mental health of rural communities. There 
appeared to be at least five factors which steered the group towards their 
decision to focus on farmers' health. These were: 
1. the currency of what was described as "compelling" evidence where 
academic research identified a hidden morbidity amongst the farming 
community which could be addressed through a targeted 
occupational health service (Gerrard 1998) 
2. the contribution of powerful professional people, where they draw on 
their tacit and experiential knowledge and they use emotive language 
and talk of a "storm warning" within the farming community. This was 
a concern which they argued they have a professional responsibility 
to do something about. 
3. the perception that some of the professionals dominated the debate, 
professionals who may indeed have been harbouring personal 
ambitions to steer the development of the initiative in a way that 
would help them achieve their personal and professional goals. 
4. the perception that those who dominated the debate effectively 
silenced alternative and lay voices by not listening to their 
contributions and continuing to talk over them. Consequently, it was 
reported that those who were not from professional groups dropped 
out very quickly thus closing down opportunities to discuss alternative 
options. 
5. an awareness of the political landscape with the plight of farmers 
described as a political hot potato and a sense that consequently the 
time was right to endeavour to address farmers' health needs. 
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The decision to focus on farmers' health, however, only explains the first two 
of the seven aims of the project outlined in table 5.2. It was not clear if all 
seven aims were of equal importance. Consequently, it was not clear what 
would happen if one aim militated against another. 
5.2.2 Nurse practitioners as the focus? 
The decision to focus on farmers' health was interestingly coupled with two 
other major decisions. The rural mental health working group elected to 
pursue an aspect of the first option (table 5.3) and address farmers' health 
needs through a NP-led service. The rationale put forward for an NP-led 
service was, that based on the relatively stoical nature of farming 
communities, a comprehensive health service, which did not focus 
exclusively on mental health issues, would be more acceptable and less 
threatening. NPs, with their advanced level of practice, could provide a "one- 
stop-shop" to identify and address the majority of farmers' healthcare needs. 
The second key decision taken was that the NPs should provide an outreach 
service. It was argued that an outreach service offered the most culturally 
sensitive approach, meeting farmers on their own terms and on their own 
territory. In this section I examine the decision to provide a NP-led service. In 
the next section I critically examine the actions taken to provide an outreach 
service. 
The decision to provide an NP-led outreach service proved to be less than 
straightforward. For example, one respondent suggested: 
"... this project started off as two completely separate projects, ...,. there was a project going on at Lancaster University with Rural Minds 
interested in rural mental health issues and at the same time .... at St. Martins, that given the track record of nurse practitioners as being 
very good at filling in niches in the whole provision market...... (and) 
realising that there was major problems in farming, I sort of put two 
and two together and said could nurse practitioners provide a service 
for farmers in Cumbria? ... and really the genesis of the project, I 
guess, was when those two came together" (Researcher 3). 
This informant was a nurse academic involved in the provision of 
educational programmes for the development of NPs and a member of the 
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rural mental health group. When I interviewed him I detected a sense of 
passion in his voice about the NP role, which I raised with him. He replied: 
"It's passion because to me it's actually letting nurses do what they 
should be doing. For so long I think nurses have been held back by 
constraints, by bureaucracy, by the traditions the way the health 
service has always run, by traditional medical dominance, it has 
always held nurses back and to me this whole nurse practitioner 
concept is empowering nurses to fulfil their potential in a true way" 
(Researcher 3). 
Another informant, herself a farmer and a qualified NP who worked 
alongside the GP who became the principal investigator for the project, 
indicated that a NP outreach service for farmers was originally her Idea. She 
had undertaken the NP degree course at St. Martin's some five years 
previously and in part fulfilment of her degree had proposed piloting a NP 
service for farmers at auction marts, the place where she knew farmers 
congregated. To her frustration, her proposal had been rejected because of 
its complexity. However, she felt passionately that this would be a means of 
identifying and addressing the health needs of farmers and she had had 
many conversations with her GP colleague both about her concern for 
farmers' health and her vision of how their needs could be met. This GP 
became the Principal Investigator for the Farmers' Health research project. 
The academic who ran the NP educational programme argued that the 
coupling of a NP-led service with a focus on farmers' health was a win-win 
solution. It both had the potential to meet farmers' needs and at the same 
time was a strategy to take nursing, and NPs in particular, forward. 
The decision to establish a novel NP-led outreach service was clearly 
significant. Some informants however, felt that the decision was neither one 
that was reached by consensus nor was it one that they felt particularly 
comfortable with: 
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"I just think, / feel that the role of nurse practitioner isn't the right one 
for what we had envisaged or some people had envisaged the project 
to be about and so that's now, sort of, is the lead part of the project 
isn't it? .... the emphasis suddenly turned to having a nurse 
practitioner because that was also looked upon as being innovative 
and I think that if it had been left with CPN's and community nurses, 
think we would have addressed farmer's health needs in a much 
wider way, I think it has become very specialised and very particular 
now, which wasn't, / think, what we set out to do.... I think it was 
because the nurse academic is, you know, quite a dynamic person, 
quite determined and he was training nurse practitioners and 1 think 
he just felt that they were the only people who could do the work as 
he envisaged it, which was very clinical and diagnostic and those sort 
of things whereas in my view the origins of it was to extend the role of 
community nursing to give a better service to farmers. " (Health 
Visitor). 
The introduction of a novel NP-led outreach service was seen as particularly 
galling by those staff who were already endeavouring to address the needs 
of the farming communities they served by working in partnership with them. 
For example, one respondent reported that "farmers' wives" worked with 
community health workers and it was proposed that to "get at the men folk" 
the workers should set up a stall at the Auction Marts. With a focus on 
lifestyles, these members of staff had attended Auction Marts on three 
occasions before their intervention "was all put on hold because this other 
thing was really getting closer then to happening" (Health Visitor). This 
account would suggest that, in this case, the dominant voices within the 
project not only had the capacity to steer the innovation in a particular 
direction, they also, through the project, had the capacity to stifle local 
endeavours to develop services in partnership with local communities. 
A community psychiatric nurse (CPN) was noted to have expressed concern 
at the beginning of the project about "the balance within the nurse 
practitioner role between mental health and general skills" (Management 
Group minutes 21/6/99). It would appear that her concerns were not 
addressed as she reiterated them in her interview with me some months 
later. She stated that she: 
"... was concerned that the mental health aspect has not been thoroughly addressed" (Community Psychiatric Nurse). 
143 
Perhaps somewhat ironically, a recommendation within the final report of the 
project appeared to echo the very concerns about the mental health of rural 
communities that were raised at the outset: 
"Mental health problems/needs in the farming community need 
addressing in ways which are more culturally acceptable. Often, 
especially in isolated, rural areas, problems are not identified until too 
late, or until the symptoms are severe enough for the Mental Health 
Act to be invoked. Such situations, with all their destructive potential, 
can be prevented by providing easier access to mental health workers 
who are familiar with the culture and problems of such communities. " 
(Burnett & Mort 2001) 
The ultimate criticism of the development of a NP-led service was perhaps 
that offered by the NP appointed to the project, who, once established in the 
role, questioned the necessity of NP qualifications to identify and address 
the heath care needs of farmers. She said: 
"I honestly think that a good district nurse or occupational health 
nurse or even to some degree a community psychiatric nurse could 
have done this job as long as they advertised what they were offering" 
(NP1) 
and, had she been in a position to start again would have handled the 
project differently. She suggested: 
"they might have had a focus group of farmers to say this is what we 
have found, what do you feel about this, if you were wanting to have a 
health service how would you like it done? " (NP 1) 
Did the decision to introduce a novel NP-led outreach service, to focus on 
identifying and addressing the physical and mental health needs of farmers, 
lead to a win-win situation as suggested? From my analysis, it would appear 
that this decision fragmented rather than cemented the critical mass of 
people who came together with a common agenda to address the mental 
health needs of rural communities. There was more of a fission (splitting) 
than a fusion (blending together into one, coalition, union) of the members of 
the rural mental health working group. 
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According to one respondent, at the point where these decisions were made, 
the rural mental health working group membership "diminished dramatically" 
(Researcher 1) and for some, there was a great sense of disappointment felt 
at that stage. Was this because people might actually have to do something 
or that names might actually be in the frame? One informant suggested that 
this was a behavioural pattern that she had witnessed before within the 
health service. Her interpretation of this behaviour was that people 
complained when decisions were not made quickly but as soon as a 
decision was made and action was to be taken, "they melted like the snow" 
(Researcher 1). However, another interpretation might be that the focus was 
becoming too narrow or too far removed from the original mental health 
agenda for some group members. They may have lost interest because they 
felt that the dominant voices in the group were taking control or even 
hijacking the agenda. 
From a critical perspective, it Is helpful to examine the events as both fusion 
and fission. Through the fusion lens we witness the emergence of a critical 
mass with a focus on the health needs of farmers. Within this group there 
was also a small but powerful coalition of professionals who argued 
passionately that a NP-led service was the most appropriate means of 
addressing farmers' health needs. Indeed, at least one member of the group 
clearly had a vested interest in making this a reality. Through the fission 
lens we see the marginalisation of the "hidden voices" within the community. 
These were perhaps the people drawn to the initiative because of its original 
aim to focus on and address mental health issues within rural communities. 
A critical question is whether the potential to address mental health needs in 
innovative ways was thwarted as a consequence of the decision to focus on 
farmers' health and the coupling of that focus with a NP-led service as le 
solution. My analysis would suggest that during the course of this project it 
sometimes became unclear if, as illustrated in figure 5.1, farmers were 
indeed at the centre of the project, or whether the agenda to further the role 
and contribution of the NP took centre stage. I concluded that the presence 
of multiple aims within this project led to a lack of clarity over the primary 
purpose of the initiative. In the following paragraphs, I will illustrate how the 
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pursuit of the aim to evaluate the impact of NPs in a rural setting had the 
capacity to place the NP role centre stage, at the expense of the farmers. 
As a consequence, identifying and addressing the healthcare needs of 
farmers became a means to an end rather than the primary aim of the 
project. 
Funding for the project was eventually secured in March 1999. The Rural 
Mental Health Working Group, along with representatives from the 
organisations who funded the project and co-options from the farming 
community, established a project steering committee. Charged with the 
responsibility of taking a strategic view, this committee met every three 
months throughout the duration of the project. A smaller management group 
was formed to oversee the project which met monthly. Minutes of both the 
steering committee and the management group were disseminated to 
relevant parties as a means of keeping key stakeholders abreast of 
developments. 
With the funding in place, two NP posts were advertised initially. The plan 
was for each NP to appoint a Support Worker to their team. The steering 
group not only sought to appoint nurses with a NP qualification but four 
individuals with rural backgrounds and / or experience of working within rural 
/ farming communities. 
Over 60 enquiries were fielded and 30 applications were received for the NP 
positions. The size of the response surprised many members of the 
management group because this was a research project offering a two year 
fixed-term contract. Despite the encouraging numbers of nurses who 
responded to the advert, only one qualified NP applied for a position. The 
interview panel appointed the qualified NP and decided to also appoint an 
experienced nurse with the right background, who agreed to undertake NP 
training "on the job". This was a critical incident in the project and the 
decision appeared to be based on the assumption that one individual could 
simultaneously: 
146 
1. undertake a demanding, clinically focused, skills-based 
academic course with an extensive requirement for clinically 
based supervision and assessment, 
2. manage and support the development of a support worker 
3. establish an outreach service and work autonomously at an 
advanced level. 
There was a view, however, that the majority of the steering group members 
did not appreciate the remit of the NP role and as a result were unaware of 
the implications of this decision. 
The qualified NP appointed to the project advised me that she felt that the 
members of the project steering committee, with the exception of the 
academic who ran the NP course, were unaware of the scope of the NP role 
and, consequently, did not understand the rationale for, and implications of, 
developing a NP-led outreach service. Early on in the project she expressed 
concern about the difficulty of meeting expectations in terms of in-service 
training and clinical supervision (Management Group minutes 15/09/99). She 
also expressed concern that she felt that she was losing her clinical 
competency due to the lack of "hands-on" nursing in the early days of the 
project. 
"... the first six or seven months were really quite frustrating. I was 
worried about losing my skills because I had been seeing between 40 
and 60 patients a day, to seeing I or 2a week, and I was concerned 
that it wasn't going to get off the ground ...... " (NP 1). 
These issues were compounded for the other nurse appointed to the project 
who was endeavouring simultaneously to train and qualify as a NP. 
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I think the problem in south Lakes ... was very difficult, you know, up there for the nurse, because she tried to do the nurse practitioner 
course at the same time which is a huge amount of work and perhaps 
wasn't able to give the same amount of time initially to be going out 
and if you like marketing and promoting this, so I don't think there is 
the same response in South Lakes as there has been in North 
Lancashire which is worrying in terms of South Lakes sort of seeming 
to view it as a valuable service because you know I live in Cumbria 
and farmers in Cumbria have very similar problems to farmers in 
North Lancashire they are no different, but I felt that South Cumbria 
were going to miss out on a possible potential service because you 
know the nurse up there was trying to do too many things all at once 
really ............. I 
look at it in terms of trying to go out there and 
promote the Farmers' Health project, trying to do all the networking 
that needed to be done initially, trying to gain people's confidence 
whilst trying to meet all the demands that a nurse practitioner course 
makes on you, I think it must be very difficult thing to try to achieve" 
(Community Psychiatric Nurse). 
There was a sense here that the appointment panel "made do" and I was left 
with the impression that the nurse who was not qualified as a NP was 
perceived by some as "second best". 
"Well, one of the nurses wasn't a nurse practitioner and so we 
decided to take a risk and appoint that person and then look to train 
that person as a nurse practitioner.... and that was because of the 
pressure of getting the project up and running. In hindsight I am not 
sure that was the right decision really, we might have been better re- 
advertising or looking at having a different staff structure to the 
project" (Manager 2). 
On paper, the impression is given is that the differences between the two 
nurses were acknowledged more positively than they appeared to be in 
reality. The methodological approach taken in this project, action research, 
allows for reflection, flexibility and change throughout the course of a project. 
The centrality of the NP role to this project appeared to make reflection and 
change a significant challenge. 
The nurse who was not qualified as a NP stated that she began to realise 
that she was not doing the project justice and was concerned that she was 
working unsupervised and beyond the scope of her professional practice. 
She felt that she was not being fair to the farmers, the project, her support 
worker or herself. As a consequence, she began to question whether a NP 
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outreach service was the only means of addressing the health needs of the 
farming community. She began to ask whether an additional service should 
be established when an alternative and potentially more sustainable 
approach would be to work with farming communities to help farmers help 
themselves and work with the healthcare professionals "in situ" to raise their 
awareness of the needs of the farming community and how to support them 
most effectively. Consequently, she proposed a different way of working. Her 
challenge led to one informant advising that the two nurses appointed "had 
a different emphasis on the work they wanted to do, which has caused quite 
a bit of tension" (Manager 2). This tension was widely reported by informants 
as leading to poor communication and strained working relationships. 
Some, perhaps committed to a NP-led outreach service, viewed the nurse 
electing to operate in a different way as a failure. Others, frustrated by the 
strong focus on evaluating NP interventions and "numbers of farmers, 
clinically assessed by a NP", perhaps at the expense of exploring other ways 
of identifying and addressing the healthcare needs of farmers, believed that 
focussing on this single measure was "missing the point". It wasn't until the 
catastrophe of Foot and Mouth (discussed below) stymied the NP outreach 
service that alternative approaches were accepted as legitimate. 
In an interim report, it was recorded that "Much time and effort was spent on 
(nurse prescribing) in the early months of the project" (Davies, Mort, & 
Stead 2000). It was not clear, however, why this was the case. There did 
not appear to be any data collected or presented indicating why this was 
believed to be an issue that warranted attention, let alone "much time and 
effort", within this particular context. For example, how many times would the 
NP have prescribed had she had the authority to do so? What percentage of 
the farmers seen required a prescription? How many times did the NP have 
to make a referral to a patient's GP for medication? Whilst some data were 
collected by the project team (see table 5.4), these specific questions did not 
appear to be asked or answered and, had they been, arguably the time and 
effort expended by project members on this issue may have been justified. 
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The legislative framework at the time allowed NPs limited prescribing rights 
within agreed protocols within a General Practice. The legislative framework 
was evidently a source of frustration for NPs who were educationally 
prepared to prescribe beyond the bounds of current legislation. Reflecting on 
her experience in general practice, the NP advised: 
"..... I'll see patients and they say, `oh do you always have to wait for 
a prescription? ' and I say 'yes I do, / say `nurse practitioners can do 
this and they can do that but the prescribing laws in this country 
cannot allow them to prescribe some of the drugs which they know 
help"' (NP 1). 
Table 5.4: Data collected by the Farmers' Health Project Team (adapted 
from the final report (Burnett & Mort 2001) 
Data collected Number(s) 
Farmers registered (including the rate and source of 277* 
referral, age, gender, location / postcode and initial 
reason for consultation) 
Consultations held 500* 
"Health promotion" contacts direct approx 1400* 
"Health promotion" contacts indirect approx 5500* 
Telephone evaluation of clients seen by a NP 98 
Number of farms visited not published 
Number of auction marts attended not published 
Number of agricultural shows attended not published 
Dissemination activities such as presentations given not published 
Reflective diaries not published 
In addition, two parallel studies were undertaken. 
a) one member of the project team instigated a review of farm accidents 
within the project area from 1999 to 2000. Data were collected from an 
Accident and Emergency department out with the study area and across five 
General Practices within the vicinity. 
b) an audit of Coroners inquest records was also conducted to endeavour to 
establish the rate and causes of farm related deaths within the project area. 
* Data were collected and analysed over the twelve month period once the project van was 
fully operational and prior to the onset of Foot and Mouth 
Presumably, those within the project team who influenced the decision to 
develop a NP-led service were aware of the legislation and could have 
anticipated that NPs working autonomously and providing an outreach 
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service, which crossed primary care and health authority boundaries, would 
not have had the legal right to prescribe. They should also have known that 
setting up prescribing protocols across multiple General Practices would be 
immensely problematic. Nevertheless, "much time and effort" was spent 
trying to find ways around this situation. 
The debate here is not whether N. P's should, or should not, have extensive 
prescribing rights or whether legislation should be changed to accommodate 
extensive nurse prescribing. The focus of this debate is whether a 
professionalising agenda has the capacity to hijack an innovation which 
purports to have clients with healthcare needs at its centre. Without 
evidence to substantiate the impact of the absence of NPs actual or potential 
prescribing rights in this context, it is difficult to ascertain whose interests 
were being served. The evidence to support the argument that this was 
indeed in the interest of the Farmers appeared to be lacking. Nevertheless, 
one of the five final recommendations from the project was based on this 
assumption: 
"Nurse prescribing is integral to an outreach health service for a 
marginalised community. Urgent attention should be given to the legal 
framework currently inhibiting practice and undermining the 
effectiveness of initiatives that seek to redress inequalities in health 
service provision. " (Burnett & Mort 2001) 
The project, therefore, clearly served as a vehicle to promulgate the desires 
of those within the NP movement to extend prescribing rights and "empower 
nurses to fulfil their potential'. 
The project had multiple aims (table 5.2). Whilst, on the face of it, the health 
of farmers seemed to be the explicit primary aim, the desire to promulgate 
the NP role appeared to have the capacity to dominate the agenda. Indeed, 
these two aims serve to illustrate how multiple aims can militate against one 
another when the explicit primary aim Is moved stage left to allow another of 
the project's aims to take centre stage. 
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I conclude that this project tried to meet too many agendas, which had the 
capacity to compete with one another for time and resources. The 
supremacy of the NP role as an aim of key stakeholders stifled debate about 
alternative ways of identifying and addressing the health needs of farmers. 
The nurse appointed to the project, who did not hold an NP qualification, 
was seen as second best and her ways of working, whilst tolerated, did not 
receive the same degree of status, support and evaluation as the 
contributions made by the qualified NP. In addition, "much time and effort" 
was spent on the issue of nurse prescribing, an issue central to the concerns 
of the NP movement. Yet this appeared to be done without any concrete 
evidence about the impact nurse prescribing might actually have on farmers' 
health. I would also suggest that this lack of clarity, and the resulting 
competition for time and resources, may have Impacted negatively on the 
sustainability of the initiative. 
5.3 The Nature of the Project 
Another tension within this project arose through different stakeholder 
perspectives regarding the nature of the project. For example, an academic 
argued that the project was primarily a research project: 
"... 1 mean it's not about service development, it is not about service 
provision, it is about research" (Researcher 2). 
A major funder of the project was the NHS Regional R&D Directorate and a 
primary and explicit expectation was that this action research project would 
develop research capability within the NHS. The practitioners were, 
therefore, employed as co-researchers. However, the NP recruited by the 
research team as a co-researcher to provide the intervention in this study 
appeared to struggle with this position: 
"... if was one of the arguments we had. 'We are not offering a service 
we are a research project. ' I am a service worker 1 am a service 
person / offer a nurse practitioner service, that's what 1 do" (N P 1). 
These tensions arose, in part, through the coming together of stakeholders 
from two different cultures and perspectives. Academics are largely based 
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within the Higher Education Sector and healthcare practitioners are, in the 
main, based with the service sector. Traditionally, academics aim to 
question and challenge assumptions. Practitioners on the other hand are 
expected to operate within tightly controlled standards and regulatory 
frameworks. Collaborative working can create opportunities for learning but 
this requires mutual understanding and respect. However in this project, 
practitioners did not always view criticism as constructive: 
"The other thing as well that I found was that sometimes some of the 
academic staff seemed very critical of the existing service staff. You 
know the staff that had actually been out there before the farmers' 
health project came along trying to do and trying to give and trying to 
reach and trying to work with these people with very limited 
resources, and sometimes I think they were perhaps being a little bit 
critical in the way that they have said things" (Community Psychiatric 
Nurse). 
There was a perception that academics were unsympathetic to the context 
and the power of the professionals they were working with: 
"... policies, protocols, confidentiality all of those kind of things that we 
are constricted by that maybe academic staff aren't in the same way" 
(Community Psychiatric Nurse). 
Critically examining the research context is an integral part of the research 
process. However, when the NP presented the research at the end of the 
project, she did not welcome criticism: 
"it was bizarre in a way that every single time when you would stand 
up to present your findings you would have somebody in the audience 
who would say, yes but nurse practitioners don't have a recognisable 
qualification do they? And it was always a practice nurse...... I just 
said obviously you are doing a really good job and we are not saying 
that we are doing it perfectly, this is a research project and we are just 
presenting the findings. / felt like saying, if you didn't want to know 
about it what are you doing here. Why just come to argue? " (N P1) 
In addition, despite the project being disseminated widely, the practitioners, 
support workers and farmers appeared to be written about. There was 
relatively little evidence of the development of the writing for publication skills 
153 
of other members of the management or steering groups, even in the 
outputs which targeted specific audiences. As one practitioner noted: 
"I mean, to be honest, / felt it was quite difficult to get your name on 
stuff... 1 felt very bad in some respects because the support worker 
didn't get her name on anything and her input was phenomenal and 
there were often times I felt that we had all pinched the words out of 
her mouth somewhere along the line" (NP1). 
Therefore, there appeared tension arising from a lack of clarity or shared 
understanding about the nature of the project. Equally, whilst there were 
tangible inputs into the development of the research capability of the clinical 
staff in the form of study days for example, there appeared to be a lack of 
negotiation and agreement about what outputs they might produce to 
illustrate the impact of this investment. 
This lack of clarity or shared understanding about the nature of the project 
also became apparent when I examined what was regarded as relevant in 
terms of the ethics of the project. As the study was to involve potential 
patients as participants, the research proposal was subject to NHS ethical 
review before proceeding. The issue of informed consent was of particular 
interest within the context of the debate as to whether the project was a 
service innovation or a research project. Normally, it is the intervention within 
a research project, that is the focus of informed consent procedures. 
However, in the FHP this was not the case. My assumption would be that a 
farmer's willingness to be examined by a NP was taken as a form of implied 
consent for a clinical assessment but there was no evidence that the issue of 
informed consent to participate in an action research project was ever raised 
within this context. Formal, informed consent processes were implemented, 
however, when these Farmers were invited to participate in a telephone 
evaluation of the service at a later date. I believe this point serves to 
illustrate the lack of clarity over the nature of the project. More 
fundamentally, the issues I considered real ethical dilemmas never appeared 
to be raised. These included: 
1. the potential risk to the lone clinician-researchers appointed to 
access a potentially vulnerable client group in remote locations 
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2. the potential of raising expectations within a community, for 
whose mental heath, health professionals had expressed 
concern, with a new, tailored health service, provided within 
the context of a research project with fixed term funding 
without any commitment to sustain the service should it prove 
to be "successful". 
This point will be discussed further in chapter 7. 
5.3.1 Cultural sensitivity 
The FHP was set up as an outreach service because farmers did not access 
primary care services as a matter of course (Gerrard 1998). This was seen, 
in part, as a cultural issue, in that farmers are noted for their stoicism. 
However, the introduction of technology and the subsequent reduction in the 
workforce on many farms was seen to have exacerbated the situation. Many 
farmers were now working in isolation and unless they had a problem that 
they themselves perceived to be of an acute or urgent nature, they simply 
could not afford to leave livestock unattended and get washed and dressed 
and leave their farm to attend a doctor's surgery at a pre determined time. 
Consequently, it is believed that mental illness is often undetected. 
Nationally, there is a higher than average incidence of reported suicide 
amongst the farming community (Booth, Briscoe, & Powell 2000). The NHS 
Mental Health National Service Framework states: 
"Evidence indicates that access to firearms or poison increases the 
risk that a person may use them to commit suicide. Although in 
absolute terms the number of deaths is small, the excess risk for 
certain groups is significant. Farmers and vets have the highest 
proportional mortality ratio. " (Department of Health 1999) 
According to the mental health charity MIND, the actual suicide rate is likely 
to be substantially higher than those reported as suicides. This, they argue, 
is because the percentage of 'open' or 'undetermined' deaths for farmers is 
very high, and there is substantial evidence that the majority of these are 
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suicides. In addition, women married to farmers have a suicide rate more 
than 20 per cent higher than the average (Kelly 1995; Price & Evans 2005). 
At certain times of year, the pace is relentless and when people are tired and 
under stress, they make mistakes. In the context of farming, mistakes can 
result in serious or even fatal injury. One local GP systematically recorded 
the farm accidents which presented within his practice and, accounting for 
gross under-reporting, concluded that the incidence was approximately two 
to three times that of the average industrial worker and probably around 500 
per 100,000 workers (Burnett 2001). 
Endeavours to ensure that the FHP was sensitive to farming cultures 
"... presented a challenge for professional and geographical boundaries. " 
(Management Group minutes 17.11.99). This discussion above, regarding 
the development of protocols to enable nurse prescribing, serves to illustrate 
this point. The acknowledgement that farmers' networks and the geography 
of those networks are very different to the artificial boundaries of the health 
service was a critical incident in this project: 
" Farmers go to the auction marts because of whether they can get a 
good price, who they want to meet there..... which is totally different to 
the health or local authority boundaries which don't always bear much 
resemblance to geography" (Manager 2). 
An analogy was drawn with the prison population: 
"I mean, another issue, .... where we have quite a lot of discussion 
about how you get across boundaries is the prison population. Totally 
different, but prisoners often are not in areas that are their own. We 
have got a young offender's institute here, and a lot of the young men 
there are from Manchester and Liverpool. So how do you link back to 
their local area? We haven't really got that one sorted yet but that is 
the sort of challenge that working with other people's networks 
causes" (Manager 2). 
Boundaries were identified as an issue with regards to accessing farmers 
and how the nurses providing the service networked, communicated and 
practised. With the benefit of hindsight, the NP stated: 
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"If I had been setting up the project I would have started small and 
then see how it grew, rather than put somebody in where they are 
crossing five boundaries" (NP 1). 
Ironically, this proposal appears to reflect the initiative cited above, where 
the health visitor and her team were working with their local farming 
community, before they were stopped in their tracks. This would suggest that 
there should be a comprehensive assessment and evaluation of current 
service provision before a new initiative is implemented. 
The arguments for ensuring the service was culturally sensitive were 
compelling and it was agreed that the FHP should be set up as an outreach 
service. As stated above, the research proposal was subject to ethical 
review before proceeding. Management group's minutes reported that 
"research ethics made cold calling impossible" (Management Group Meeting 
Minutes 20th June 2001). One of the lead applicants reported that the local 
NHS research ethics committee chair had informed her there should be no 
"cold calling" of farmers, that is no visiting of farms without an expressed 
invitation. It is unclear why this was raised as an ethical issue as it was not 
an explicit intention within the research proposal. However, within an action 
research methodology, the course of events unfolds and, therefore, cannot 
be predicted from the outset. "Cold calling", therefore, could have come up 
at a later stage in the process. More importantly, why cold calling might be of 
concern on ethical grounds is unclear. Nevertheless, the subject was raised 
on a number of occasions by members of the project team and most 
importantly by farmers themselves: 
"One of the things that / suggested early on when they were looking 
at different ways of getting to this group of people, cold calling to me 
was OK, you just drive up the drive and say hello here I am which Is 
what a rep would do who was selling you veterinary products or 
whatever he was selling just turns up. That is what farmers are used 
to. They are used to people driving up the drive and say spending 
twenty minutes talking about the price of sheep or wool or the 
weather and then oh and by the way" (Farmer 1). 
This would appear to suggest that cold calling would have been culturally 
acceptable within the farming community but the local research ethics 
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committee chair ruled cold calling out as an option for the project and the 
project team did not appear to contest this position. 
It was decided that the outreach service would be provided by NPs in a 
converted van which would serve as a mobile clinic. The van would be taken 
to the places where farmers congregate such as the auction markets, and 
from there it could be taken to farmers' own homes, by invitation only, This 
decision required the procurement of a van with the relevant kit to enable the 
NPs to assess and treat, or refer, farmers. This decision was based on the 
assumption that this modus operandi would be acceptable to the farmers. 
The project put this assumption to the test. 
There was a five month delay between the appointment of the nurses and 
the arrival of the van. The nurses suggested that the delay in getting the van 
gave them space and time to network extensively with organisations nurses 
would not routinely connect with. These included the Citizen's Advice 
Bureau, the Agricultural Institution, the National Farmers' Union, Business 
Link and the Fire Service. This time and opportunity they regarded as 
extremely productive. The NP stated: 
".... that networking has been one of the innovations of this job I think" 
(NP 1). 
The time the nurses spent prior to the arrival of the van "getting connected" 
was invaluable. It meant that they had a specialised knowledge of the 
context in which they were to be operating. They could examine farmers' 
health within a wider socio-economic context. 
if we had had the van initially we might have seen more clients, but it 
was felt we would then be networking to find solutions to problems, 
whereas now that networks are becoming established the NPs are 
more likely to respond appropriately to problems. " (Management 
Group Minutes 15/09/99) 
When the van did eventually arrive, its use varied from area to area. 
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"The van is always reasonably busy at Lancaster. At Sedbergh, the 
farmers prefer to see me in the auction. They give the van a wide 
berth but will chat about the state of farming and then about health 
issues as they arise. " (Nurse Practitioner and Support Workers 
Report 13/07/00) 
The van, quite literally, was the vehicle through which private clinical 
consultations could be carried out. It was reported that some farmers were 
put off by the highly conspicuous act of actually getting into the van at the 
auction marts. Others were happy for the NP to visit their farm to see them 
there but did not appreciate the van coming up their drive. In both cases, 
farmers were put off because they did not want it to be known by their 
friends, colleagues and neighbours that they were getting their health 
checked out as others may conclude that they had a problem which might 
impact on their business. Thus the location of the van in the auction marts 
required careful consideration. In addition, the signage on the van proved to 
be significant and had to be changed. Initially, there was no reference to the 
NHS and consequently many farmers assumed that the service was a 
private enterprise and that they would have to pay. 
The nurse who was not a qualified NP often challenged the utility of the van 
and, much later on in the project, even the NP herself admitted: 
"it was just as helpful walking around, than it was having the van 
there, because nearly everybody wanted us to go to their home" (NP 
1). 
There was no specific analysis of hard data to support this comment but, as 
the NP was ultimately the only project team member who undertook clinical 
consultations with clients, her impressions would indicate that In the final 
analysis, the capacity of the van to serve as a mobile clinic was relatively 
limited. 
It was acknowledged that the farmers who attended the auction marts and 
accessed the service in this way represented only a proportion of the 
farming community. Arguably, those who were socially networked in this way 
were perhaps less likely to have mental health problems. 
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"We know we are not reaching everybody and it concerns us that 
those most in need of help are least likely to spend time at the 
auctions because of pressures of work and second jobs" (Nurse 
Practitioner and Support Worker report 13.07.00). 
"The thing ... we have said is that if somebody is so severely depressed then they are likely not to go to the mart, they are likely not 
to come off the farm, so we are still missing them in that sense" 
(Community Psychiatric Nurse). 
Some farmers, particularly the younger ones, were inclined to drop their 
stock off at the markets and leave. Others used mechanisms which 
prevented them from personally attending the marts. For example, some 
farmers utilised facilities which provided: 
"... lorry collections to their farms that were then taking the animals to 
central distribution or abattoirs and so the need for some of those 
farmers to go to the auction marts is disappearing" (Manager 2). 
There appeared to be mounting evidence to suggest that, whilst a mobile 
clinic and attendance at auction marts provided a means of accessing a 
section of the farming community, it was by no means the total solution. 
Nevertheless, it seemed to take an unforeseen catastrophe before 
alternative ways of working were accepted as legitimate by the whole of the 
project team. 
5.3.2 Foot and mouth 
Attendance at auctions marts was totally eradicated during the 2001 Foot 
and Mouth crisis, which was officially identified in the UK on Monday 19`h 
February (The Anderson Inquiry 2002). 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is a highly contagious and economically 
devastating disease of cattle and swine. It also affects sheep, goats, deer, 
and other cloven-hooved ruminants. Many affected animals recover but the 
disease leaves them debilitated. FMD causes severe losses in the 
production of meat and milk, has grave economic as well as physical 
consequences and is considered to be one of the animal diseases that 
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livestock owners dread most. FMD spreads widely and rapidly. It is highly 
contagious with nearly 100 percent of exposed animals becoming infected. 
Transmission is understood to be through a range of media: - 
> Direct or indirect contact (droplets) 
> Animate vectors (humans, etc. ) 
> Inanimate vectors (vehicles, implements) 
> Airborne, especially temperate zones (up to 60 km overland 
and 300 km by sea) 
The UK Government elected to contain the epidemic (and thus prevent FMD 
from becoming endemic within the UK) through a massive cull of both 
infected and potentially infected animals, prevention of the movement of all 
livestock and severe curtailment of traffic to and from farms across the UK. 
The impact of this FMD epidemic in the UK was catastrophic for rural 
communities: 
"By the end of September over 2000 premises had been declared 
infected, millions of animals destroyed and many rural lives affected 
in a manner unknown for a generation" (The Anderson Inquiry 2002 p 
20). 
FMD forced the stakeholders in the FHP to have a rethink. It was clearly a 
critical incident in the development of the Initiative: 
"7 mean who would have thought a few months ago that there would 
be no auction marts and those sorts of things? So you have got to 
keep thinking about how you are accessing if you are taking a service 
to people rather than them coming to you, you have got to think about 
how you do that and keep evaluating it and keep modifying until it is 
not working" (Manager 2). 
Outreach via auction marts was now impossible: 
"Unfortunately our strengths as a mobile outreach service are not 
effective in present circumstances" (Management Group Minutes 2161 
March 2001). 
The team had to identify new ways of reaching people and so they took the 
van to supermarket car parks and forest clearings as alternative venues. 
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They also provided a telephone advice service throughout the catastrophe. 
Much of this type of work was regarded as more of a social type of support 
and clearly had a huge impact on the number of farmers physically seen by 
the NP This was highly significant when 'number of farmers seen' was 
identified as a key measure of success (see table 5.4. ). The impact of the 
telephone advice service was, however, far-reaching. The NP reported 
fielding calls from: 
".... literally all over England / would say there were people ringing up 
because they had seen the number in the press, the farming press 
and read about it, so we gave out a lot of advice" (NP 1). 
It was reported in the management group minutes that much of the advice 
that was being given included "dealing with the stress caused by 
bureaucratic muddle and delay and changes necessitated by regulations" 
(Management Group Meeting Minutes 20th June 2001). 
The project nurses and support workers were appointed because of their 
backgrounds. As they were supporting farmers through the crisis, they were 
themselves living in the midst of it all. They had first-hand experience. One 
of the support workers lost all of her livestock. They knew intimately how it 
felt to lose everything. They also knew how it felt to see their friends and 
neighbours experience similar losses or face economic paralysis as a result 
of the crisis, with no prospect of compensation because their animals had 
survived the cull. 
The critical incident here was the learning that occurred. The service was 
initially established as an outreach service and the focal point for the activity 
was the auction mart. The team began to appreciate that the farmers who 
were accessing the service represented only one section of the farming 
community and there was still considerable unmet need. When access via 
auction marts was cut off as a result of Foot and Mouth, they were forced to 
reconsider their modus operandi: 
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"The way we designed the project to access farmers was being 
challenged and we were having to think of new ways to access them 
when they were going to stay on their farms and not come off to the 
auction mart. So the challenge is to constantly look at how you are 
designing access to services and if that access changes to look at 
ways of keeping on top of that" (Manager 2). 
Nationally, part of the process of managing the outbreak was to try and 
identify the source of FMD. The supplier of the sows to the abattoir in Essex 
where FMD was first officially identified was a Northumberland pig farmer, 
Bobby Waugh. In May 2002, Waugh was found guilty of cruelty to animals 
and of concealing the outbreak of FMD, a notifiable disease, amongst his 
livestock. He was, however, never formally accused of starting the outbreak. 
Waugh maintains that he was made a scapegoat. In The Guardian, Fran 
Abrahms reported: 
"He still maintains that if he hadn't taken pigs to Cheale Meats that 
week in February 2001, the foot and mouth epidemic would still have 
happened but someone else would have been blamed. He was just in 
the wrong place at the wrong time, he says. " (Abrahms 2002) 
Perhaps he was in the wrong place at the wrong time. Perhaps his 
predicament was another of the collection of incidents that led to the GPs 
talk of a "storm warning", some twelve months before the outbreak. Had the 
Government both the volition and the capacity to take heed of these local 
voices, the epidemic might have been handled very differently. One of the 
reported lessons to be learned in the Anderson Inquiry was to "respect local 
knowledge" (The Anderson Inquiry 2002). 
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5.4 Sustainability 
Three years after it was established, the Farmers' Health initiative was 
disbanded, My analysis of these data would indicate that securing the 
sustainability of the Farmers' Health Initiative was dependent upon the 
coming together of three essential ingredients: 
a) integration with mainstream service provision 
b) secured funding 
c) a champion within the system 
The FHP began as a two year action research project with a mixed portfolio 
of funding. A successful R&D bid to the NHS North West Region provided 
the majority (65%) of the funding and this was augmented by contributions 
from a variety of other sources, including the Regional Development Agency. 
Therefore, with respect to mainstream health service provision, the project 
was effectively externally funded. The project was also additional to, and 
was seen to operate out with, mainstream health service provision: 
"... being a stand-alone project we never really fully integrated what 
was happening with General Practice and primary care so it was seen 
as a secondary service (probably not the right word) but it was not 
seen as part of mainstream primary care.......... 
.... When we 
have been to the primary care groups to talk about 
ongoing funding, there has been a mixture of responses from some 
who have seen the benefits from the project and who are very keen, 
to others who have not been as actively involved and not certain 
about the value of the project" (Manager 2). 
The lack of integration of the initiative into mainstream service provision 
appeared to cause budget holders to question the value of the service and 
thus impact negatively on the sustainability of the project. 
The lack of strategic integration was probably compounded by the fact that 
NHS primary care provision was in the midst of organisational restructuring. 
Primary Care Groups (PCGs) were being disbanded and Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs) were in the process of being set up. An NHS manager 
advised that during these changes the team "should keep the initiative In the 
eye of the trust" (Management Group Minutes 20th September 2000). 
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In their efforts to secure the future of the project, the project team also 
engaged in political lobbying. A local Member of Parliament, who was also a 
Government Health Minister, was shown around the project van by the 
project team and was reported in the management group minutes to have 
stated that "one-stop shops" in primary care should be the way forward and 
should be funded (Management Group Minutes 18th April 2001). This 
rhetoric was echoed within the rural white paper which promised £100m 
towards one-stop healthcare centres in 100 communities (Department for 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs 2000). Great effort was put into trying 
to track down this funding, but, despite lobbying the Minister for Rural 
Affairs, a member of the project team reported: 
".. we never got any confirmation that there was any new money 
attached to the promises of funding" (Manager 2). 
Thus, engagement in national politics, in this instance, proved to be a red 
herring. 
The two year action research project came to an end in the midst of the foot 
and mouth crisis. "Exit funding" for one more year was made available from 
both the Lancashire and the Cumbria Regional Development Agencies. 
Additional funding was provided by the Wyre Primary Care Group (PCG). 
This resource supported one full-time and one part-time NP and a part-time 
healthcare support worker. It also secured the maintenance of the van. The 
initiative was now no longer an action research project but was essentially 
an NHS service, wholly managed under the auspices of the Morecambe Bay 
NHS Trust. Academic colleagues, therefore, were no longer directly involved 
in the management of the project. However, some of the academics did 
continue to provide advice and support, keep a watching brief and attend 
some of the meetings. A smaller management group was established which 
met monthly throughout the 3d year of the Initiative and a smaller steering 
group met on a quarterly basis. There were no published reports of any data 
collected during this period. The group was still chaired by the GP who was 
the principal investigator in the action research study and was now retired 
from General Practice. Other members included two NHS managers from 
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the PCT who had been involved in the initial study and the staff who were 
still providing the service. The research assistant funded by the Countryside 
Alliance to disseminate the action research project kept in close contact with 
the initiative until she resigned near to the time that the funding for her post 
ran out. 
As a result of the reduction in the number of personnel involved in delivering 
the service, a decision was taken to reduce the size of the geographical area 
covered, although it was still operating within two distinct areas. At the same 
time, a decision was taken to broaden the focus beyond farmers and the 
service was re-badged as a rural health service. 
Now that the initiative was no longer a research project, it was no longer 
subject to the limitations imposed by the local research ethics committee. 
This meant that cold calling, the method of engagement proposed by the 
farmers themselves, was now a possibility. When the foot and mouth crisis 
came to an unexpectedly abrupt end, every farmer in the locality was 
contacted by letter and advised that a NP would visit them on their farm at a 
designated time unless they contacted the service to decline the visit. 
According to the NP, cold calling proved to be very successful: 
".. we thought, why didn't we do this right from the beginning? It was 
amazing. ...... we picked up all kinds of things......,. I did see quite a lot of people who I have never seen at markets but they had heard of 
us as well, so that was something.......... I think we saw something 
like half again as many patients between the January and February 
and the end of the project than we had in the whole of the previous 18 
months which was amazing really': (NP 1). 
Encouraged by these successes, but with only twelve months' funding 
secured, the sustainability of the project was the primary concern throughout 
this third year when the initiative was no longer a research project. The lack 
of integration of the service within mainstream provision was recognised as 
a key issue and identified as a factor which led to the demise of the project. 
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"the danger of a sort of "stand alone" project is 'how do you integrate 
that with other services? ' Whilst we place the staff within community 
clinics and they are working with other staff within those clinics. In a 
rural project how do you engage with all the other rural staff, GPs in 
other practices, district nurses in other practices? (Manager 2) 
Of the 277 farmers registered with the service during the period that data 
were formally collected and analysed by the project team (see table 5.4), 
89% referred themselves. The NFU made 4% of the referrals and the 
support workers 1%. Only 6% (n=17) of farmers were referred by health 
professionals from within the system. 
The Research Assistant employed through the Countryside Agency 
investment in the initiative spent the last few months of her contract 
endeavouring to secure rescue packages for the service within the two areas 
in which the project was operating. The PCT was so large it was subdivided 
into three local health groups which covered defined geographical areas. 
The local health groups had the autonomy to make decisions about service 
provision within their locality. The service was being provided within two of 
these areas. 
In one area (the most rural) the Research Assistant was able to secure 
funding but, unfortunately, there was no will from the local health group to 
integrate the service into their portfolio of service provision. In the other area, 
funding was promised and the local health group wanted to provide the 
service, but there did not appear to be anyone within the system with the 
capacity to champion the initiative. One of the NHS managers I Interviewed 
suggested that it was not seen as a priority. She did not suggest that the 
initiative was not a priority on the grounds of the quality of the evidence 
presented (see Burnett and Mort (2001)) when pitted against competing 
demands, but because it did not have a political champion within the system: 
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"well / guess it is when money is tight and services have to be cut, 
you ask the people closest to you and when people are worried about 
their jobs and their future they lobby for the services they are 
responsible for, so if you are talking about something that is seen as 
the icing on the cake which the Farmer's Health Project and the 
health visitor service to the homeless in Morecambe was seen as, 
then they are the ones that get cut" (Manager 1). 
When discussing the lack of capacity in the service to champion local 
innovations such as the Farmers' Health Service and a Health Visitor service 
for homeless people in Morecambe, I was advised that this was largely down 
to the burden of managing the implementation of national initiatives such as 
National Service Frameworks (NSFs). 
" If you listen to what a lot of the managers, or co-ordinators or team 
leaders are having to do with this modernising of older people's 
services (they are bringing NSF after NSF and there is a huge 
amount of work in each NSF and mental health has theirs, NSF for 
older people and things like that) and unfortunately we have not got 
enough people to pull people in to sort of work short term on specific 
things, they have got their day job still to do" (Manager 1). 
The FHP appeared to stifle the local initiative cited above, where a health 
visitor and her team were working with farmers' wives to improve the health 
of farming communities. In addition, national initiatives such as NSFs 
appeared to have the capacity to stifle local innovations which aimed to 
address the health needs of communities who appeared to be marginalised 
from mainstream health services. 
When it seemed unlikely that the initiative would be sustained beyond year 
three, the staff that were providing the service, were served their notice and 
forced to seek alternative employment. It was felt that the termination of the 
service represented a considerable loss of knowledge to both the local and 
the national health economy: 
"That was the saddest thing for me, in a way, that we had gathered all 
this expertise about organophosphates and .. farm situations and everything else and we packed that all up into boxes. Will it ever see 
the light of day again? I just thought what a waste! " (NP 1). 
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5.5 Summary 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, during the course of my analysis 
of this case I identified fifteen 'critical incidents' which I believe shaped the 
trajectory of the FHP. These are listed in table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Farmers' Health Project: Critical Incidents (CI) 
Cl 1. The marginalisation of the initial contribution and the voices of lay participants and 
groups members "melting like snow" when major decisions were taken 
Cl 2. The decision to shift the focus from the mental health of rural communities and focus 
specifically on the general health of farmers 
Cl 3. The decision to endeavour to address the health needs of farmers through the 
establishment of a nurse practitioner-led outreach service 
CI 4. The decision to locate the project over a large geographical area Incorporating two 
local authority boundaries 
Cl 5. Securing a mixed portfolio of funding 
Cl 6. The decision to appoint a nurse without an NP qualification with the expectation that 
she would simultaneously: 
- undertake academic training and supervised clinical practice to function as an NP 
- manage a support work 
- establish a novel outreach service 
Cl 7. The decision to establish an outreach service from a mobile clinic 
Cl B. The lead In time which allowed the project team members to network extensively 
(facilitated by the delay In getting the van) 
Cl 9. The stifling of a local Innovation to work collaboratively with farmers' wives to address 
farmers' health issues in order to make way for this Initiative 
Cl 10 Funding for a RA to co-ordinate dissemination activities as a consequence of the 
initial media profile of the initiative and concern that dissemination activities were taking the 
project team away from the development of the project Itself 
CI 11. The focus on nurse prescribing without an evidence base to justify the time and effort 
vis-d-vis its potential impact on the farming community. Professionalising agenda hijacking an 
initiative to Improve the health of a marginalised community? 
Cl 12. A service Innovation or a research project? A clash of cultures? 
Cl 13. No to cold calling: the silencing of the farmers' voice 
CI 14. Foot and Mouth: the catastrophe that legitimated alternative ways of identifying and 
addressing farmers' health needs 
Cl 15 The demise of the project through lack of funding, lack of Integration with mainstream 
service and the absence of a champion within a system in a constant state of flux 
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I suggest that the implications of these critical incidents may be synthesised 
into three interconnected themes (figure 5.2). 




Firstly, authentic engagement of the key stakeholders in an innovation in 
healthcare provision would appear to be fundamentally important. This 
theme I have labelled 'partnership'. Secondly, clarity, or agreement amongst 
stakeholders about the primary focus of a project, would appear to be 
equally important. This second theme I have labelled 'purpose'. Thirdly, 
political engagement may be necessary to develop and sustain an 
innovation in healthcare provision. This third theme I have labelled 'politics'. 
In this chapter I have presented the empirical evidence and the argument to 
justify these three themes. In this concluding section I draw together the 
threads of these debates. 
Authentic engagement of stakeholders looked as if it was fundamentally 
important in this case, in three key areas. Firstly, despite what appeared to 
be genuine endeavours to engage people, with a concern about mental 
health within rural communities, at the outset of this initiative, I was informed 
that professionals effectively silenced the voices of lay members of the 
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group (CI 1). The sense of urgency -a storm warning - expressed by the 
GPs and the passion of the nurse academic to allow nurses to realise their 
potential, fuelled their collective professional power and their capacity to 
dominate the debate, control the agenda and deny lay participants the 
opportunity to offer alternative perspectives. Indeed, it appeared that these 
particular professionals were considerably more influential than others and 
effectively silenced the voices of other professional colleagues within the 
team. 
Even after the decision was taken to focus on the healthcare needs of 
farmers (CI 2), and two married farmers were invited onto the project 
steering committee, the system conspired against the farmers' voice. The 
feedback from the research ethics committee was that 'cold calling', the 
method of engagement with the farming community the farming 
representatives advocated, would be unacceptable and the project team did 
not contest this position (CI 13). The system, therefore, was seen to 
conspire against authentic engagement with the community whose 
healthcare needs the project sought to address In a culturally sensitive way. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the NP suggested that if she were starting all 
over again, she would invite farmers to join a focus group to ascertain what 
sort of a health service they would like, which arguably would have been 
more in keeping with the spirit of action research, engaging the farming 
community as co-researchers in the process. Instead, the project team 
engaged in providing a service designed by professionals, for professionals. 
For example, the decision to establish a mobile outreach service (CI 7), 
because such a service would be an appropriate and sensitive foil to the 
stoical reticence of the farming community to access health services, proved 
erroneous. It is possible that this expenditure could have been avoided if 
more lay farmers had been authentically involved In the project as co- 
researchers, from the outset. 
Secondly, tensions arose in this case between the clinical and academic 
members of the project team (Cl 12). There appeared to be a lack of clarity 
about the roles and contributions of each member of the project team and 
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consequently criticisms were not always recognised as constructive. 
Consequently, there were perceptions that vested interests were being 
served and the potential to build research capability was not fully realised. 
For example, there was relatively scant evidence of the project team 
engaging in writing for publication, despite a plethora of outputs. 
Thirdly, despite the time the project workers invested in networking at the 
outset of the initiative (Cl 8) and the additional funding secured to support 
dissemination (Cl 10), the initiative was not fully integrated with mainstream 
service provision and this appeared to be a factor which led to its demise (Cl 
15). This may have been exacerbated by the decision to provide a mobile 
outreach service (Cl 7) over a vast geographical area (Cl 4) thus adding 
considerably to the complexity of the project and the numbers of potential 
stakeholders. Certainly, within the most rural community served, local 
service providers were not sufficiently engaged with the initiative to 
incorporate it into their portfolio of service provision. 
Some of the tensions which surfaced in this case were a result of, and 
exacerbated by, the multiple aims of the initiative. At face value, the FHP 
was an action research project seeking to identify and address the health 
needs of farmers (CI 2). Upon closer inspection however there was an 
explicit agenda to further the role of NPs (CI 3). Whilst one of the advocates 
of a NP-led intervention saw this as a win-win situation, I have argued here 
that this professionalizing agenda demonstrated a capacity to distract 
attention and resources away from the farmers or service users. In this case, 
for example, considerable time and effort was expended in trying to address 
the national legal framework for nurse prescribing (CI 11). This appeared to 
be without evidence of the tangible difference nurse prescribing would have 
made to the farmers accessing the project. In addition, a nurse, who was 
not qualified as an NP or experienced in the role, was recruited to fulfil the 
role of an NP in the project. The expectation was that she could develop and 
autonomously deliver the outreach service and at the same time attain the 
skills required to provide the service (Cl 6). This emerged to be unrealistic 
and so she proposed alternative means of Identifying and addressing 
farmers' health needs. However, her proposals did not appear to be fully 
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legitimised until Foot and Mouth conspired against what appeared to be 
considered the Gold Standard' NP outreach service (Cl 14). 
With a portfolio of funding (Cl 5), with the lion's share from an NHS R&D 
capacity building budget, there was a lack of clarity and hence agreement 
amongst stakeholders as to whether this initiative, as an action research 
project, was primarily a research project, or primarily an innovation in service 
provision (Cl 12). This lack of clarity manifested most vividly through the 
aspects of the initiative deemed to require formal informed consent. 
In this case, macro-, meso- and micro-politics appear to impact on 
innovation. By macro-politics I mean politics at a national level, by meso- 
politics I refer to politics at an organisational level and interpersonal politics I 
refer to as micro-level politics. 
Analysis of the decisions made and the surfacing of hidden tensions in this 
case study illustrate that there was a significant amount of Interpersonal 
politics in this case. The stakeholder analysis, discussed In section 5.2 
above, illustrates some of the structural, organisational and cultural 
differences which fuelled these micro-politics. The political capital achieved 
from the project by the academic committed to championing the role of NPs 
appeared to be significant. Arguably, his ability to negotiate the development 
of a NP-led outreach service (Cl 3) illustrates a degree of personal political 
acumen. The degree of media coverage the project enjoyed clearly put NPs 
under the spotlight. Equally, the amount of time and effort the project team 
spent on nurse prescribing (CI 11), a policy concern central to the NP 
movement, without any clear evidence of the impact the right to prescribe 
could have had In this particular case, illustrates the depth of this Influence 
on the project as a whole. Set against this argument, the authentic 
engagement of stakeholders can be constructed as a political issue. 
The identification of the necessity for an innovation champion at a senior 
level within an organisation to sustain an innovation in service provision 
illustrates the importance of engagement in meso-level politics (CI 15). 
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Equally, there is the apparent necessity for the integration of an innovative 
service into mainstream service provision and the capacity of a local health 
group to curb that potential. The constant re-configuration of health 
services, in this case from PCGs to PCTs, with the inevitable impact this has 
on the personnel involved, makes it particularly difficult to identify and 
sustain an innovation champion. 
Equally, the capacity of the research ethics committee to thwart the very 
intervention farmers themselves advocated serves as an example of the 
capacity of systems to stifle innovation (CI13). Indeed, this was further 
illustrated by the power of this innovation to thwart the local endeavours of a 
health visitor and her team working innovatively with her local farming 
community (CI 9). 
National political issues also appeared to have a significant bearing on this 
innovation. Rural issues were recognised as "a political hot potato" and this 
was seen to provide political capital and, perhaps, help to secure funding for 
the project (CI 5, Cl 10). In addition, the politically-driven requirement to 
implement numerous NSFs was proposed as a rationale for the absence of 
any capacity to champion this service within the local health economy (CI 
15). Here again, a top-down policy driven innovation is seen to stifle a 
locally grown one. The NP movement was an innovation seen to be limited 
by the national legislation on nurse prescribing. Even when this local 
innovation appeared to explicitly match nationally policy, with the explicit 
implication that there were resources to support the policy, there was, in fact, 
no new ring-fenced resources. This innovation was, therefore, totally 
dependent upon meso- and micro-political processes for its sustainability. 
The next chapter presents the second case study of Innovation examined In 
this study and in chapter 7, the cases are compared and contrasted. 
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Chapter 6 Case Study 2- "The Corner" 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the analysis of Case study 2: The Corner health and 
information services for young people. Introduced in chapter 2, where the 
methods deployed to investigate this case are set out. Types and sources of 
evidence examined are listed in table 2.7 and the semi-structured interview 
schedule which was used is presented in table 2,6. In analysing and 
interpreting these data, I identified fifteen critical decisions or incidents which 
appeared to me, to have had a significant impact on this particular case. 
Critical analysis of these incidents, through the consideration of the probing 
questions listed in table 2.8, offers insight into the conditions in which 
initiatives that endeavour to innovatively facilitate access to healthcare, to 
groups of people who do not routinely access mainstream services, can 
flourish. 
The Corner drop-in centre opened its door to the public in March 1996. 
Based in the city of Dundee, in Scotland, The Corner provided a wide range 
of confidential health and information services to young people aged 
between 11 and 25 years. The Corner had a long gestation period which 
spanned over ten years. This appears to be significant as it may offer a 
rationale for the clarity of thinking that emerged around the purpose and the 
modus operandi of The Corner. 
Throughout the 1980's, the authorities in Dundee were concerned about 
social and housing issues along with the high incidence of drug, alcohol and 
solvent misuse amongst the young people in the city. Consequently, the 
Regional Council Community Education Service sought to gain the support 
of other stakeholders to establish a city centre facility for young people. 
Despite receiving support in principle from a number of agencies, 
reservations from others meant that early proposals never came to fruition 
(Easton 1997). Between 1981 and 1991 the local health board and the local 
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authority independently undertook a range of consultative initiatives with 
young people in the city. For example: 
"... we held a thing called 'The Dundee City Youth Forum' and we 
had a lot of young people came, probably as many as 1500 young 
people came to the event in the Caird Hall, an all day event with 
bands and all that sort of stuff, and one of the things that came 
through that event was the need for a city centre facility, and the other 
thing that came through that event was the need to respond to the 
whole issue of sexual health, by independent confidential advice for 
young people" (Local Authority Senior Manager). 
There was a groundswell of evidence emerging in both the local authority 
and the health service that young people needed a confidential health and 
information service, developed with, and specifically for, the young people of 
Dundee, within a city centre location. This evidence included the views of 
the young people consulted coupled with the concerns cited above, the 
relatively low uptake of family planning services and a need for effective 
HIV/AIDS health promotion activities. In 1990, the health board's Chief Area 
Medical Officer (CAMO) annual report stated: 
"Innovative ways of working with young people need to be initiated 
and a Project Team should be established to speed up the 
development of appropriate health and education prevention 
services. " (Chief Area Medical Officer 1990) 
It was increasingly clear that the health needs of the local young people 
were not being addressed and young people were not accessing traditional 
health services. Consequently, in 1991, the Public Health Medicine 
Department proposed that a joint health board 1 local council project team 
should be set up to develop health promotion initiatives related to the sexual 
health of the young people of Dundee. A senior health promotion officer was 
appointed for three years by the health board to progress the consultation 
work with young people. A local authority community education professional 
was seconded to work with her for a period. The senior health promotion 
officer's brief was defined within the CAMO's report. She was to find 
innovative ways of working with young people to develop appropriate health 
and education prevention services. Her remit is detailed in table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Remit of Senior Health Promotion Officer (Redman 1992) 
" To study similar initiatives in other parts of the UK 
" To define and appraise the options for service developments 
" To identify and recommend projects which should be developed by the 
health board 
" To pilot these projects 
" To co-ordinate the long term establishment of the projects 
The CAMO's recommendation of a project team emerged as a steering 
group with representation from the health board, the community education 
service, health education, the family planning service and the voluntary 
sector (Easton 1997). In 1992, a joint bid from the YMCA and the community 
education service was made to the health board to support a collaborative 
venture to provide a range of services from the YMCA premises (see table 
6.2). For reasons which were not documented, the CAMO did not support 
this bid and these plans were not progressed. 
The Senior Health Promotion Officer visited several youth projects across 
the UK and recommended that any local developments should have a 
positive image with young people and should be run by young people. She 
also recommended that any sort of healthcare provision should not adopt a 
traditional medical model of care (Easton 1997). To progress her agenda, 
the senior health promotion officer ran an extensive consultation exercise 
with young people throughout the summer of 1992. 
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Table 6.2: The Joint YMCA Community Education service proposal 
(Easton 1997) 
0a youth information counselling service 
"a supportive environment 
0a base in support of street work 
promotion of health education 
0 safer sex advice / contraception clinic 
0 peer education 
" engaging young people in challenging opportunities 
0 promotion of personal / social development 
0 drugs primary prevention 
" cultural / European opportunities 
0 promotion of workshops 
Her aim was to: 
" Begin a dialogue with young people about their health needs 
" Make contact with young people who might want to become 
involved in setting up a health project 
" Inform the health promotion officer- young persons' project 
" Ensure the recommendations for project development best 
meet young people's needs (Redman 1992) 
The specific aims of the consultation are detailed in table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3: Aims of the Young Person's Health Project Consultation 
Exercise (Redman 1992) 
To find out young people's views on different aspects of a young 
person's health project 
What should be offered? - i. e. what health services, information or 
support do young people need? 
How can services be made accessible? - i. e easy to get to and open 
at the right time 
How can services be made acceptable? - i. e. welcoming and OK to 
go in, provided in the way young people want them 
253 young people took part in the consultation in 35 focus groups. The 
average group size was 7 (range 2-17). The average age was 15 (range 11 
- 20) (Redman 1992). The consultation raised many issues and the report 
offered 11 recommendations (see table 6.4). 
In a review of this report, the level of consultation was challenged, and it was 
argued that certain key decisions had been made prior to consulting with the 
young people: 
"it was clear from the methodology of the consultation that it had 
already been decided that a young people's health and information 
project should be created and that the consultation was to establish 
what young people would expect from such an initiative. " (Easton 
1997 
Some of the report's recommendations were also challenged. For example, 
a number of the issues raised were not important to young people, but had a 
more professional focus, such as the legality of services to the under 16's 
and the benefit of outreach workers. 
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Table 6.4: Recommendations of the Young Person's Health Project 
Consultation Exercise (Redman 1992) 
1. Single door access to a variety of services because: 
a. issues are often linked 
b. the service which is most often needed i. e. condoms, 
contraceptives, pregnancy test is least acceptable if provided 
on its own. 
2. A range of services are required including: 
a. information and support on health issues, benefits, legal and 
housing issues 
b. short-term and long-term counselling for a variety of problems 
including family problems, pregnancy, physical or sexual 
abuse, bullying, homelessness 
c. a doctor who is separate form the family doctor 
d. healthy things to do (e. g. exercise, meeting with others). 
3. There is a need for services in different locations, i. e. both in the 
schemes and in the city centre. Accessibility, safety and discretion all 
need to be considered. 
4. A health project needs a positive image, i. e. it needs to look attractive, 
have a positive name, be a drop-in, have a creche. It needs to avoid a 
clinical or official atmosphere and health education posters. 
5. Confidentiality must be guaranteed. This will be a major if not the major 
factor in young people being able to use a service. 
6. Outreach workers would need to be an ongoing aspect of any health 
project. 
7. Support groups should be encouraged. 
8. Under 16's need to be explicitly welcomed. Education is needed for 
young people and adults about the legality of providing services to under 
16's. 
9. Those with special needs must be considered so they have access and 
feel safe. 
10. Staff are needed, who listen, understand, don't treat young people like 
kids, are street wise, can be trusted, have been through it themselves. 
For many this means that staff have to be young. Young women in 
particular need to be assured that they can see a woman. Training will be 
needed whether they are professional or lay people. 
11. Young people involved. Young people want and should be involved in 
decision making and involvement in other ways should be explored. This 
is important to ensure that the services are what they want and are what 
they would use. 
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Easton (1997) identified four key issues from this report (see table 6.5), 
Table 6.5: Key issues raised by Redman (1992) Report. (Easton 1997) 
1. There was an unmet need for contraception including the use and the 
negotiation of use of condoms, emergency contraception and pregnancy 
testing 
2. The under 16's perceived that they were excluded from current service 
provision 
3. Young people felt that there was a need for a range of services to be provided 
all under one roof 
4. The ability to guarantee confidentiality was of paramount importance to the 
young people consulted 
Ninetysix of the young people who participated in the consultation exercise 
expressed an interest in getting involved in the establishment of a health 
project. Twentyone turned up to the first meeting of what became "The 
Bodymatters Youth Group". Approximately twelve young people met on a 
regular basis to progress this agenda through a variety of media. They also 
developed their own magazine "Bodytalk". Supported by health promotion 
and community education staff, they became active in promoting the need 
for a city centre facility (Easton 1997). 
A working group was also set up where representatives from Public Health 
Medicine, the Community Education Service and Health Promotion joined 
the two workers who had already been assigned to the project. Other 
professionals had an input into this group depending on the issues they were 
discussing. Momentum was clearly building up and a number of proposals 
and bids for development were put together by the various stakeholders. 
There was unanimous agreement that a city centre young people's health 
and information service with multi-agency input was the way forward and a 
project specification was agreed (table 6.6). 
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Table 6.6: Project Specification 
1. To be developed with the active involvement of young people 
2. To combine the provision of youth information with targeted health 
information, health education and a confidential counselling service 
3. The youth information was to mirror national developments in youth 
information services 
4. To deliver contraception and other health services 
Start-up funding would be made available from multiple sources including 
the health board, the local council and the YMCA. The longer term view was 
that the project would become a charitable trust. Concern arose that this 
momentum could be lost, however, as the complexities of sorting out the 
funding arrangements became apparent and finding suitable city premises 
that met with the project premises' specification (see table 6.7) was proving 
problematic (Easton 1997). 
Table 6.7: Project Premises Specification 
A. Premises that would accommodate: 
1. A Youth Enquiry Service to provide information on a variety of issues e. g. 
housing, welfare rights 
2. Access to information and advice on health issues 
3. Contraception and pregnancy tests, including a twice weekly session by 
a family planning doctor 
4. A counselling service for young people on Issues relevant to them e. g. 
family problems, pregnancy, homelessness 
5. Groups activities to address social and educational need 
6. Support / self help groups in conjunction with appropriate specialist 
agencies. 
B. Premises should be: 
1. in the city centre 
2. away from the main shopping streets 
3. in an area which young people considered to be safe and neutral 
with a shop front with rooms and meeting areas 
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These bureaucratic complexities delayed the development of the project for 
several months and this had a negative impact on the morale of the 
Bodymatters Youth Group. They complained that they felt as if they were 
now taking a back seat in the project's development. In April 1994, the 
health board assured its share of the funding and the Health Education 
Board for Scotland (HEBS) committed to provide £20,000 per year for three 
years to evaluate the project. Following complex negotiations, a joint NHS / 
local authority management model was finally agreed. Health board and 
local authority funding was complemented by a Scottish Executive urban aid 
grant for outreach work (Easton 1997). 
Proposals to establish a city centre health and information service for the 
young people of Dundee had been banded about for nearly fifteen years. 
The appointment of the project coordinator, in October, 1994 was clearly a 
watershed: 
"It is arguable whether the appointment of the Project Coordinator 
hailed the birth of the Young People's Project but it would seem to be 
a suitable description because the next stage of the Project has been 
reached and the lengthy gestation period is over. " (Easton 1997) 
6.2 Stakeholder Analysis 
From my account of the genesis of this initiative, it would appear that there 
were multiple stakeholders in The Comer and that young people were firmly 
at the centre. To facilitate an analysis of stakeholders I have mapped the 
range of issues highlighted by informants as the types of concerns raised by 
the young people who used The Corner. These are illustrated in figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 not only serves to illustrate the range and complexity of the health 
and social concerns of the young people who attended The Corner, it also 
serves to indicate the potential range of agencies that may have a stake in 
The Corner. Whilst the concerns of the authorities may have driven the 
development of the The Corner, a holistic approach to the issues of concern 
to young people led to the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders. 
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Figure 6.1: Range of issues raised by The Corner Young People 
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Figure 6.2 provides an overview of the range of stakeholders I identified. 
Here young people are seen to be firmly at the centre. The other primary 
stakeholders are identified in the second circle. The third circle includes the 
organisations and entities which support and drive the agendas of the 
primary stakeholders. It also identifies the agencies that the primary 
stakeholders are accountable to. Tertiary stakeholders are identified in the 
outer circle. These are recognised as interdependent upon one another and 
the entities to which both primary and secondary stakeholders are ultimately 
accountable. 
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IT Access Relationships 
Figure 6.2: The Corner stakeholder analysis 
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Media of the Project 
6.2.1 The media, the controversy and the Roman Catholic 
church 
An endeavour to work with young people and address sexual health issues, 
with a brief to deliver contraception (table 6.6), was not without its opponents 
and the local press seized the opportunity to sensationalise the opening of 
The Corner and create as much controversy as possible: 
"... we opened in a blaze of publicity with the Roman Catholic Church 
giving us "den of iniquity", "scurrilous", em "ill thought out venture" and 
all that sort of stuff" (Project Coordinator 1). 
The project coordinator was contacted by the press two weeks before the 
centre opened, advised that the Roman Catholic Bishop was "up in arms" 
about the centre and asked for his comments. Because of his lack of 
experience in dealing with the media, he declined to comment. The result 
was that, when the centre opened, it made front page news and it didn't stop 
with the local press. The Scottish tabloids and eventually the broadsheets 
and Scottish Television followed up on the story. 
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"... it led to myself and young people being on television and 
interviewed ... So the press stuff was a huge learning curve for me because I had never dealt with the press in that way before" (Project 
Coordinator 1). 
Support from the management group facilitated a pro-active approach to 
dealing with the controversy and the project coordinator was encouraged to 
tackle the source of the concerns. 
"... that sort of stand where your enemy is. I believe that 
fundamentally. You have really got to hear what they are saying and 
say, well if we can do this better, if what we are doing is not needed, 
we will go away. It is needed, there is a big social need out there, 
prayer alone is not solving this Bishop, we have to be here and we 
are here for your younger parishioners as well as for those who are 
atheist who access the service" (Local Authority Manager) 
The project coordinator, therefore, rang the Bishop and asked for an 
appointment. The Bishop agreed to meet with him and their meeting 
appeared to diffuse the controversy. The project coordinator believed that he 
had been able to persuade the Bishop that they had shared concerns - the 
health of young people, whether that is spiritual, mental, physical or social. 
He also persuaded him that The Corner project was not ill thought-out, was 
not being run by "a bunch of amateurs" and was not "chucking condoms at 
young people" but "engaging in challenging discussions". 
The media frenzy was a steep learning curve for the Coordinator: 
"... what it confirmed was just how you can be stitched up in the press 
and what is reported in the media doesn't reflect always what the 
general public feel.. ". (Project Coordinator 1). 
This controversy fizzled out but the upshot was that The Corner has enjoyed 
a huge amount of media interest since the day it opened, I was afforded 
access to four lever arch files in the offices which were full of press cuttings 
about the project and associated issues. The project coordinator and his 
team have learned how to work with the media interest in their work to the 
advantage of the project and the young people in the city. The consequence 
of this is that whenever any issue such as local teenage conception rates 
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(which are reported to be the highest in Western Europe) get back on the 
agenda, The Corner is always one of the first places the press go to for a 
comment. They do not give an instant response but ask for details of the 
questions to be addressed with a promise that that they will get back in time 
for their deadline, once they have garnered the appropriate evidence to back 
up their claims. They have also become proactive in their dealings with the 
media, feeding them positive news stories at every available opportunity in 
order to put young people and the project in a positive light with both the 
media and the public. 
"There has been an openness there. Early on they got some good 
stories and they got some good coverage and they were brought in to 
what the ideas were and I think (journalist] in particular in the local 
press developed quite strong personal relationship with PCI in terms 
of his willingness to share with her, she could phone up and say what 
do you think about this, and that has helped, enormously" (Local 
Authority Manager). 
By the very nature of the project, it inevitably courts controversy and other 
incidents have arisen as a matter of course. Two years after the drop-in 
opened, a parent who had found an appointment card for The Corner in her 
daughter's bedroom, complained to her local councillor and the media 
because her daughter had been given an appointment with a doctor and a 
prescription for contraception, without her consent. 
"... there was front news headline from a parent who had 'phoned the 
local paper and was incensed that her 13 year old could access an 
injectable contraceptive at the drop-in" (Project Coordinator 2). 
Partnership working actually helped to diffuse some of the controversy. 
When the project was initially set up, no one was quite sure whom to point a 
finger at. There seemed to be an assumption that, because the project was 
so different to mainstream services, it was actually run by a voluntary 
organisation with financial input from both the local authority and the health 
board. The management team could see that this was working to their 
advantage because: 
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".. it had that image, the press were more benign to it. It had that kind 
of arms length feel so people, if they wanted to attack it, couldn't 
attack Dundee City Council, they had to attack this thing which was 
working for the benefit of young people in difficulty, in a fair and 
reasonable way of involving them, quite hard to attack" (Local 
Authority). 
Because a significant chunk of the project's funding was provided by the 
local authority, keeping elected members of the Council on-board was seen 
as important. 
"... the powers that be always want it to be portrayed in a positive light 
which we do as well" (Project Coordinator 1). 
One way of doing this was to link the city, Dundee, to the major reports 
which resulted from The Corner's work. "Made in Dundee" for example is 
often stamped on reports to celebrate the work that is being achieved within 
the city. Another way was to have an open-door policy for local councillors 
so they could see the work of the project in action. Building alliances was 
seen crucial to the future of the project. 
"in the early days, it was like a lot of leg-work just establishing 
relationships" (Project Coordinator 1). 
The project coordinator told an anecdote about how he was feeling at the 
end of the week before the drop-in opened. He was exhausted with dealing 
with the media and all the controversy over what the project was about. He 
was standing in the drop-in with his colleagues just commenting on what a 
week it had been and how ready he was for the weekend when a middle- 
aged woman put her head round the door and asked "is this The Corner? " 
Fearful of what was coming next, he admitted that it was. To his delight she 
said... 
"Well, I tell you what, I've been reading about you in the newspapers 
and listening to you on the telly and I think this place is great. My 
daughter took part in one of your workshops up in Kirkton 
neighbourhood centre and I think you are doing a good job" (Project 
Coordinator 1). 
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The project was clearly controversial. In order to help young people reduce 
their own personal risk-taking behaviour, the project team were actively 
encouraged to employ innovative methods which could themselves have 
been considered risk-taking. For example, young people from The Comer 
were reported to have used drama in the Council Chambers in order to 
communicate their message to local Councillors and secure ongoing support 
to address the concerns of young people within the City. 
6.3 The Nature of The Corner Project 
Young people were firmly at the centre of this initiative. The appointment of a 
project coordinator, with a strong value base, by a panel of key stakeholders, 
was regarded as a key factor in the success of The Corner. The project 
coordinator, in turn, appointed like-minded individuals to the project team 
which led to the development of a strong 'Corner culture'. The support of a 
senior, cohesive and committed inter-agency management group was cited 
by the project coordinator as a significant factor in the success of the 
initiative. The acquisition of culturally acceptable premises to operate from, 
were also considered to be a major milestone in the development and 
success of the project. 
6.3.1 Appointment of the project coordinator 
It was agreed that the project coordinator's post would be jointly funded by 
the two lead funding agencies, the health board and the local authority. 
There was apparently a good history of joint health board / local authority 
working in the city but what was unique about this project was the decision 
form the outset to jointly fund and jointly recruit into the Project Coordinator 
role. The appointment panel, therefore, included representation from the 
NHS and the local authority. There were also four young people from the 
Bodymatters group on the panel. National representation was provided by 
the person responsible for establishing the "Young Scot"2 initiative. This 
2 Young Scot is a national initiative (www. youngscot. org) with a philosophy to support young 
people to take advantage of as many opportunities as possible. It offers incentives, 
information and opportunities to young people aged 12 to 26 and aims to help them make informed 
choices, play a part in community life and make the most of their leisure and learning. 
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appointment process was a critical incident in the development of The 
Corner. 
The man appointed to the post3 had a professional background in 
community education and had supported the young people that he was 
working with at the time to participate in the consultation exercises with the 
young people in the city in the early nineties. He was not from Dundee but 
had had considerable experience of working with young people in the city 
and in other cities in Scotland. He had worked in a variety of settings 
including street work, school work, children's hearing work and residential 
care. 
"You name it, it was right across the spectrum" (Project Coordinator 
1). 
He advised me that he had made very considered career choices: 
"I had trained in community education. I had done four year's work in 
a residential social work setting with young people before that, and I 
saw at first hand what happens when you have got young people and 
children in places they don't want to be. They might have to be for 
their own safety or for what other reason but the bottom line is most of 
them didn't want to be there, and I thought long and hard about which 
route I went down in terms of professional qualification and ultimately 
saw community education as the one as having most scope in that it 
was all about voluntary engagement and people, you know, were in 
contact because they wanted to be, for whatever purpose" (Project 
Coordinator 1). 
Through drawing on this experience, he was acutely aware how difficult it 
was, at times, for young people to access the services they needed. This 
was either because the services just didn't exist or because young people 
didn't know about them. The fact that services were rarely young people 
friendly coupled with the artificial boundaries between services, added to his 
frustration. 
3 NB During the period of time I collected data for this case, the original Project Coordinator had 
been promoted and was working on the development of a sister initiative. Ile was line managing the 
person who was acting up as his replacement. After a period of time this acting post was made 
substantive. 
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"You know, a service for this, a service for that, a service for 
something else. And not necessarily geared towards young people" 
(Project Coordinator 1). 
He applied for the job because he saw it as a means to filling in some of the 
gaps in current service provision. 
"I thought, ah, this is the opportunity to join up some of the gaps that 
I've seen in relation to mental health, sexual health em and broader 
health issues. This is a chance to pull it together . ............ and I 
went, ah, that's for me" (Project Coordinator 1). 
He believed that he was offered the job because he was able to demonstrate 
that he wasn't particularly tied in to his own discipline: 
"And I don't know, / think probably without trying to boost myself too 
much they saw .... they being the management group .... that / didn't have the preciousness of the local authority although my background 
was working with young people in a pretty focused way, that was 
about, this is about everybody wins, it is not about trying to push a 
particular agenda other than get it right for young folk... " (Project 
Coordinator 1). 
The two members of the management group interviewed, from the Health 
Service and from the local authority, identified the appointment of this man 
as one of the key factors that they believed to be critical to the success of 
the project: 
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"I think the appointment of [PC1] as the project manager originally 
was really important as he had certain thoughts, ideas, principles 
around what he wanted to do and even things like the artwork they 
used was very innovative the way they engaged with young 
people...... I was constantly amazed at the ideas they came up with 
that were fresh and different to what we had experienced 
before-using young people's imaginations. " (NHS Chief Executive) 
"We needed someone who could both manage and develop a project, 
manage and develop work with young people, manage and develop 
partnership work on an inter-agency basis and have a competence to 
manage and cope with information retrieval, presentation and it was 
very hard to find that in any one person ............... / think the project leader was ........ the person that made 
it work and if it hadn't have 
been [PCI] it might not have been as successful, so he had made a 
huge personal contribution and he has carried that through". (Local 
Authority Senior Manager). 
Once appointed, the project coordinator had three major tasks. They were to 
find suitable premises, to appoint staff to the project and to develop a 
framework under which they would operate. 
6.3.2 Appointment of the project team 
It was agreed that all other approved posts would be held within the 
establishment of the lead agency depending upon the role specification. 
Appointment panels would involve young people and representation from 
both the health board and the local authority (Easton 1997): 
"young people have been involved ....... in probably 80% of all staff interviews and a whole range of other things "(Project Coordinator 1). 
Whilst recognising the range of skills the project would require, the 
Coordinator was clear that he was not interested in appointing anyone who 
was in any way precious about their professional discipline: 
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"staff who have come to the project ..... it is not the about their 
qualifications it is about their experience, their attitude and at times 
that doesn't have to be a lot of experience. I would rather have 
somebody employed who had a really healthy attitude, a lot of 
energy, was open to development, that maybe had not had lots of 
experience than someone who has been around for ten years bitten 
and chewed all the strategies, all the lack of resources, caught in 
professional identify" (Project Coordinator 1). 
A willingness to learn and an ability to engage with young people as equals 
and on their terms were seen as the key attributes: 
"two of the most necessary things are being open to learning and the 
other one is having a strong sense of seeing young people, being 
able to see young people as people they can learn from as opposed 
to just preach to or teach or educate" (Project Coordinator 1). 
At the time of the opening of the drop-in the project team was seven strong. 
The project coordinator in collaboration with the Bodymatters Youth Group 
and the management group had appointed five professional staff from a 
range of health and social care backgrounds. A senior clerical officer was 
appointed to provide administrative support to the project. Staff appointed 
included nurses (with specialist qualifications in family planning), health 
promotion specialists and community education specialists. By virtue of their 
professional backgrounds, they had had experience of either working for the 
NHS or for the local authority. 
Despite professional backgrounds and despite the fact they might have been 
appointed for the different skill set and experience they brought to the 
project, the project coordinator advised that all professional staff should 
carry the title "project worker". The rationale for this is to help breakdown any 
potential professional barriers between the staff themselves and between 
the staff and the young people within the project. The project coordinator 
was very clear in his own mind about this issue: 
"when I qualified it wasn't about the discipline and I am still not 
precious about that, and one of the first things I did when I came in 
post was change all the job titles ..... but I had to consult with the staff 
.... " (Project Co-ordinator 1). 
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The exception to the rule was the doctor who was contracted to work on a 
six hours per week sessional basis in the drop-in. This person was referred 
to as the Project Doctor. 
6.3.3 The Corner culture 
There was a sense that the The Corner had a very explicit culture. I asked 
what this was: 
"... it is about respecting people, it is about going at their own pace, it 
is about making things fun, it is about getting rid of status which 
prevents people from being approachable and it is ... about 
accountability I suppose, making information, making staff, making 
the agencies responsive to the rapidly changing needs of young 
people from all the different places that they come from. (Project 
Coordinator 2). 
The culture was one where it was acceptable to take risks. Staff at The 
Corner claimed that they were able to tackle difficult issues that no one else 
felt they could address. For example, sexual exploitation: 
`Ace magazine, sexual exploitation, young people involved in 
prostitution, for the want of a better word.... wanting to raise 
awareness of it and everybody going uhhh! don't want to touch it 
because Dundee will get slammed as being the child prostitution 
centre and we don't want that. And we worked, how long did it take to 
get that out? six months? Consultation with the Chief Constable, this 
was heavy stuff by the way, not even what is in the magazine which is 
quite challenging but the bigger picture around paedophile rings, drug 
dealers, big networks, Internet all.. stuff like that. People know it goes 
on but to actually raise awareness of it, and this, by the way, was at 
the highest level, it was all elected members... administration, Chief 
Constable, Director of Social Education, NRD [Neighbourhood 
Resources Department], and that magazine would not have been 
produced if it had not been for us, The Corner, because we agreed to 
say we will do it and, what was it like? ....... Discomforts to small a 
word for it. Fear of, again. labels being attached ... and young people being more exploited" (Project Coordinator 1). 
It was suggested that The Corner culture was in fact a counter-culture: 
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"if you are going to innovate you have got to take some risks and 
some stuff will bomb, that is being in the risk game, if you weren't in 
that it wouldn't be what it is, so the endorsement to do that, the right 
to fail, the right to fail in a project without you failing as a member of 
staff because you are associated with the project is critically important 
and again that is a kind of counter-culture thing isn't it, it is not the 
dominant culture in the public sector. We couldn't have done that as 
easily if we had not had the support of a senior member of staff in the 
local authority and the health authority. If people feel they are 
punished or under the cosh or they take a risk and it bombs and they 
put quite a lot of money behind something and it isn't used they way 
people think it will be then that makes them more cautious, and the 
one thing that project cannot afford to be is conservative with a small 
c, it has to always be given the kind of support to challenge 
conventional approaches" (Local Authority Manager). 
The Corner culture actively encouraged risk-taking within the project team in 
order to find innovative ways to help young people reduce their risk-taking 
behaviour: 
But like the stories around the 13 year getting contraception and the 
Bishop going mad because condoms were going to be given out, I 
think they are all part of the process and we have had to take risks to 
be able to prevent risks" (Project Coordinator 1). 
There was also a culture where problems should be tackled head on, which 
began as described above, when PC1 met with the Bishop to identify their 
common ground and respect for their differences. When a new nightclub 
opened in the city, it produced a four-page glossy brochure which clearly 
had the potential to undermine the advances The Corner had made in 
addressing sexual health issues: 
Z were very angry about the new stripper's nightclub in Dundee, it 
was promoting "shag tag" all that jazz, it was awful awful stuff. They 
produced a colour 4 page brochure and were giving it out to young 
people" (Local Authority Manager). 
The Corner team took direct action against the proprietors, and, when they 
became fearful that they might lose their licence, they invited the project 
coordinator to meet with their staff. The club had the capacity to cater for 
2000 young people each night and PC1 was afforded the opportunity to 
meet with and train the bouncers and the bar staff. 
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It was suggested that The Corner culture was in fact a counter culture, which 
challenged the status quo. On the wall of the office of the project 
coordinator was a quotation from the inside cover of The Dance of Change 
by Peter Senge (1999). See table 6.8: 
Table 6.8: Quote on wall of original project coordinator's office 
"Organisations that establish change initiatives discover after initial 
success that even the most promising efforts to transform or re- 
vitalise organisations - despite interest, resources and compelling 
business results, can fail to sustain themselves... because 
organisations have complex well built immune systems aimed at 
preserving the status quo" 
There was a sense that those who were working to champion the voices of 
the young people within the city were never going to be complacent. There 
was awareness, within The Corner, that their purpose and the methods they 
use presented a constant challenge to the status quo. Consequently there 
was a view that external commentators, including researchers like myself, 
were viewed with suspicion, and that The Corner lacked the ability to 
examine itself critically. The researcher I liaised with before I approached 
The Comer articulated this view: 
196 
"I don't know whether you have felt this when you were going in and 
asking questions but I think sometimes external researchers come 
under some kind of suspicion and that what they are doing is sort of 
not quite right, or, you know, I definitely got that feeling when I went 
along there, I was allowed in to do this piece of work but there was a 
lot of, sort of, put it this way, in terms of the report of the findings I felt 
there was quite a lot of constraint on what you could and couldn't say 
at times, and that came to kind of like focus when we released the 
press release for The Corner, it was just before the conference 
started we released this press release and I had to go back to The 
Corner and say well look what do you think of the wording of this and 
all the rest of it, and they weren't happy about anything you know, and 
eventually we found a form of words that was acceptable to both 
sides, but it was probably one of the most difficult press releases I 
have ever written and I have written a few you know in relation to 
some of the work I have done. It was highly sensitive, you knew at 
the time that what you were saying was highly sensitive and that you 
had to tone it down a bit or whatever on their side or adjust the 
meaning of some of the sentences. So it kind of reinforces itself after 
a while and I think these researchers who are external I don't think 
are terribly welcome after a while. " (Researcher 1) 
My own experience was one in which the project coordinator was extremely 
facilitative in enabling my access to the project. In the light of the concerns 
expressed above, the question must be asked as to whether this was 
genuine facilitation, or in reality, about control. R1 had found his dealings 
with the project problematic in as much he felt that he was constrained in 
what he could and could not say about his research. 
At no time, has any effort been made to either have sight of or censor my 
work. The key difference between RI's research and mine was that his was 
funded by The Corner and mine clearly was not. It is not uncommon for an 
organisation, like the Department of Health, for example, to withhold the right 
to publish research they have funded until they have approved the wording 
of the report and any associated press releases. 
My sense is that The Corner team have a strong philosophy which puts 
young people at the centre. Because this philosophy challenges the 
prevailing orthodoxy, they are seen to be protective of the culture they have 
created. From my own experience, The Corner was open to uncensored 
scrutiny. They are totally focused on young people and are extremely 
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protective of the trust and respect that they as a team have been able to 
build up with the young people who access their services. 
How was The Corner culture sustained and how did they prevent it from 
becoming corrupted? There appeared to be two key, interdependent 
elements to the strategies adopted to sustain The Corner culture, namely, 
consultation and evaluation. The Corner staff developed and utilised 
dynamic, innovative, consultation processes with young people: 
"we have got a consultation framework which highlights ............ the 
process that is involved in consulting young people and the choices 
that need to be within that because some people you know, hate the 
idea of questionnaires, or hate the idea of speaking into tapes, so it is 
using video, it is using feedback boards, graffiti you name it, ! think it 
has just been creative a lot of the time" (Project Coordinator 2). 
".. we never developed a model which was, that's the one group of 
young people which would advise on everything. We avoided that like 
the plague" (Project Coordinator 1). 
To ensure the active involvement of young people from the outset, a project 
advisory group was established with representation from the Bodymatters 
Youth Group, project staff and other agencies committed to supporting the 
project (Easton 1997). Keeping focused on young people was a key strategy 
and an integral aspect of The Corner culture: 
"The main way that we have done that is going back to young people 
time and time again and confirming or reaffirming that what they are 
looking for is what we are giving them and again that can sound 
cheesy and people can say well you know but we have always said 
that young people are at the core of everything we are involved in so 
although they never wanted to be in amongst suits and ties or 
necessarily certainly making up strategies with me or drawn up great 
big strategic plans they do have a lot of energy, ideas and honesty 
and I think whether it is painting the kitchen or making a now leaflet or 
pulling together an annual report, there is a responsibility for 
everybody working here to check that we are still on track and we are 
still on the lines and a lot of that comes through from evaluation and 
feedback" (Project Coordinator 2). 
The appointment of a half-time project evaluator at the outset was a critical 
incident in this project and was described as a key enabling factor. The post 
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was funded by the Health Education Board for Scotland (HEBS) and the 
post holder was located within the department of Public Health Medicine. 
The purpose of the role was to focus on the processes of multi-agency 
working with young people who were considered to be both a 'hard to reach' 
and vulnerable group of people. 
An evaluation group was set up to support the appointment of the evaluator 
and to consider evaluation reports and make recommendations for policy 
and practice (Easton 1997): 
". in terms of developing our practice, one of the other key strengths 
was that because of the interest in this model HEBS [Health 
Education Board for Scotland] wanted to fund an evaluation of the 
implementation, not the impact, of just how you bring together this 
kind of service" (Project Coordinator 1). 
This led to the development of an evaluative culture within the project and 
amongst the members of the project staff team. 
"The team that were there in the beginning very quickly realised the 
value of it..... and then it just became part of the culture so that as the 
team expanded, evaluation was just something that they did, and ! 
think that the team sold it to new people" (Researcher 2) 
"And now what you have is staff who see evaluation as very important 
and they build it in to different areas of their practice and at times staff 
have worked with young people ... there is an example of young 
people being trained by the research officer and then the staff to 
conduct a needs assessment in one area and that was a really good 
bit of work" (Project Coordinator 1) 
"(R2) instigated a lot of the evaluation systems including the enquiry 
sheet, some of the interview focus groups and everything like that and 
the reality is that most of the staff here now are quite confident and 
able to do that themselves" (Project Coordinator 2). 
The benefits realised from this degree of evaluation have included providing 
the evidence for additional funding, team development and the direction the 
project has taken. Perhaps most importantly, through the inclusion of 
consultation work and needs assessment, evaluation has provided the 
199 
evidence to keep the project focused on its purpose, its primary client group, 
young people. 
Therefore evaluation and feedback was embedded into the fabric of the 
ways of working within The Corner and this was coupled with a strong value 
base: 
"That is a simple answer to a big question in terms of how do we 
prevent things from heading down other people's agenda I suppose. 
There is a strong conviction within the project" (Project Coordinator 
2). 
Even on an individual level there was a culture amongst the staff of openly 
challenging one another, which one informant advised was "done very 
nicely" (Project Worker 1). The project team held weekly team meetings 
which addressed support and development (SAD) issues, described as 
"almost like supervision" (Project Worker 1). 
Another key factor which helped sustain The Comer culture was the support 
of the project management group. 
6.3.4 The management group 
The original project coordinator identified the project's management group 
as one of the enabling factors in this innovation. Words he used to describe 
it were 'joint', in that it was multi-agency and "tight" because it had been in 
existence for six years, with three out of the four members having been there 
since the start and therefore offering consistency, "strategic" and "extremely 
supportive - from a distance". The management group appeared to have 
confidence in the project coordinator and gave him autonomy to run the 
project as he saw fit. Nevertheless, they were there to provide advice and 
support as and when required. It was also suggested that the management 
group had seen the Initiative come to fruition and had fun In the process: 
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"The management group have, I think, enjoyed their experience and 
this has been enjoyable, this is your ideal, it has been created, it 
wasn't always that way..... this one has been good fun, pretty hard 
going, and pretty scary at times, but good fun" (Project Coordinator 
1). 
Membership of the group included senior staff from both the NHS and the 
local authority with a wide range of expertise and networks. The project 
coordinator said that the management group had developed strong 
professional relationships with one another and had a shared understanding 
of what they were jointly endeavouring to achieve. The group advised on 
policy matters, strategic development, funding routes and connections. It 
met formally every six weeks but the project coordinator knew that each 
member of the group was only a phone call away. He described a sense of 
trust. The management group had got to know the staff and the young 
volunteers on the project and the project coordinator felt that they had faith 
in their ability to deliver. Continuity within the management group was 
considered to be a key factor in the success of the project. The group 
members remained committed to the initiative even when their roles 
changed over time: 
"We have been complemented in the health side by the Director of 
Finance for the NHS Healthcare Trust who became the acting Chief 
Executive when [NHSJ got promoted, so not only did we have the 
Chief Executive we had the Director of Finance, these are senior 
people who, if they are committed to something, they can make it 
happen and / guess the interesting thing is, why do people get as 
passionately interested and committed to a project? And they 
wouldn't have stuck with this project as long, they would have left it 
behind when they had career moves themselves if they weren't 
getting something back out of this" (Local Authority Manager). 
Senior managers stated they could see the strategic advantages of working 
collaboratively. They were able to achieve objectives they would not have 
been able to achieve without the support and input of the other agencies and 
they were able to secure funding from their own organisations on the basis 
that it was matched by their partner organisations. 
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Established on a project basis, sustainability was always dependent upon 
funding streams and the management team were focused from the outset on 
mainstreaming the project to secure its funding base: 
"The funding strategy, as you know, has been to take project funding 
and to gradually mainstream it, working all the time to mainstream the 
core. So now we have got to a point where within the local authority 
budget and within the health board budget, if all the project funding 
stopped, the core would still be secure, it would be a vastly slimmed 
down core, but there would be a core of service which is now 
mainstream and opposed to entirely dependent on short term external 
funding, and that's not universally the case with short-term funded 
projects. A lot of them get to the end of their short-term funding and 
close and that won't happen with The Corner" (Local Authority 
Manager). 
Management group members used evidence of successful multi-agency 
working as a negotiating tool, to secure "matched funding": 
"I have had the ability to say in local government this is matched 
funding. If you don't match it, not only do we lose our share, but we 
lose the health board's share and I know that has been played the 
other way round............ in the case of local government it is a hard 
slog getting money for innovation and for development and it has 
been in Dundee in particular with the budget position. So to 
mainstream something which was urban programme or SIP4 funded 
or innovation funded through the health board executive, to get the 
funding for the core budget for that is really difficult and we would 
never have managed it unless we could have used the lever, this is a 
match funding the health board is putting more money in and we are 
just keeping balance here and if you don't do it then it won't be a 
partnership project, so it has been tremendously helpful. That 
partnership, I wouldn't want to undersell in any way the importance of 
the partnership because it has allowed the local authority to do things 
that it couldn't do on its own for a whole variety of reasons, the 
funding reason I have referred to, the policy reasons, we couldn't 
have provided the direct access to sexual health services without 
having a GP a family planning accredited GP" (Local Authority 
Manager). 
° SIP - Social Inclusion Partnership funding was introduced by the New Labour Government in 1999 
for disadvantaged communities in Scotland. Whilst badged as a new approach there was no new or 
additional money made available to address poverty and social exclusion in Scotland. The `new' 
approach placed more emphasis on prevention rather than cure and a key element of SIP funding 
applications was that they had employed a multi-agency approach with communities actively 
involved at the heart of the process (Johnstone & McWilliams 2005). 
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The decision that the health board and local authority should collaborate to 
address their shared concerns regarding the health and well-being of the 
young people within the city, also appeared to impact more widely. For 
example, I was advised that evaluation had since become standard practice 
within the Health Service and all new service developments had inbuilt 
evaluation strategies. In addition, the lessons learned from The Corner 
regarding pubic involvement had informed the development and 
implementation of the local health board's Patient and Public Involvement 
strategy: 
"if you can do it with young people you can do it with anyone, so / 
think we have learnt from that if you are serious about taking this 
patient involvement thing forward then there are principles that we 
have learned from this that we can use......... we talk within the health 
service about engaging people and listening to people but we don't 
take it to the sort of extremes that The Corner took it to. Extremes is 
the wrong word, it's about putting your money where your mouth is 
really and saying if you are serious about this thing you have to put 
this in place.... " (Chief Executive NHS). 
It was acknowledged that public and patient involvement "at this sort of 
extreme" requires a significant cultural change which does not happen 
overnight. It was suggested that there was still a great deal of defensiveness 
within the establishment, and so, for example, there were considerable 
anxieties about the potential of a patient sitting on an appointment panel for 
a hospital consultant. 
6.3.5 The acquisition of culturally acceptable premises 
As an interim measure, the project coordinator and the team he appointed 
were initially based on the outskirts of Dundee in a psychiatric hospital. This 
was considered to be less than ideal. They were relocated to temporary city 
centre premises as soon as was feasible but had to wait a considerable 
length of time before they were to move into the premises that would be 
known as "The Corner". Their temporary premises at first seemed so much 
better than their initial location. However, their office was open-plan and, 
therefore, offered no privacy. As the team grew, these premises soon 
became very cramped and increasingly unsatisfactory. 
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Finding suitable premises was a major hurdle and was seen as essential as 
young people were clearly not using health facilities that they perceived to 
be designed by adults, for adults (Easton 1997; Redman 1992). A city centre 
drop-in facility was seen as central to delivering the project's aims: 
"The acquisition of premises to be used as a drop-in centre for young 
people had always been central to the whole concept of having a 
health and information project. Without a central point the Project 
could only be delivered in a fragmented, selective way. " (Easton 
1997) 
Box 5.7 details the specification for suitable premises. The location was 
considered of primary importance so that no young person in Dundee felt 
excluded because of the territorial issues that were associated with 
neighbourhood gangs. Only certain parts of the city centre were considered 
to be safe and neutral. The difficulty of finding suitable premises was 
compounded by the fact that young people had been explicit in that they did 
not want the premises to be in or near a shopping centre where they could 
be seen entering and leaving. They detailed their specification: 
"it could only be in five streets...... all on the South side of the High 
Street...... and we want a cafe, we want services integrated and we 
want a staff base all in a one-er5" (Project Coordinator 1). 
They also detailed what they felt should be provided within a drop-in facility 
(table 6.9): 
Finding suitable premises was a major challenge for the project coordinator, 
taking him into hitherto unknown territory: 
"I mean to be quite honest at that time I felt like a property agent, I 
spent so much time... I was based in Liff Hospital6 and 1 was by the 
Chapel praying for premises to turn up" (Project Coordinator 1). 
$ "All in a one-er" is Dundonian colloquialism meaning "all together" 6 The local mental health facility 
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Table 6.9: Young people's views of what drop-in facility should 
provide (Easton 1997) 
1. Place specifically for young people 
2. Somewhere safe and welcoming 
3. Someone of the same age to talk to 
4. Confidential Services 
5. Family Planning Services specifically for young people 
6. Information to make choices 
In March 1995, five months after the co-coordinator was appointed, he found 
premises that matched most of the criteria identified. It was a listed building, 
on three floors and on a corner. One entrance led to a facility that staff would 
use on the second floor. Around the corner from there, on a corner, there 
was a shop front entrance to the facility that would be refurbished for use as 
the drop-in. Refurbishment plans were drawn up by the Project management 
group in partnership with the Bodymatters Youth Group. Table 6.10 lists the 
refurbishment specification agreed. 
Table 6.10: Refurbishment specification (Easton 1997) 
a front reception area 
a computer corner 
racks for leaflets 
large windows suitable for displays 
cafe area and drinks machine 
two one-to-one rooms 
toilets with provision for disabled young people 
a kitchen area 
a meeting room 
a doctor's room with waiting area 
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With refurbishment complete and all but a cafe area in situ, the drop-in 
opened on 11th March 1996. 
When approaching "The Comer" premises you are immediately struck by the 
window displays. They are bright, eye catching and creative and carry key 
messages. All the displays are developed with young people in the drop-in. 
At the time of my site visit, in one window there was information about when 
young people can access legal advice in the drop-in. In another there is a 
large poster which at first glance looks like the map of the River Thames 
shown during the credits for the television soap, "Eastenders". On closer 
inspection you see that it is in fact a map of the River Tay, the river on which 
Dundee sits. The caption is not "Eastenders", but "STI-Enders". It asks, "Are 
you talking about it? If you are going TAY (local dialect for "to") have sex - 
protect your self from unplanned pregnancy and Sexually Transmitted 
Infections (STI's), use a condom. " The poster and the message were 
developed with and by young people. It draws on popular culture, plays on 
the local vernacular and conveys an important health message about safe 
sex. 
6.3.6 Team building and policy development 
Although there was considerable frustration in the time it took to find and 
refurbish the city centre premises for the project, this time was productively 
used in team building and developing a framework under which the team 
would operate and endeavour to ensure a consistency in approach. This 
was believed to be extremely important considering the wide range of skills 
and experiences the team offered and the different organisational cultures 
they had previously experienced: 
"...... when we brought the initial staff team together it was like, 
psychiatric nurse, 2 nurses, one that worked in a hospital, one that 
worked in a psychiatric background, a health promotion worker that 
worked in a drugs project and a youth worker that had done street 
work and everything, and a family planning doctor that worked in a 
very clinical setting within a medical framework and the challenge for 
me ..... was ... to merge medical and social models of health and 
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help people to see that their role was really important but that there is 
more than one way here, and that took time" (Project Coordinator 1). 
During their protracted induction period the team were afforded the 
opportunity to undertake two residential team building sessions. Affording 
local authority staff the space to so this was considered very high risk and 
extremely innovative: 
The risks involved in saying yes to that were being pilloried in the 
press, costs that would be exposed, it was just against culture it 
would be seen as a precedent to the other staff who would love to do 
that but don't get a chance in their working lives, how can we justify 
for one lot and not the others... " (Local Authority Manager). 
There was no doubt amongst informants that these team-building initiatives 
were a legitimate investment, as they not only enabled team building but 
allowed the project coordinator and his team to begin the process of 
developing the policies and procedures under which The Corner team would 
operate. On one of their residential team-building sessions the team worked 
together to agree a common policy with regard to child protection. In order 
to ascertain their differing approaches, all members of the team were given 
the same scenario. The five different disciplines that were represented 
offered five different views about how to respond to the situation. 
Consequently, The Corner staff had to develop their own policy for 
managing child protection issues (The Corner Young People's Health and 
Information Service 2001) which would allow them to integrate their multiple 
perspectives with their collective focus on the young people they were 
working with. This was a major challenge because of the complexity and 
legality of the issues. There were pressures from many directions. The local 
authority for example wanted The Corner to adopt their policies. The 
guidelines that were eventually produced, the Co-ordinator believed allowed 
The Corner staff team to move at the pace of the young people they were 
working with and take them with them, rather than "chuck them into the 
system". He clearly was seeking to preserve the confidentiality of the young 
people, a key concern young people themselves raised of primary 
importance to them (see table 6.5). He was of the firm belief that both he 
and his team were happy with the set of child protection guidelines that they 
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had developed even though he acknowledged that he had been accused of 
being naive. 
The policy was cited by a member of the management group as an example 
of innovation which demonstrated that The Corner was not afraid to take 
risks and challenge the status quo: 
"One of the major risks they took was to stand at some distance from 
the local authority's child protection policy and to offer a much higher 
guarantee of confidentiality than social workers, youth workers, 
community education workers and teachers could offer" (Local 
Authority). 
6.4 Macro-, Meso- and Micro-Politics 
The Corner project appeared to have clarity of focus, a cohesive and 
committed management team, strong value driven leadership and a 
dedicated project team. Young people appeared to be firmly at the centre of 
the project and fully engaged with the development and the delivery of the 
service. However, no project operates within a political vacuum. Political 
controversy was evident at a national (macro) level, an organisational 
(meso) level and at an interpersonal (micro) level. 
6.4.1 Macro-level politics 
Top-down policy initiatives appeared to have the potential to undermine The 
Corner. National level concern over the incidence of teenage pregnancy in 
Scotland led to the development and implementation of national policy 
aimed to address this concern. The solution selected by the Scottish 
Executive was to establish a new, nationwide service to provide the young 
people of Scotland with confidential advice, information and support on any 
aspect of sex, contraception and relationships. In developing and 
implementing their plans, the Scottish Executive did not appear to take 
account of any provision that was already in place in different parts of the 
country. The provision, or rather the imposition, of a "Caledonia Youth" 
service within Dundee was not recognised as a useful contribution by those 
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involved in The Corner management group. It was seen as a State-driven 
intervention, which cut right across the philosophy of The Corner 
"I think it is an outrageous waste of money. I think they could have 
added value, they could have stabilised us and I believe it is purely as 
a result of a Scottish Executive top-down decision. It had no bearing 
on a local analysis of what was needed. Once the decision was taken 
to create Caledonia Youth and franchise it down to local level I further 
believe that they should have actually targeted identified needs that 
The Corner couldn't meet, and that would have been primarily around 
looked after young people..... The young people who were either in 
care or foster care where there are many of the sexual health issues, 
many of those who go in for terminations and serial terminations, 
many of those who are involved as young people in prostitution in 
Dundee come from that cohort, and there are lots of reasons for that, 
it is not to blame the care environment it is the function of how chaotic 
their lives have been before they came into care, and they are the 
ones at The Corner because it doesn't have dedicated outreach 
capacity, it is a centre, cannot work on a one-to-one basis or a group 
work basis or in a home setting with that group of extremely 
vulnerable young people and we lobbied that Caledonia Youth should 
take on board that challenge in Dundee and we would work with them 
as a clear partner. But they wanted to open a centre with open times 
which overlap with The Corner do a service which is the same as The 
Corner, I don't think it does anything different but offer alternative.... 
the crazy thing was that it wasn't done in a way that was reflected by 
the local evidence of need in the sense that it didn't plug gaps" (Local 
Authority Senior Manager) 
"I think more recently the introduction of Caledonia Youth, Brook 
Advisory as it was, for me is unnecessary, ! think we have got a good 
service through The Corner and this was a ministerial initiative which I 
thought the money could have been better used with The Comer with 
an established service but we were told it was happening and it has 
happened" (Chief Executive NHS). 
As discussed in 6.3.3 above, an evaluative culture was recognised as a key 
element which served to sustain The Corner culture and the centrality of the 
young people within the project. However, there was a national view that the 
level of evaluation embedded within The Corner was unsustainable, a 
position which a member of the management group described as "absolutely 
staggering": 
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"... The Chief HMI [Her Majesty's Inspectorate] for Scotland came 
visiting and he was very very impressed and as he came away he 
said that is a completely unsustainable level of investment in 
monitoring evaluation ` don't know how you can justify that'....... he 
had made it on the basis that we couldn't justify that everywhere 
therefore how could you justify it anywhere and we were just gob 
smacked because we had actually egged it and said look how much 
we have put into this, we have argued for this, the health board 
invested in it, look at the return. It's really action research where we 
are continuously shaping policy in the light of evidence ..... Because the evidence we have got is that it changed practice, it changed 
culture, it improved targeting, it provided the management information 
necessary to make the case for future funding, all of those things, it 
provided the frightening information about what was still going on, it 
provided the kind of qualitative assessment of how difficult this was 
going to be to actually tackle the problems" (Local Authority Senior 
Manager). 
This position does appear somewhat ironic when it is pitched against a 
National decision to invest in a service without any assessment of local 
provision. Whilst evaluation might appear expensive, there is a strong 
argument in this case, that an overall analysis of costs and benefits could 
justify the outlay. By building evaluation into the fabric of this innovation, it 
remained focused and the skills to evaluate the services were passed onto 
the project workers themselves in order to sustain a level of evaluation 
beyond the life of the initial investment from HEBS. For example, one 
project worker, armed with the statistical facts, articulated the need for the 
project to continue: 
"....... young people using the service speaks for itself and getting it 
across, not having to justify, but just putting across the very fact that 
young people are coming again and again, 12,000 young people a 
year use that drop-in for a variety of different reasons. It confirms that 
their lifestyle more than ever requires the kind of support services that 
we offer" (Project Worker 2). 
6.4.2 Meso- & micro-level politics 
Within The Corner, it was suggested that organisational politics may have 
been exacerbated by a project's funding arrangements. For example, one 
respondent argued that in an environment where innovation is encouraged 
and risks are taken, some projects will inevitably fail. Some of the failures 
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within The Corner were identified as developments driven by the availability 
of funding rather than based on an assessment of the needs of the Young 
People. Funding-led projects were reactive, not always as carefully thought 
through as other proactive initiatives and often carried within less than 
optimum timescales. This in turn, meant that issues such as recruitment 
were rushed and the project workers appointed were not necessarily the 
most competent to undertake the role required. All of these factors were 
seen to militate against the success of an initiative. 
Whilst the project enjoyed continuity in the membership of its management 
group, it did not, to the same degree, amongst its staff, and this was 
regarded as problematic: 
"... funding arrangements that depend on how high issues are on the 
government's or the health boards or the council's list of targets that 
tends to affect how much funding we get and for how long ...... It is a 
major frustration to work with young people whose problems are long 
term and whose lifestyles are long term and have to do it on a short 
term fragmented basis when staff, who maybe high quality, but they 
move on because their contracts are never extended" (Project 
Coordinator 2). 
It was suggested that this situation may also have impacted on a gender 
bias amongst the staff: 
"we have lost some male staff through funding problems, and through 
the feedback young people are saying yes we love the service but 
where are the male staff, there is a lack of male staff" (Project 
Coordinator 2). 
Interestingly, there was a counter-gender bias in the management team, the 
majority of who were male and appeared to enjoy a relative degree of job 
security. The health board and local authority leads were both male as was 
the initial project coordinator and the acting project coordinator. 
At the time when data was collected for this case study, the project 
employed 14 full-time staff and had managed to secure three quarters of its 
funding on a long-term basis. However, the majority of these staff was not 
around when the project was initially set up. They had not, therefore, been 
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afforded the time-out opportunities that their predecessors had enjoyed and 
when they joined the team they were expected to "hit the ground running". 
The consequence of this was that at times they appeared to have difficulty 
taking ownership of some of the philosophies, policies and procedures that 
were developed in the early days of the project. 
For example, I uncovered that some newer members of the staff team, who 
were not party to those earlier discussions, did not share the same degree of 
confidence in The Corner's Child Protection Policy. They felt strongly that it 
needed updating. For example, whilst the nurses currently working on the 
project recognised that their professional peers had been represented at the 
time the policies were developed, they argued that the service they are 
offering had further developed since then, and, as a consequence, the 
policies needed to be updated to reflect these developments: 
"I believe that policies should be reviewed every year once they are 
established" (Project Worker 2). 
When The Corner first opened, the nurses were offering pregnancy testing 
services. Now, due to the advent of new legislation on nurse prescribing, 
they were also able to offer the morning-after pill and repeat prescriptions for 
oral and depot contraceptives [PW1]. 
With regard to the Child Protection Policy, the original project coordinator 
was identified within the policy as the named Child Protection Officer for the 
project. According to the policy, it was with him that the buck would stop. 
The nurses I interviewed, who were not amongst the initial staff cohort, were 
concerned that this policy was no longer workable as the original project 
coordinator had been promoted and in his new role was no longer as 
accessible as he had been. In addition, the nurses were concerned about 
their own professional accountability: 
" -'ca- use you are a child protection nurse you would deal with it because you are accountable for it ........... At The Corner, we use a different process, and that can take longer time and it doesn't always 
sit comfortably" (Project Worker 1). 
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However, they found this difficult to convey "without sounding obstructive" 
(Project Worker 1). 
The purpose of the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) is to protect the 
public. It is a body which essentially gives nurses and midwives their licence 
to practise. Nurses registered by the NMC must abide by a code of 
professional practice (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2002a). The Code of 
Conduct clearly states that nurses are personally accountable for their 
professional practice (see table 6.11). 
Table 6.11: Nursing and Midwifery Council Code of Professional 
Conduct 
As a registered nurse, midwife or health visitor, you are 
personally accountable for your practice. In caring for patients 
and clients you must: 
respect the patient or client as an individual 
obtain consent before you give any treatment or care 
protect confidential information 
co-operate with others in the team 
maintain your professional knowledge and competence 
be trustworthy 
act to identify and minimise risk to patients and clients. 
These are the shared values of all the United Kingdom 
healthcare regulatory bodies. 
These nurses were struggling with their personal professional accountability 
to act to identify and minimise risk to patients and clients when it came to 
child protection issues. 
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The Corner policy clearly states that it has been developed for the use of the 
multidisciplinary staff team, sessional workers and volunteers. It states: 
"The project is committed to working in collaboration with other 
agencies and its strength of response is in moving at each young 
person's pace and involving them in each stage of a process of 
communication with third parties.......... 
Should any service user(s) disclose they are abusing a child or young 
person, the information must immediately be passed to the Project 
Leader......... 
In the case of a young person disclosing abuse the young person 
must be advised of what may/will happen next and the Assistant 
Project Leader and/or Project Leader must be informed as soon as 
possible.... 
If neither are available staff should contact (the child protection unit) 
directly. " (The Corner Young People's Health and Information Service 
2001) 
The nurses I interviewed argued that the requirement within The Corner to 
pass a problem up a hierarchical chain of command had the potential to 
delay due processes and this was problematic for them, as they believed 
that they were both trained and professionally accountable for taking direct 
action. On the other hand, it could be argued that The Corner policy 
embraced other elements of the code as guiding principles, namely, respect 
the patient or client as an individual, obtain consent before you give any 
treatment or care, protect confidential information and co-operate with others 
in the team. 
The nursing staff stated they were committed to the philosophy of The 
Corner, "The Corner culture". They joined the project staff team because that 
valued the centrality of the young people to the project. They appeared to 
really appreciate the culture. However, despite being employed on the basis 
of their professional knowledge and skills, they struggled with the 
expectation that they should leave their professional identity (but not their 
skills) at the door when they came into the project: 
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"I don't think I would feel devalued if 1 wasn't told that you can't do this 
and you shouldn't do this and you shouldn't call yourself nurses, to 
me that is unnecessary, I don't think anything as such needs to 
change, I just think we need more recognition from people on high" 
(Project Worker 2). 
They were committed in principle to the philosophy that young people should 
always be at the centre but they struggled with the methods employed to 
achieve this - methods which the project coordinators were clearly 
committed to: 
"A lot of our job has been opening boxes and trying to get people to 
see out with the box. It has been a ... theme that has 
been 
continuing and having a project which from the word go in 1995 
embraced multi-disciplinary working with all its ups and downs there 
has been nursing staff, youth work staff, health promotion staff, social 
work staff and a whole mix of disciplines which have offered that kind 
of richness of services and it has grown to the point now where we 
have people who have done like therapy courses, taken placements 
within the project and people who have good health and welfare 
qualifications to do healthy eating projects within The Corner so the 
whole idea of boxes and people being stuck in them or trying to put 
other people in them has been a major pattern of frustration and 
challenge but it has also been positive in the sense that as the team 
has grown and we have seen things, I suppose cross-fertilising and 
changing, there is a great buzz from that, sharing skills and sharing 
learning and training" (Project Coordinator 2). 
The nurses' struggle manifested when they were faced with scenarios which 
they believed had the potential to compromise their professional 
accountability. It also manifested when they felt marginalised from service 
development discussions which they believed they could have expedited, for 
the benefit of the young people they were working with, had they been 
included. 
Consultation with young people identified concern over sexually transmitted 
infections (STI's). Only a small number of the young people referred to the 
one genitourinary medicine (GUM) clinic within the major teaching hospital at 
the west end of the city by the The Corner, actually attended the clinic. This 
led to discussions around how services might be developed to incorporate 
an STI clinic within The Corner. It was proposed that an experimental clinic 
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should be introduced and evaluated. Getting GUM partners to agree to 
participate in an experiment and provide clinical services within the Drop-in 
was cited as an achievement in itself. 
Within this experiment, the cultural differences between medical and social 
models of care gave rise to tensions which remained unresolved at the end 
of the experiment. The expectation from the GUM clinical partners was that 
the experiment would essentially run like a GUM clinic but within a city 
centre venue so there would be an appointment system and "patients" would 
be processed through the system. They would first be seen by a nurse 
appointed by The Corner to run the clinic who was expected to pass "the 
patient" on to the (one and only, male) GUM consultant within the city, who 
would make a unilateral decision about the level of screening required. "The 
patient" was then passed on to another nurse known as a "Health Adviser". 
This nurse was a part of the hospital-based GUM clinic team and would be 
responsible for the provision of advice and information, contact tracing and 
"counselling". This task-orientated approach to care was completely at odds 
with the holistic model that The Corner staff and young people valued, and 
more importantly, would access. Delivering STI services according to the 
GUM model was dependent on a chain of people. It frequently ground to a 
complete halt because one link in the chain was missing. For example, if 
either the consultant or the Health Adviser were on holiday, sick or absent 
for any other reason, the service was not provided. The GUM consultant 
would not support the nurses employed by The Corner to do any screening 
or prescribe any treatment. 
This situation was particularly frustrating for the nurse I spoke to who had 
been employed by The Corner to run the clinic. Prior to coming to the UK, 
she had autonomously run "suitcase clinics" where, single-handed, she 
provided a 'one-stop shop' sexual health screening service for young people 
in schools and other community settings. She Joined The Corner team 
because she believed in the consultation process and felt deeply privileged 
to be working with young people. The frustration expressed by this nurse 
and her professional colleague was exacerbated by the fact they had been 
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excluded from the GUM project management meetings. The project 
coordinator represented The Corner at these meetings and fed back the 
outcomes to the nurses in the project. The nurses felt strongly that his 
professional background and lack of clinical knowledge slowed up 
negotiations and served to further undermine their professional contribution 
to the project. 
The Corner culture aimed to ensure that professional agendas did not 
supersede the agendas of the young people for whom the service was set 
up to serve. Management endeavours to ensure this was the case, however, 
had the capacity to leave the professionals within the project, committed to 
the project ethos, feeling personally and professionally undervalued, 
underutilised and oppressed: 
"that is another thing, we have come across a wee bit of a challenge 
against linking into networks that are specifically nurse networks, we 
are discouraged from that, because it seemed to reinforce our role as 
nurses, and we are project workers" (Project Worker 2). 
This scenario illustrates a relationship between organisational and 
interpersonal, or meso- and micro-politics. The methods used to liberate the 
voice of one suppressed group, in this instance young people, appeared to 
lead to the suppression of another, namely the nurses employed in The 
Corner as Project Workers because of their professional skills. 
A third area of concern for the nurses employed at The Corner was in 
relation to record keeping. Although they kept records of those who 
accessed their clinical services they had difficulty with the fact that in the 
name of confidentiality, no individual records were kept of each encounter 
within the drop-in. At the end of each drop-in session, the team held a 
debriefing. Brief notes were made about any individuals that caused specific 
concern. 
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The nurses felt that, if they were dealing with young people who, for 
example, came in to talk about a drug or relationship issue or bereavement, 
the lack of record keeping presented a threat to the continuity of care the 
young person received. This also concerned the nurses in terms of their 
professional accountability. The NMC provides guidelines on records and 
record keeping for registered nurses which includes the following 
statements: 
"Good record keeping is a mark of the skilled and safe practitioner, 
whilst careless or incomplete record keeping often highlights wider 
problems with the individual's practice............ 
Good record keeping is, therefore, both the product of good team 
work and an important tool in promoting high quality healthcare. " 
(Nursing and Midwifery Council 2002b) 
The guidelines go on to state that registered nurses have both a professional 
and a legal duty of care and provides details of what a nursing record of care 
should contain (table 6.12). 
Table 6.12: Nursing & Midwifery Council Guidelines on records and 
record keeping 
As a registered nurse or midwife, you have both a professional and a 
legal duty of care. Your record keeping should therefore be able to 
demonstrate: 
"a full account of your assessment and the care you have planned and 
provided 
" relevant information about the condition of the patient or client at any 
given time and the measures you have taken to respond to their needs 
" evidence that you have understood and honoured your duty of care, 
that you have taken all reasonable steps to care for the patient or client 
and that any actions or omissions on your part have not compromised 
their safety in any way 
"a record of any arrangements you have made for the continuing care of 
a patient or client. 
The NMC is currently one of nine health professional regulatory bodies 
tasked with protecting the public from unsafe or poor quality practice: 
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The system of professional regulation in the United Kingdom is 
designed to ensure that if a patient is seen by a healthcare 
professional, such as a doctor or a midwife, the patient can trust that 
the care they receive will meet certain minimum standards of safety 
and quality. (Maybin 2007). 
Evidence indicated that young people do not access mainstream services 
principally because they fear a lack of confidentiality. This created a dilemma 
for professionally regulated practitioners who ultimately had to make a 
judgment that they feel able to defend, The question is whether: 
a) the public interest is served better when young people access services 
and receive the support they require and confidentiality is assured, 
or 
b) when records are maintained by professional staff, in the belief that such 
records can facilitate the continuity of care that a patient receives, and offer 
a degree of professional accountability for the actions taken by the 
professional concerned. 
Young people accessing services are a precondition for professionals to 
provide continuity of care. Professional contact with vulnerable young people 
is so fragile and appears to be so dependent upon their trust in the system 
that their concerns over confidentiality should arguably supersede all other 
concerns. However, operating in this non-conventional manner clearly did 
make professional nursing staff feel as if they are operating beyond the 
scope of their professional code of conduct and they feel the need for 
professional support and permission to take these risks, in the interests of 
the young people for whom they are providing a service. They reported that 
within The Corner they were actively discouraged from engaging in 
professional networking activities. Despite claims that team meetings were 
"almost like supervision" and offered a supportive and challenging 
environment, it was clear that the nurses I Interviewed were struggling to 
reconcile the tension created by the pull of young people's insistence upon 
confidentiality and the professional push for documented evidence of 'public 
safety' and 'professional accountability'. Analysis of this case illustrates the 
capacity of innovation to create professional dilemmas for individuals, Le. 
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'micro-level politics'. This would suggest that systems should be put in place 
to support individuals who are willing to take what might effectively be 
described from a professional perspective as personal risks in order to 
innovate in the provision of health services. 
Identity politics not only affected individual staff members; it was also an 
issue for The Corner itself. The team aimed to deliver their project 
specification (table 6.6) by working with young people and taking holistic 
approaches to addressing their needs. Whilst delivering contraceptive 
services was within their brief, The Corner was not just a sexual health 
service. Figure 6.1 offers a flavour of the range of issues raised by young 
people who attended The Corner. The Corner team consistently sought to 
change the impression that their sole purpose was to provide sexual health 
services because they knew this could act as a deterrent to some young 
people: 
"we have struggled at times because of the early press interest to get 
rid of the sexual health tag, and done loads of work around housing, 
homelessness, drugs, mental health, relationships everything to get 
away from that sexual health tag but still unfortunately at times we are 
seen as a place that, you know, open for sexual health services and 
that is within professional circles as well, not just with young people" 
(Project Coordinator 1). 
The project coordinator was keen to tell me how the initiative had had far- 
reaching effects on the lives of some of the young people who participated in 
activities within The Corner. 
I am just thrilled to bits what it has represented for people who use it, 
as a stepping stone in their careers, young people who have come 
through it, / have met quite a number of young people who have 
personally gained not just "the service" they have gained a huge 
amount of pleasure and esteem from being associated with doing 
things there and the feedback from that has been tremendous and it 
has gone on innovating so it is quite a different project in some 
senses from the one that was talked about ten years ago (Project 
Coordinator 1). 
It was argued that the success of The Comer was evidenced by the 
numbers of young people accessing the service and the requests for 
outreach work: 
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"I think the project's success is down to the fact that we do consult 
with young folk and that is reflected in the numbers that we see 
coming through our door and you know I suppose we have proven 
ourselves in lots of ways to other agencies, to schools, to community 
groups because we are getting more requests to do outreach work, 
we are really busy... " (Project Worker 2). 
This was coupled with a high media and political profile and national 
recognition: 
"We have hundreds of visitors from all over the country and I know 
that people have gone away and been influenced by it. Not 
necessarily set up the same thing but they have done what has been 
relevant to them and their resources and capacity" (Project 
Coordinator 1). 
However, the success of The Corner and sustained support from senior 
managers within both the local authority and the health board led to a 
degree of local resentment: 
"... none of the others in my experience have pulled off quite the 
dynamic The Corner has, and that works both for it and sometimes 
against it. I think you need to be up front about that. There is either a 
professional envy issue or there is a resentment of the profile, or 
there is a resentment of the seniority of the support that is available 
for that project that sometimes comes through in my contact with 
others. I think it just comes with the territory and you have just got to 
kind of like live there and then dismiss it because if you let that 
become something that gets to you it will eat at you so if you keep a 
focus on the young people and keep a focus on what the project is 
there to do and keep listening to the critics as opposed to reacting to 
the critics it will keep alive" (Local Authority Senior Manager). 
The Corner culture, maintaining a strong focus on young people, appeared 
to be the strategy adopted to deal with the local resentment from other 
service providers who were also endeavouring to provide services to young 
people. 
Indeed, even within The Comer, the potential for resentment was 
recognised. The original project coordinator was in the throes of developing 
a complementary, innovative initiative to provide a social meeting place and 
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educational opportunities for young people right next door to The Corner, 
called The Shore: 
"The Shore's... I don't know if you have been through to it, it is worth 
a look .. because The Corner is a key partner in its development because we didn't have space to do what we wanted to do, because 
we were hiring other venues, because we saw the need for social and 
educational opportunities as well as access to focused services, and 
young people saying all the time, We want to have fun, not to be seen 
as problems, we might have lots of problems, but we want to have 
fun, and sometimes, by the way, adults, you give us loads of mixed 
messages'. So that led along with a number of other agencies to the 
creation of The Shore (Project Coordinator 1). 
There was a very real potential to create tension through shifting attention 
away from The Corner and onto The Shore: 
"the link with The Shore, this kind of tension that is a wee bit around 
just now, but I think is completely resolvable, that The Comer doesn't 
feel that it is being left behind by The Shore development, that is the 
kind of tension that has to be carefully managed (Local Authority 
Senior Manager). 
This was a political tension that was recognised and that would be carefully 
and proactively managed. 
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6.5 Summary 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, during the course of my analysis 
of this case I have identified fifteen `critical incidents' which I believe shaped 
the trajectory of The Corner. These are summarised in table 6.13. As with 
the first case, I suggest that the implications of these critical incidents may 
also be synthesised into the three interconnected themes illustrated in 
chapter 5 (figure 5.2), namely partnership, purpose and politics. 
The Corner initiative had a long and protracted gestation period (CI 1) and 
clearly acknowledged the wide range of stakeholders with a concern for the 
health and social well being of the young people within the city. This shared 
concern did not, however, lead to universal support for The Corner team's 
methods. The criticism expressed by the local Bishop, fuelled by the local 
media, served to illustrate this point and highlighted the capacity of the 
media to heighten the differences between stakeholders and influence public 
perception (CI 10). 
The ability of the project coordinator to address these concerns proactively, 
by identifying the common ground between the two stakeholders, illustrates 
the political acumen of the project team and their advisers (CI 5, Cl 11). 
Equally, their capacity to turn the media spotlight on the initiative to their 
advantage, by working in partnership with the media, showed a considerable 
degree of insight into the potential of the media to influence public opinion 
and the views of local politicians. In addition, working in this way illustrated 
a willingness to take risks, a trait which appears to be a feature of The 
Corner culture (CI 12). 
Established as a joint venture between the local authority and the NHS (Cl 
2), this partnership enabled members of the management group to negotiate 
for additional resources for the project from their respective organisations on 
the basis that their input was matched by their partner (CI 3). In addition, the 
learning gained from this partnership working had wider ramifications. The 
level of engagement of the young people in the project in particular informed 
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the development and implementation of the health board's Public and 
Patient Involvement Strategy (CI 4). 
Table 6.13: The Corner Critical Incidents 
Cl 1. A gestation period of over 10 years 
Cl 2. The decision that the local authority and the health board should address 
their concerns for young people together 
Cl 3. Securing a portfolio funding package thus binding the stakeholders together 
with a common goal and providing a mechanism for defusing some of the 
controversy 
Cl 4. The authentic engagement of young people in the planning and delivery of 
the service and the development of an innovative consultation framework 
Cl 5. The appointment of project coordinator with a clear vision, appropriate 
experience, strong leadership skills and quick to learn new skills 
Cl 6. The appointment of a project team of staff with appropriate experience and 
attitude 
Cl 7. Time to build the multi-professional multi-agency team and develop and 
agree policies (and the lack of engagement of new staff In policy development / 
policy revision processes) 
Cl 8. A de-professionalizing agenda to ensure that young people remain centre 
stage (leading to the exclusion of professional staff from meetings about the 
development of services they were appointed to provide) 
Cl 9. The acquisition of premises that met with the criteria drawn up by the young 
people 
Cl 10. Identity management which began with the proactive management of the 
media fuelled reaction of the Catholic church to the opening of The Corner and led 
to a strong relationship with local media 
Cl 11. The existence of a strong cohesive committed and stable multi-agency 
senior management group 
Cl 12. The development of a distinctive Corner culture to ensure that young 
people remain centre stage and staff are enabled to take risks to achieve that end 
Cl 13. Evaluation informed development embedded Into the culture of the 
enterprise (in the face of a National perception that this level of evaluation was 
unsustainable) 
Cl 14. The primacy of the importance of confidentiality (because of Its 
significance to young people and the challenge this posed to health professionals 
and their sense of professional accountability) 
Cl 15. National policy development and blanket implementation without due 
regard to local initiatives 
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This project was firmly focused on working with young people to Identify and 
address their needs, on their terms (Cl 4). There was a strong philosophy 
within the project to maintain and protect this focus both internally and 
externally. Authentic engagement with young people in all of The Corner's 
activities and a commitment to evaluation (Cl 13) were key elements of The 
Corner culture (Cl 12) and led to the acquisition of The Comer property in a 
strategically important location within the City centre (Cl 9). Factors which 
were thought to have aided the development and sustained the culture 
included the personal attributes and commitment of the original Project 
Coordinator (Cl 5) and a strongly supportive management team (Cl 11). 
Internally, the management style adopted to maintain this culture was 
reported to cause some staff, who had not been members of the original 
staff team that drew up the operational policies and agreed the ways of 
working, to feel marginalised, underutilised and oppressed (Cl 7, Cl 8). It 
also led to an external perception that The Corner was not open to external 
scrutiny and was self-fulfilling (Cl 10). 
There was evidence of political controversy and tension within The Corner at 
macro-, meso- and micro-levels. Top-down Scottish Executive policy 
initiatives which did not take account of local innovations were thought to be 
unnecessary and unwelcome (CI 15). They were seen as a duplication of 
efforts and a waste of resources. There was also top-down criticism of the 
level of externally funded evaluation associated with the project, which it was 
argued was unsustainable (CI 13). The view from The Corner was that 
evaluation had become embedded within the culture of the project which 
enabled it to effectively function as an action research project. Internal 
evaluation, as stated above, left the project open to external criticism that it 
was self fulfilling. 
The Corner enjoyed a high profile and a significant degree of high-level 
managerial support (Cl 11). This caused some local tension, particularly 
from those who were also working with young people but without the same 
high level of support. 
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Short-term funding arrangements created pressures and exacerbated 
organisational politics. It was also suggested that it did not always lead to 
the best appointments and meant that short-term projects were not always 
thought through adequately (CI 6). A gender bias within the hierarchy was 
evident and, as stated above, the management style adopted to suppress 
any professional tribalism left some staff feeling underutilised and 
undervalued (CI 8). In addition, endeavours to secure confidentiality, left 
these staff feeling concerned that their record keeping practices were 
inadequate, and a threat to their ability to professionally account for their 
practice (CI 14). 
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PART IV 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
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Chapter 7 Power, Politics and Innovation 
7.1 Introduction 
The initial aim of this study was to examine the conditions in which 
innovations in the provision of healthcare services may or indeed, may not, 
flourish. The first case examined was the development of a NP-led outreach 
service to farming communities in the North West of England. By facilitating 
access to health services for a group of people who did not routinely access 
mainstream health services, the project innovatively sought to identify and 
address their healthcare needs. 
Based on the premise that access to healthcare is a key concern of the 
public, successive UK Governments have made 'access' a key health policy 
priority. Through the identification of a second case, which also endeavoured 
to facilitate access to healthcare for a group of people who did not routinely 
use mainstream health services, comparisons can be drawn to build up a 
picture of the conditions in which such innovations do and do not prosper. 
Within each case, I identified fifteen 'critical incidents' which I have argued 
shaped the trajectory of the innovations and which offer insight into the 
conditions which have enabled or militated against their capacity to flourish. 
Examination and comparison of these two cases have enabled a narrowing 
and focussing of the original research question. Thus, this study specifically 
aims to provide insight into the conditions in which innovations, which seek 
to identify and address the healthcare needs of groups of people who not 
routinely access mainstream services, do and do not develop and thrive. 
From within each case, three interconnected overarching themes were 
identified and these are illustrated in Chapter 5, figure 5.2. Firstly, authentic 
engagement of key stakeholders in an innovation in healthcare provision 
appeared to be important. Specifically, the authentic engagement of the 
group of people whose health needs the innovation seeks to identify and 
address would appear to be of fundamental importance. Whilst at face value 
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this might seem to be rather obvious, in practice this can prove to be a 
considerable challenge. In this chapter I will compare and contrast the cases 
examined and consider the conditions in which potential service users may 
be fully engaged in an innovation aimed at facilitating their access to health 
services. Secondly, clarity and agreement amongst stakeholders about the 
primary focus of an innovation appeared to be equally important. Again, 
when written about, out of context, in a seemingly objective way, this also 
seems to be rather obvious. Why then does it emerge as a key issue? I will 
compare and contrast the cases and consider the conditions in which clarity 
and agreement about the primary focus on an innovation can be identified 
and sustained. 
In chapter 2I suggested that much of the writing on the management of 
innovation is presented in a sanitised form and, consequently, is rather 
unhelpful. I suggest here, that through the close examination of the third 
theme, 'politics', and the impact politics has on 'partnership' and 'purpose', I 
will offer insight into the conditions in which such innovations might flourish. 
7.2 Power 
In identifying the critical incidents which shaped the development of the 
cases examined, in each case I uncovered tensions between the various 
stakeholders. The concept of power is, therefore, central to this discussion. 
Power is recognised as a complex concept and it has been analysed from a 
number of theoretical perspectives. Consequently, there are multiple 
interpretations of the meaning of power and methods by which it has be 
researched and understood. Lukes (2005) and others have suggested that 
power is a concept that is 'essentially contested', for example: 
"The study of power has meant a behavioural focus for some 
researchers, and attitudinal or hegemonic factors for others. Power 
has been berated as being repressive and lauded for being 
productive. Small wonder then that there is little agreement! " (Hardy & 
Clegg 1996 p 636) 
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Spinoza (1958) helpfully distinguished between 'potentia' and 'potestas' 
where the former signifies the power of things in nature to exist and act and 
the latter refers more specifically to being in the power of another. 'Potestas' 
is where an agent has the capacity to have power over an other or others, 
constrain their choices and secure their compliance. Whether this is positive 
(beneficence) or negative (domination) will depend upon both context and 
perspective. Recent legislation throughout the UK, for example, has banned 
smoking in confined public places. I personally think that on public health 
grounds this was appropriate state intervention, the right thing to do. I would 
argue that this was justified paternalism for the common good. Smokers on 
the other hand, may see it as the intervention of a nanny state infringing 
upon their civil liberties. Lukes defines potestas or power as domination as: 
"... the ability to constrain the choices of others, coercing them or 
securing their compliance, by impeding them from living as their own 
nature and judgement dictate. " (Lukes 2005 p 85) 
Morriss argues that we need to know our own power and the powers of 
others so that we know how to get others to do things and how to avoid 
unwanted things being done by them, to us. Our own power depends upon 
our abilities to harness or diminish the powers of others. In these terms, an 
understanding of the concept of power would appear to have both practical 
importance and moral significance (Morriss 2002). 
Power is thought to be of moral importance because with power comes 
responsibility. The argument here is that powerful members of society have 
a moral responsibility and should be called to account to improve the 
conditions of the less powerful. Thus, Lukes (2005) argues that the question 
of responsibility is not only a moral issue but also a political one. 
7.2.1 Lukes on power 
Over thirty years ago Steven Lukes published an analysis of the concept of 
power which is now recognised as a seminal text. Currently Professor of 
Sociology at New York University, Lukes Is a Fellow of the British Academy. 
As a graduate, fellow and former tutor in politics at Balliol College Oxford, 
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Lukes has also held positions at The European University Institute In 
Florence, the University of Siena and the London School of Economics. 
In his original analysis Lukes proposed that theorists had hitherto analysed 
power from two different standpoints. Power, therefore, was seen to have 
two faces or 'dimensions'. Lukes offered a radically new 'third dimension'. 
The original text has recently been re-published and Lukes has defended 
and augmented his original position in two new chapters (Lukes 2005). 
The one-dimensional view of power takes a behavioural perspective, which 
Clegg (1989) argues is founded on Hobbes' mechanistic world view and is 
essentially positivist. It is based on the assumption that power lies solely 
within the process of decision-making and that decision-making is either an 
elite (sovereign) or a pluralist (democratic) activity. Where decision-making 
is considered to be democratic it is assumed that all stakeholders have 
equal access to decision-making processes and that non participation in 
decision-making is an indication of agreement. Here, it is argued that, 
without overt evidence of conflict, there is no observable evidence of power 
and the conclusion drawn from the one-dimensional view is that where there 
is no conflict power does not exist. 
In his analysis, Lukes assessed the contribution of American political 
theorists who studied political decision-making processes from this 
behavioural perspective. These included, for example, Dahl (1957; 1961), 
who sought to apply scientific principles, in order to introduce methodological 
rigour and observe and measure power being exercised through the analysis 
of cases of political decision-making. By virtue of their technical expertise, 
political scientists such as Dahl could, with empirical evidence, challenge the 
hitherto ideological based theories of sovereign power, held by, so called, 
elite model theorists which included, for example, Marx (1995). Lukes 
argued that Dahl's empirical examination of local politics In Now Haven, 
Connecticut, USA in the late 1950's concluded that the decision-making 
process involved a variety of interest groups, all attempting to influence 
political decision-making. Some groups were dominant over some Issues, 
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whilst others were dominant over other issues. Thus, Dahl explicitly rejected 
the Marxist ruling class theory which argued that power is fundamentally 
lodged with the owners and controllers of economic production (the 
bourgeoisie) and so these economically dominant groups or classes 
dominate political decision-making process. Dahl concluded that decision- 
making in American politics was a democratic, pluralist activity rather than 
an elite or sovereign activity. Recent accounts of US national politics might 
serve to challenge the assumption that Dahl's assessment of New Haven 
politics was generalisable and is still relevant. For example, the Bush 
family's dynastical hold over national Republican politics and the emerging 
Clinton hold over Democratic politics would appear to reflect a country 
governed from sovereign power bases. 
In table 7.1 1 offer illustrations of elite and pluralist one-dimensional views of 
power within a healthcare context. 
Table 7.1: Illustration of the One-Dimensional View of Power 
Consider a hospital ward round. If a hospital consultant instructs ward 
staff to discharge a patient in spite of protests from an Occupational 
Therapist (OT) who argued that the patient was not yet able to function 
independently, a one-dimensional view of power might conclude that 
this one instance signified both conflict and sovereign power. If this 
pattern was seen to repeat itself, then this analysis may appear to be 
conclusive. If, however, the OT simply acquiesced because she knew 
from past experience that the consultant would overrule her, there 
would be no observable conflict and the one-dimensional view would 
assume that power does not exist. Where a multidisciplinary clinical 
team operated under a consensus model, and would only discharge a 
patient when all members of the team were in agreement, this could be 
considered to illustrate a one-dimensional, pluralist view of power, as 
conflict would be observable, but any member of the team to express 
concern could be the final decision maker as to when a patient was 
ready to be discharged. 
The two-dimensional view of power offers a qualified critique of the one- 
dimensional view by suggesting that, because it is based on the premise that 
power only exists where it is visibly exercised within decision-making 
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processes in order to resolve conflict, it is limited. The two-dimensional view 
sought to address this perceived limitation by acknowledging "non-decision- 
making power". This dimension still maintained that conflict was necessary 
for power to manifest but suggested that, to avoid public displays of conflict, 
agendas were controlled, formal decision-making processes were confined 
to 'safe' questions and difficult issues were dealt with behind closed doors 
through, for example, the co-option of potential adversaries. The main 
proponents of this second face of power were Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 
1963) who maintained that the pluralist analysis only illuminated the public 
face of power. They saw failure to acknowledge the second, private face of 
power as a methodological weakness and argued that the covert exclusion 
of the interests of particular individuals or groups was the result of the 
'mobilization of bias', that is: 
"A set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional 
procedures ('rules of the game') that operate systematically and 
consistently to the benefit of certain persons to defend and promote 
their vested interests. More often than not, the 'status quo defender' 
are a minority or elite group within the population in question. Elitism 
is neither foreordained nor omnipresent: as opponents of the war in 
Viet Nam can readily attest, the mobilization of bias can and 
frequently does benefit a clear majority. " (Bachrach & Baratz 1970 p 
7) 
Bachrach and Baratz, therefore, redefined the boundaries of the political 
system examined and sought to include control of the political agenda within 
their analysis. Consequently, they developed a typology of power which 
embraces coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation, which the 
defenders of the status quo may apply covertly when required (table 7,2). 
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Table 7.2: Typology of power after Bachrach and Baratz (1970) 
Coercion Where there is a conflict over values or course of action, A secures 
B's compliance by the threat of deprivation 
Influence Without resorting to either tacit or overt threat of severe deprivation, 
A causes B to change his or her (sic) course of action 
Authority B recognises that A's command Is reasonable in terms of his or her 
own values and therefore complies 
Force A strips B of the opportunity for non-compliance 
Manipulation A subset of force where B complies without knowledge of who A Is 
or the demand placed upon him or her 
Despite highlighting the methodological weaknesses within the pluralists' 
behavioural analysis, they concluded that conflict, either overt or covert, was 
a precondition within both faces of power. Some commentators have 
suggested that Bachrach and Baratz themselves acquiesced in response to 
the pluralists' challenge and, by agreeing that observable conflict was a 
prerequisite, effectively weakened their argument (Clegg 1989; Lukes 2005). 
In table 7.3 1 offer an illustration of a two-dimensional view of power within a 
healthcare context. 
Table 7.3: Illustration of the Two-Dimensional view of Power 
The Occupational Therapist (OT) cited In table 7.1 may have elected not to 
question or challenge the hospital consultant's decision to discharge a 
patient on the ward round and, to all Intensive purposes, may have appeared 
to have acquiesced. In reality, however, the OT may have challenged the 
consultant privately and, if unhappy with the outcome of the challenge, may 
have documented these concerns in writing. A behavioural methodological 
analysis of clinical decision-making could have 
, 
missed these activities and 
reached the erroneous conclusion that power was absent. A two- 
dimensional view would acknowledge that the absence of observable power 
from the ward round would not necessarily equate to the absence of power 
per se. It would have acknowledged the conflict that existed between the 
consultant and the OT and perhaps concluded that the OT was according to 
Bachrach and Baratz's typology, forced to comply, as the consultant retained 
the ultimate power to make the decision to discharge the patient. 
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In response, Lukes observed political quiescence and argued that power 
was not confined to observable conflict, the outcome of conscious decisions 
or even suppressed issues. Lukes looked beyond the behavioural limitation 
of one and two-dimensional power and suggested that defenders of the 
status quo may be unaware of their actions. There was, he argued, a third 
and perhaps greater, non-behavioural dimension where the Gramscian 
conceptualisation of hegemony is recognised. 
Gramsci was an Italian writer, politician and political theorist. A Marxist and a 
founding member and onetime leader of the Communist Party in Italy, he 
was imprisoned by Mussolini's Fascist regime. From the confines of his 
prison cell he reflected on the question which troubled him most: How is 
consent to capitalist exploitation secured under contemporary conditions, in 
particular democratic ones? Gramsci documented his thinking in notebooks 
which were later published (Gramsci 1971). He concluded that an anti- 
capitalist revolution had not occurred in Italy because the perspective of the 
ruling class had been absorbed by the masses of workers. The workers' 
ideology, their self-understanding, had been effectively captured by the 
hegemonic (ruling) capitalist culture, Gramsci proposed that workers had 
been indoctrinated with a false consciousness. Instead of working towards a 
revolution that would truly serve their collective needs, workers in 
"advanced" societies were listening to the rhetoric of nationalist leaders, 
seeking consumer opportunities and middle class status, embracing an 
individualistic ethos of success through competition and accepting the 
guidance of bourgeois religious leaders. Gramsci argued that prevailing 
cultural norms should not be viewed as "natural" or "inevitable". Rather, 
cultural norms - including institutions, proactives and beliefs - should be 
investigated for their roots in domination and their implications for liberation. 
Therefore, theories of hegemony attempt to explain how dominant groups or 
individuals can maintain their power and explain the capacity of dominant 
groups such as classes to persuade subordinate ones to accept, adopt and 
internalize their values and norms. Lukes concludes that the supreme and 
most insidious exercise of power is where cultural and normative 
assumptions dominate: 
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"Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent 
people, to whatever degree, to have grievances by shaping their 
perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such way that they accept 
their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see 
or imagine no alternative to it or because they see it as natural or 
unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial? " (Lukes2005 page 28) 
Unlike the first two dimensions, Lukes' third-dimension does not require 
evidence of actual conflict to conclude that power exists. It does, however, 
acknowledge that when there is a contradiction between the interests of 
those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude, potential 
or latent conflict may exist, may never actually be expressed and may even 
be subconscious. 
Lukes' third-dimension, where the powerful prevent people from having 
grievances by shaping their perceptions, thoughts and preferences in such a 
way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, was radical, 
because its interpretation requires a shift away from the traditional positivist 
epistemology. By proposing a theory that power is most effective when it is 
least observable and, therefore, could not be empirically demonstrated by the 
scientific method, it could be argued that Lukes' contribution to the discourse 
on power was nothing short of a Kuhnian scientific revolution within the field. 
Lukes' third dimension arguably widened the debate beyond a traditional 
positivist epistemology and moved towards a critical paradigm (see Chapter 
2 table 2.2) (Hindess 1996). Alternatively, it could be argued that Lukes' third 
dimension closed the loop and facilitated acceptance of the contribution of 
the Marxists' notion of ideology, which the positivist sought to refute, thus, 
creating a paradox for the empirically-minded researcher -a paradox which 
can be explored through seeking out observable examples of the third- 
dimension, by finding means of falsifying it or by examining contexts which 
the first and second dimensions cannot explain. 
Lukes suggests that the wider the scope of one's conceptual framework of 
power, the more power in the world one can see. Set against the three 
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dimensions, by failing to acknowledge the existence of power that is 
unobservable and by offering empirical evidence of situations where 
dissatisfied groups have successfully penetrated the system, the one- 
dimensional view and, albeit to a lesser degree, the two-dimensional view of 
power serves to preserve the status quo and perpetuate the biases that lie 
within the system. 
In table 7.4,1 provide an illustration of the three-dimensional view of power 
within a healthcare context. 
Table 7.4: Illustration of the Three-Dimensional view of Power 
In a democratic society, we might expect that any member of the public, or 
professionally regulated healthcare professional, would have the power and 
autonomy to challenge any clinical or managerial action or decision that, in 
their opinion, put a patient at risk. We would also hope and expect that the 
concerns raised by any such 'whistleblowers' would be dealt with, with the 
utmost respect and expediency. Evidence, including recent public scandals 
and their subsequent enquiries, would suggest that in reality, this is 
unfortunately not always the case. For example, the public inquiry into 
mortality rate within children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
1984 -1995, which were above the national average, highlighted the 
potentially devastating consequences of unchecked medical hegemony, 
coupled with system failure (The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry 2001). This 
is an example of three-dimensional power, when such hegemony is taken as 
normative and remains unchecked. 
Having reflected on his earlier contribution, Lukes acknowledges its 
limitations. Its focus was on the securing of compliance to domination 
through the exercise of power, within the context of binary relations between 
actors who are assumed to have only unitary interests. Lukes concludes that 
power is a capacity and not merely the exercise of that capacity. Equally, 
holding the resources of power such as wealth, status, military forces or 
weapons, does not necessarily make you powerful. This assumption Lukos 
describes as the 'vehicle fallacy' and cites the USA position with regard to 
Vietnam and postwar Iraq as evidence. He delineates four aspects of power, 
namely 'issue scope', 'contextual range' 'intentionality' and 'activity'. Issue 
scope considers whether an agent has power over a single Issue or if they 
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have power to prevail over several different issues. In most cases, an agent 
able to prevail over several issues would be considered more powerful than 
one championing a single issue, but the nature of a single issue can have a 
significant impact here. Contextual range considers whether an agent's 
power is 'context bound', that is, only effective within tightly defined 
conditions, or if they have power to prevail over a range of contexts. Once 
again, the former would, in most cases, be less powerful than the latter, 
although Lukes notes that an agent whose power is context bound is likely to 
meet less resistance than one whose power is context transcending. 
Intentionality acknowledges that power is manifest where an agent is able to 
realize what he or she wants or intends. However, unintended 
consequences can also be a manifestation of power which can be highly 
significant. Finally, activity acknowledges that a decision not to act can also 
be a form of power and action can also be a form of weakness. Proposing 
power differentials implies that one is more able to bring about a significant 
change than another when 'significant' may be judged by the impact it may 
have on the 'interests' of the agents involved: 
"If I can affect your central or basic interest, my power (in relation to 
you) is greater then someone who affects you only superficially. " 
(Lukes 2005 p 80) 
What constitutes an agent's 'interests' is, however, recognised as equally 
contestable. Based essentially on value judgements, a degree of objectivity 
may be introduced if interests are assessed with regard to an agent's 
preferences, whether these be overt or covert, notions of their welfare or 
their well-being. In summary: 
"The power of the powerful is to be viewed as ranging across issues 
and contexts, as extending to some unintended consequences and as 
capable of being effective even without active intervention.., and 
power as domination will present wherever it furthers the interests of 
the powerful and bears negatively upon those subject to it... " (Lukas 
2005 p 86) 
In order to provide insight into the conditions in which initiatives, which 
innovatively seek to facilitate access for groups of people who do not 
238 
routinely use mainstream health services, might flourish, Lukes' analysis of 
power serves as a heuristic device to facilitate a comparative analysis of the 
cases of innovation examined in this study. 
7.3 Power and Innovation 
The cases of innovation examined in this study both aimed to facilitate 
access to healthcare for people who were known to have physical and 
mental health problems. They were groups whose healthcare needs either 
remained unchecked, were addressed outside of the formalised healthcare 
system, or were addressed within the system at a relatively advanced stage. 
They did not routinely access mainstream health services. Consequently, 
the extent of the healthcare needs of these populations was not known. 
Through critical analysis of these cases, I identified within each, fifteen 
incidents (chapter 5 table 5.6 and chapter 6 table 6.13) which I have argued 
had a critical impact on their trajectory. I will now consider these critical 
incidents within the context of the three overarching themes presented in 
chapter five, figure 5.2, namely partnership, purpose and politics, using 
Lukes' analysis of power as my conceptual framework. Figure 7.1 illustrates 
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7.3.1 Partnership 
In March 2001, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer commissioned Derek 
Wanless to undertake a review of the long-term trends affecting the health 
service in the UK and attempt to quantify the resources that would be required 
to provide a publicly-funded NHS in 2022. To predict the 2022 healthcare 
resource requirements, Wanless constructed three future scenarios. In the 
first scenario, there was "solid progress" towards increased public 
engagement in their health, life expectancy rose considerably, public 
confidence in health services increased and there was evidence of more 
effective use of primary care facilities. Equally, there was evidence that the 
service was more responsive; there was greater take-up of technology and 
more efficient use of resources; there was greater productivity. In the second 
scenario, "slow uptake ; there was slow progress towards all of the above and 
in the third scenario `fully engaged", expectations were surpassed. Wanless 
concluded: 
"The slow uptake scenario is more expensive but it also the one based 
on the worst health outcomes. Fully engaged is the least expensive but 
based around the best outcomes. Higher spending inputs do not 
necessarily imply better health outputs and outcomes. " (Wanless 2000) 
As discussed in Part II, Wanless appears to have had a significant impact In 
the direction of travel within the NHS. In addition the UK Governments have 
recognised and attempted to capitalise on the potential of the public to 
mobilise change with the health sector, which has hitherto been perceived to 
be dominated by the interests of the professions, and medicine in particular 
(Gabe, Kelleher, & Williams 1994). Consequently, policy calls for the active 
engagement of the public as consumers rather than passive recipients of 
healthcare. 
The farming community were involved in shaping the Farmers' Health Project 
(FHP) in four ways. Firstly, part of the rationale for shifting the focus of the 
project was based on academic research evidence. Research-based 
evidence currently carries a particularly strong currency within the context of 
241 
UK healthcare. For example current professional discourses indicate that 
medicine, nursing and, indeed, all of healthcare policy and practice should be 
based on, or informed by, the best available research evidence. Aside from 
whether they adopt a uni- or multi-disciplinary focus, healthcare professionals 
all appear to subscribe to the following definition of what it means to practise 
from an evidence base: 
"the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence 
in making decisions about the care of individual patients" (Sackett, 
Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, & Richardson 1996). 
This evidence-based practice (EBP) movement is based on the premise that 
appropriately designed objective research studies have the capacity to reduce 
uncertainty about whether a clinical intervention will work or not. Thus, the 
more research evidence can be seen to reduce uncertainty, the stronger it is 
regarded. Consequently, proponents of EBP subscribe to frameworks where 
they privilege certain types of research evidence over others. In such a 
"hierarchy of evidence" (Sackett 1986) the more research evidence is 
considered to offer certainty, the greater it is privileged over other forms of 
evidence (see, for example, table 7.5). 
Table 7.5: Hierarchy of Evidence 
1. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses 
2. Well-designed randomised trials 
3. Well-designed trials without randomization (e. g. single group 
pre-post, cohort, time series or matched case controlled studies) 
4. Well- designed non experimental studies from more than one 
centre 
5. Opinions of respected authorities based on clinical evidence, 
descriptive studies or reports of expert committees. 
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Rated at number one, the systematic review and meta-analysis are 
considered the 'gold standard' form of evidence. Systematic review is the 
review of a body of data that uses explicit methods to locate primary studies 
and explicit criteria to assess their quality. Meta-analysis (also known as 
pooling and quantitative synthesis) is a statistical analysis that combines or 
integrates the results of several independent clinical trials considered by the 
analyst to be "combinable", usually to the level of re-analysing the original 
data. Booth (2006) suggests that the hierarchical approach can be 
problematic if it leads decision-makers to uncritically privilege a poor 
randomised control study over a good observational study. It is also limited in 
cases where evidence at the same level within the hierarchy is conflicting or 
where a body of evidence at a lower level, conflicts with, for example, a single 
study located with a higher position in the hierarchy. 
Whilst in Sacket's definition of EBP, practice refers explicitly to clinical 
decisions made in relation to individual patients, it has been argued that the 
same principles should be applied in, for example, management decision- 
making (Hewison 1999) and policy development (Gray 2001). Paton (1999), 
however, has argued that, whilst technical-rational knowledge may have a 
useful place in assessing the efficacy of clinical interventions, its contribution 
to the complex worlds of management and policy-making may be limited. 
Nevertheless, the currency of research-based knowledge and the impact of 
hierarchies of knowledge such as the one, illustrated in table 7.5, cannot be 
underestimated. 
Gerrard (1995) conducted a telephone survey of 150 farmers across three 
English counties and concluded that farmers believed that the health and 
safety risks in farming were increasing; that current statutory means of 
informing them of health and safety risks in the form of written 
communications from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) were ineffective; 
that farmers had more trust in their vet than their GP; and that farmers would 
be more inclined to listen to a health and safety professional with a farming 
background than to an 'outsider', especially an outsider employed by the HSE 
'inspectorate'. Within the context of the hierarchy of evidence in table 7.5, 
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Gerrard's research might be considered relatively weak research evidence. 
Nevertheless, it was emotively described as compelling and part of the 
justification for developing a farmers' health outreach service. Gerrard 
proposed that her findings lent themselves to further research. She 
recommended action research to investigate the benefits of an occupational 
health service tailored to the needs of the farming community. 
Secondly, two farmers were actively involved in the project steering 
committee. They advised that they had advocated at the outset of the project 
that cold calling, that is, visiting farms unannounced, would be a culturally 
acceptable modus operandi within the farming community. However, it was 
reported that, as this initiative was being progressed within the context of a 
research project, ethical approval was contingent upon there being no cold 
calling. One reason for this may have been that cold calling was considered to 
be a coercive means of recruiting research subjects. If this was the thinking 
behind the ruling, arguably it was both culturally insensitive and 
methodologically problematic. Blanket rulings about what is, and what is not, 
acceptable practice in the recruitment of research subjects have the capacity 
to exclude certain groups from research processes (Johnson 2007). By 
rejecting the recommendations of the farmers on the steering committee and 
by not appearing to challenge the chair of the research ethics committee on 
these grounds, the hardest-to-reach farmers, those who did not come off their 
farms to access the auction marts, arguably those who were most at risk and 
in greatest need of support, were excluded from the research process. In the 
third year of the initiative, when it was no longer a research project and the 
Foot and Mouth exclusion zones had been lifted, cold calling was introduced 
and reported to be very successful. 
Thirdly, the project team brought back feedback from the farmers they 
encountered when in 'the research field' and this, for example, led to a 
change in the signage on the mobile clinic. Fourthly, telephone interviews 
were held with farmers who accessed the NP-led service to ascertain their 
levels of satisfaction with the service. 
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A one-dimensional view of power might conclude that farmers were fully 
engaged and central within the FHP. They informed both its development and 
evaluation and, where there had been observable conflict on the point of cold 
calling, the farmers on the steering committee appeared to acquiesce. A two- 
dimensional view might argue that cold calling as a potential modus operandi 
never actually made it on to the agenda. The reported telephone call between 
the chair of the research ethics committee and the project researcher left no 
audit trail that cold calling was formally rejected by the research ethics 
committee. A third-dimensional view might look more critically at the role of an 
ethics committee and conclude that, through exercising his positional power, 
the chair of the research ethics committee, albeit, perhaps, unwittingly, 
effectively silenced the voice of the farmers and stifled the potential of this 
particular innovation to flourish. 
The issue of cold calling was the only area of conflict between the farmers on 
the steering committee and the project team that I uncovered. This might have 
been the only area of contention, but it might not. I suggest that, whilst there 
were two farmers on the steering committee which met quarterly, there were 
no farmers (who were not themselves also members of the healthcare team) 
on the management group, which met monthly, to make key operational 
decisions. Thus, I conclude that the FHP was fundamentally professionally- 
led. Indeed, it was marketed as a NP-led service. 
Whilst I criticise the FHP for not fully engaging farmers as co-researchers in 
their action research project, I recognise that failure to fully engage farmers in 
my own study is a key weakness in my analysis. Nevertheless, I am able to 
highlight the marked comparison between the FHP and The Corner in this 
regard. The centrality of the young people within The Corner and their 
engagement in it was explicit. This was not a service developed for people 
who do not routinely access mainstream services but a service developed 
with them. The Corner developed and used creative means of engaging and 
empowering young people, which were shown to not only have a powerful 
impact on the young people themselves, but also on local politicians, the 
media and the wider community. Here, young people were not just actively 
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involved in decision-making processes, they also worked alongside the staff 
and together they shaped the agenda. The culture within The Comer, which 
placed young people firmly at the centre of the project, was facilitated, in part, 
by a strong culture of evaluation and feedback incorporating an innovative 
consultation framework. The centrality of the young people was evidenced by, 
for example, the trouble that was taken to acquire premises within the City, 
that met with the stringent criteria developed by the young people and the 
controversial impact on some of the more recently appointed staff of ensuring 
that the preservation of the confidentiality of the young people who accessed 
the service was maintained. 
In the example of the The Corner, this level of 'consumerism' is seen to 
provide disadvantaged young people with a voice, or what Henderson and 
Peterson (2002) describe as an 'identity label', and the language to reclaim 
their rights. In contrast, within the FHP it may have been assumed that 
because a plurality of stakeholders appeared to be involved in decision- 
making processes, they all had equal capacity to influence the agendas and 
the outcomes. For example, by taking an inclusive approach, the project team 
may have operated under the assumption that all participants in the rural 
health steering group were afforded the opportunity to influence the decision 
to focus on the health of farmers. However, it is possible that, due to the 
effective silencing of certain, less traditionally powerful voices, alternative 
proposals did not even reach the agenda. 
Professionals may be under the illusion that working in 'partnership' with lay 
participants means that consultation will lead to a convergence of lay and 
professional views, but this is not necessarily the case (Anderson, Shepherd, 
& Salisbury 2006). Authentic engagement with the public will require 
professionals and others to ensure that everyone has a voice, and is listened 
to, and that those in traditionally powerful positions are open to challenge, and 
accept the fact that they must face the potential of relinquishing their power. 
One informant suggested that the lay members of the rural health steering 
group, who may have been participating in a voluntary capacity because of a 
real concern about the mental health of rural communities, were not given a 
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voice, and they left the group. If they did not feel anyone was listening, they 
were faced with three choices. They could 'voice' their protest, they could 
leave or 'exit' the group or they could acquiesce through a sense of 'loyalty', 
perhaps, in the hope that someone else, whom they perceived to be more 
powerful than themselves, might share their reservations and voice their 
concerns: 
"It is true that in the face of discontent with the way things are going in 
an organisation, an individual member can remain loyal without being 
influential himself, but hardly without the expectation that someone will 
act or something will happen to improve matters. " (Hirschman 1970 
page 78) 
Economist Albert Hirschman (1970) first recognised these three concepts as a 
means of understanding consumer practices and concluded that they reflect 
behavioural choices within a wide range of contexts where individuals are 
dissatisfied. The problem that arises when dissenting voices exit, as some 
members of the rural health steering group chose to, is that the status quo 
prevails and the traditionally powerful groups continue to dominate the 
agenda with their position even further entrenched by the perception that it 
has been endorsed by the local community. 
In order to ensure that the concerns of young people were not overshadowed 
by professional agendas, the strong, focused project co-ordinator within The 
Corner purposefully adopted a de-professionalising strategy. As this strategy 
showed no observable signs of conflict, a three-dimensional interpretation is 
required to assess what, if any, power might have been exercised In this 
regard. As a result of surfacing the sense of exclusion felt by the nurses I 
interviewed, I conclude that this strategy effectively replaced one type of 
hegemony with another. The potential of professionals appointed as project 
workers to dominate agendas was managed out of this particular system and 
these professional voices were effectively silenced by a managerial 
hegemony. 
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The imposition of managerialism into the UK public sector and the health 
sector in particular, was introduced in chapter 4. It is fair to say that the 
legitimacy of the authority of the 'manager' has been normalised within 
Western Society and the genesis of thinking about management can be 
traced back to the turn of the 20th Century. The Industrial Revolution heralded 
the development of large-scale industrial and organisational units. Frederick 
Winslow Taylor (1911) in the USA (discussed, in brief, in chapter 4) and Henri 
Fayol (1949) in Europe were two of the most notable "classical" management 
theorists. They were both engineers and their thinking was underpinned by a 
rational, bureaucratic, scientific view of the world. They believed that 
organisations could, and indeed should, be run as efficiently as machines and 
the role of the 'manager was to ensure these ends. Whilst Taylor focused on 
work organisation and efficiency, Fayol's interests lay in the implementation of 
authority. 
Taylor was greatly influenced by what he perceived to be the increasing 
capacity throughout the nineteenth century of science, and physics in 
particular, to explain and problem-solve fundamental questions about the 
physical world. If the laws of motion could be identified through scientific 
processes, so too, thought Taylor, could the laws of maximum efficiency. 
Taylor was greatly perturbed by what he saw as overwhelming inefficiency 
throughout the USA. He believed that the answer lay within systematic, 
scientific management that could be learned and applied within any context, 
By applying scientific principles to analyse the processes of production, Taylor 
became the founding father of the principles of 'scientific management' and 
the 'time and motion study' (Taylor 1911). Scientific management privileged 
science over experience and claimed to replace the subjective judgement of 
the workman with an objective, scientifically controlled measurement of each 
routinised task within the production process. Through the application of 
scientific principles, Taylor argued, a manager could calculate and define the 
'best method' of production. Taylor's scientific management not only 
privileged science over experience, it also privileged the scientific manager 
over the worker claiming that the worker, through lack of education or mental 
capacity, was incapable of understanding the science of management. Once 
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the scientific standard or quota for a particular task was known, Taylor 
believed that, through the application of scientific principles, management 
could ensure the optimum performance of the workforce through motivational 
training and financial reward. Taylor advocated that any financial gains 
accrued through increased scientific productivity should be shared with the 
workforce. By objectifying both the worker and work processes, Taylor held a 
reductionist, objective view of human beings. He viewed them as the 'basic 
raw material' that scientific managers could, through the application of 
scientific principles, transform into efficient, well-ordered and productive 
members of a clearly ordered workforce. 
Henri Fayol was considered the first management theorist in Europe to 
produce a theoretical analysis of what administration (or management) was 
and, more importantly, what administrators had to do in order to manage 
properly and effectively. Fayol published his 'General and Industrial 
Management' in France in 1916. It was translated into English in 1949 (Fayol 
1949). Fayol's theories were developed through the application of "Social 
Darwinism". Charles Darwin was a British Naturalist who became famous for 
his theories of evolution and natural selection (Darwin 1872). In particular, 
Darwin observed that species adapted to changing environments, and those 
species best able to adapt or evolve over time, were the most likely to survive. 
According to Fayol, organisations able to adapt to changing environments 
were most likely to survive and the means to survival was through rational 
management, based on principles, laws and rules (Fayol 1949). Fayol 
identified and codified fourteen generalisable, unifying principles of 
management. Within the ninth, Fayol recommended the 'scalar chain' or line 
of authority, from the top executive to the shop floor operative, should be 
'sensible, clear and understood'. The legitimacy of the ultimate authority of the 
top executive was taken as a given, as part of the natural order. This 'natural 
order of things' was picked up in the tenth principle, order, where, in good 
management practice, there is 'A place for everything and everything in its 
place' as well as 'A place for everyone and everyone In his place'. Where 
there is order, management exercises seamless and invisible power and 
control over both the material of the business and the people within it. Fayol's 
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principles were not intended to be rigid, but with the right adaptation, could be 
used in any management situation to improve efficiency and productivity, and 
thus the chances of survival, through harnessing co-ordination and control of 
activities. 
The Human Relations management theorists, which included, for example, 
Mayo (1945) and Maslow (1970) were critical of the classical management 
theorists for their focus on the task, at, what they saw as, the expense of the 
human being performing the task. Scientific research conducted at the 
Western Electric Hawthorne Plant between 1924 and 1932 became widely 
known as the "Hawthorne Experiments" (Roethlisberger 1939). The first 
studies sought to identify if worker fatigue, which had an affect on their 
productivity, was affected by the quality of the lighting in the plant. The 
"Illumination studies" were abandoned because they "didn't work". No matter 
how the researchers manipulated the lighting environment, productivity was 
increased. It was later concluded that the increased productivity resulted from 
the researchers showing an interest in the female workforce who in turn tried 
to please them, irrespective of how the variable (the lighting) the researchers 
were measuring was manipulated7. Further experiments manipulating multiple 
variables also proved equally inconclusive. However, it was noted that 
productivity was affected by non-pay considerations and the researchers 
began to develop the theory that social dynamics influenced worker 
performance, a variable which Taylor and Fayol considered at best irrelevant 
and at worst a hindrance to the production process. 
Elton Mayo was regarded as an excellent publicist of the Hawthorne studies 
(Rose 1975). According to Trahair (1985), Mayo did not himself initiate, direct 
or control the research. His contribution was that of an appreciative helper, 
counsellor-cum-publicist, cooperative collaborator and protective supporter, 
Mayo's lasting contribution was to herald the Hawthorne Experiments as a 
watershed, leading to a fundamental shift from scientific management which 
focused on the tasks of the production process, to human relations 
Subsequently, this was regarded as a phenomenon where a researcher has the capacity to 
"corrupt" a scientific experiment and it became known as the "Hawthorne effect". 
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management which focused on the people involved in the process (Mayo 
1945). 
Whilst it is acknowledged that the new human relations management differed 
from classical scientific management in its focus, it has been argued that the 
purpose remained the same. Both schools of thought sought to increase 
efficiency through management control (Bolton 2005). With its focus on the 
social psychological element of work, the aim of the new human relations 
management was to identify and minimize, or eliminate, the factors which 
hindered performance. Equally, the privileged position of the manager was 
taken as a given and, if anything, was enhanced through this development as 
further social commentators such as Maslow (1970) and McGregor (1960) 
provided managers with theories and a language of management which 
enhanced their status (Fournier & Grey 2000a). 
Maslow, for example, observed that in monkeys, some needs take 
precedence over others, and he transferred this learning to his assessment of 
the human condition. He offered an analysis of human motivation which 
became widely known as 'Maslow's hierarchy of needs'. Physiological needs 
are at the base of Maslow's hierarchy. Oxygen, water, nutrients and 
homeostasis are fundamental to human existence and Maslow argued that 
only when these needs are taken care of can the second layer of needs, 
safety and security, come into play. The third layer on Maslow's hierarchy was 
love and belonging needs and the fourth esteem needs. All of these Maslow 
described as 'deficit needs'. According to Maslow, people are only ever really 
aware of these needs when they are not being met. He also described these 
needs as 'instinctoid' and argued that they were genetically built into the 
human condition. If you have enough to eat you don't feel hungry. At the 
pinnacle of Maslow hierarchy is "self-actualization". This need, which was not 
a deficit need, was about an individual realizing their fullest potential. Maslow 
argued that if someone has deficit needs they cannot fully devote themselves 
to realizing their potential. The contribution of Maslow and other human 
relations commentators to the field of management studies was to provide 
managers with theories that could be used to assess the motivational factors 
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contributing to or hindering workers' performance. If so inclined, managers 
may elect to apply these new psychological theories to manipulate and control 
workers performance. Edwards (1979), for example, refers to 'welfare 
capitalism' where social and other benefits have been provided by employers 
in an attempt to control the behaviour of their staff. 
Critical of both the classical and human relations management theorists for 
being both inward-looking and reductionist, systems management theorists 
argued that they offered a more holistic, outward-looking approach that 
facilitated innovation and the capacity for organisation change (and survival) 
in response to their external environment. Through mathematical modelling, 
the 'systems approach' to management was seen to offer greater precision 
and control. The systems approach was based on Ludwig von Bertalanffy's 
'General Systems Theory' (Bertalanffy 1968). Bertallanffy initially developed a 
general theory of biology where he proposed a holistic, organismic view of 
nature and life. Bertalanffy proposed that organisms were open systems 
which developed and maintained stability or homeostasis through their 
engagement with their external world. Essentially, Bertalanffy argued that life 
happened according to its environmental circumstances. This fundamentally 
challenged the prevailing reductionist view in Biology where the focus of 
analysis was on activity at the subcellular level which disregarded the external 
environment. From this general theory of Biology, Bertallanfy developed a 
General Systems Theory (Bertalanffy 1968) which has found multiple 
applications including within organisation theory. Organisations are, therefore, 
seen as consisting of interdependent internal parts in a relationship with their 
external environmental circumstances. Systems thinking has had a 
considerable impact on the literature within the field of organisation and 
management (Bolton 2005) and laid the foundations for the application of 
complexity theory to management in general (Stacey 1996) and healthcare 
management in particular (Kernick 2004). 
In 1961, for example, Burns and Stalker examined the capacity of electronics 
firms in Scotland to innovate (Burns & Stalker 1961). Through comparing the 
differences between 'organic' and mechanistic' organisations they argued that 
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'organic' organisations had a greater capacity to innovate and survive in a 
changing external environment, whereas a 'mechanistic' bureaucratic 
organisation functioned most effectively in a stable environment. The legacy 
of the influence of social Darwinism on Fayol's thinking can be seen clearly in 
this context. 
Whilst the influence of the classical theorists can be related to systems 
thinking, the human relations influence can be clearly linked to the rise in 
popularity of the pursuit of 'quality' or 'excellence' and 'culture management' 
(Peters & Waterman 2004). In their best selling book «In search of 
excellence", Tom Peters and Robert Waterman offered a seductive degree of 
certainty. Through their analysis of what, at the time of their research, were 
the 10 most successful companies in the USA, they identified the eight 
themes for corporate success, namely: 
1. A bias for action, active decision-making -'getting on with it'. 
2. Close to the customer - learning from the people served by the 
business. 
3. Autonomy and entrepreneurship - fostering innovation and 
nurturing 'champions'. 
4. Productivity through people - treating rank and file employees 
as a source of quality. 
5. Hands-on, value-driven - management philosophy that guides 
everyday practice - management showing its commitment. 
6. Stick to the knitting - stay with the business that you know. 
7. Simple form, lean staff - some of the best companies have 
minimal HQ staff. 
8. Simultaneous loose-tight properties - autonomy in shop-floor 
activities plus centralised values. (Peters & Waterman 2004) 
The appeal of Peters and Waterman's work was that they appeared to offer a 
'recipe for success'. They provided a sense of certainty amidst the chaos and 
complexity of everyday existence. They provided 'engineer' managers with a 
'toolkit', which, if deployed effectively, would guarantee success. Failure to 
utilize the toolkit successfully, however, would put the blame firmly at the 
manager's door. 
Managers were urged to 'manage the culture' of their organisations and the 
values of their employees in order to enhance employee and organisational 
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performance. The ultimate scenario here would be where employees imbued 
the organisation culture to the degree that they 'self managed', or engaged in 
what Freedman described as 'responsible autonomy' (Freedman 1992), which 
negated the need for managers to exert any overt power or influence over 
highly skilled or professional employees. O'Reilly and Tushman (1997), for 
example, advocated 'using culture for strategic advantage' and 'promoting 
innovation through social control'. The role of the manager as 'culture 
manager is seen as legitimate and whatever means are employed to achieve 
these ends are deemed unproblematical. Indeed, according to the orthodoxy, 
theories of management from classical and human relations through to 
systems and culture are unproblematical means to achieving legitimate ends 
and the authority and status of the manager are taken as a given. 
Through the lens of Lukes' analysis of power, it is clear that power is present 
within all of these theories. Specifically within the context of culture 
management, arguably the insidious nature of three-dimensional power is 
present, and as critical management theorists would contend, potentially 
considerably problematic. Fournier and Grey (2000) contest that orthodox 
management studies take the pursuit of efficiency as a given, that is, the 
production of maximum output for minimum input, by whatever means. CMS 
in this respect can be seen as the antithesis of the orthodoxy, the voice of 'the 
other', or perhaps more accurately, 'the other voices'. 
From the perspective of the professional nursing staff employed within The 
Corner, their sense of oppression, which I interpreted to be as a result of a 
managerial hegemony, where managers attempted to manage the Culture of 
the enterprise, was deemed problematical. The project co-ordinators either 
assumed that all new members of staff bought into the philosophy of The 
Corner, or alternatively, they did not care, as long as young people remained 
central to the initiative, the means justified the ends. From a critical 
perspective, in their desire to ensure the centrality of the young people to the 
project, the Leaders within The Corner appear to have replaced one 
hegemony with another. I would argue that it is both possible and desirable for 
a plurality of perspectives to co-exist and create the tension required to 
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sustain a critical, questioning edge to our thinking about innovation and 
healthcare in general. I fail to see how engaging the nursing staff in the 
negotiations with the Genitourinary Medicine (GUM) consultant could have 
undermined the centrality of the young people within the Project and indeed, 
will later argue that their inclusion in the process may even have resulted in a 
better outcome for the young people. 
The de-professionalizing strategy itself appeared to have it limitations. All 
those who contributed to the drop-in sessions within The Corner were known 
as project workers, with the notable exception of the 'Project Doctor'. The 
relative power of the nurses employed to work within The Corner, who were 
managerially accountable to the project co-ordinator, was relatively easy to 
suppress by authority, if not through influence. Whereas the professional 
power of the GP with Family Planning qualifications, contracted to work within 
The Comer on a sessional basis, was not. 
The occupation of healing was not fully professionalized until the middle of the 
19th Century. As stated in Chapter 4, an alignment with science was part of 
medicine's professionalizing strategy at this time, and the dominant discourse 
to this day remains one in which medicine is seen as a science (Harding & 
Learmonth 2000). This alignment, in part, enabled the professions which 
practised medicine to enjoy considerable power, authority and status 
(Kelleher, Gabe, & Williams 1994) and the assumption that medical science 
had the potential to triumph over disease and illness put the medical 
profession in a very strong position of influence when the NHS was 
established (Klein 2001). Whilst ownership and control of the means of 
production is recognised as a source of power and at the heart of Marxist 
sociology, Weber also acknowledged that knowledge of operations was a 
source of power (Hardy & Clegg 1996). Both of these sources of power can 
be attributed to the traditional dominance of the medical profession. Their 
hegemony extends to "ownership" of "their" patients and their allegiance to 
science serves to legitimise their knowledge base and their authority to dictate 
health service expenditure. More recently there have been political 
endeavours to curb the powers of the medical profession and their spending 
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powers in particular, through the introduction of managerialism by the 
Thatcher Government (1979-1990) and consumerism by the Major 
Government (1990 - 1997), ideologies which have been embraced by 
successive New Labour Governments. Better management was seen as the 
means of increasing financial efficiency (Kelly & Glover 1996) and of making 
the NHS more patient or consumer orientated (Pollitt 1991). Against a 
background of individualism, coupled with declining public trust and 
antagonism towards the professions and the state, the consumer discourse 
was mobilised in an effort to reshape medicine and bureaucracies (Henderson 
& Peterson 2002). Despite these systematic political endeavours to erode the 
power of medicine and challenge the fundamental assumption that "good" 
decision-making is based on scientific knowledge (Harrison 1998a; 1998b; 
2002), medicine's allegiance to science remains intact (Sackett, Rosenberg, 
Gray, Haynes, & Richardson 1996), as does its position as the most powerful 
professional group within UK health systems. Medicine still harbours, albeit to 
a lesser degree, power and status within the community and in the majority of 
cases is recognised as the lead member of healthcare teams. GPs are the 
major employers of practice nurses and nurse practitioners and, through the 
new NHS Primary Care management arrangements in England, the indirect 
employers of nurses who work in the community. It is arguably normative for 
GPs to lead clinical teams in primary care and for other members of the 
healthcare team to accept this as the given order of things. Only recently has 
this traditional position been challenged, under the auspices of new policy 
initiatives, which aim to improve access to primary care by introducing more 
flexibility within General Practice and for the first time allow nurses to take a 
lead in the provision of primary care (Chapman, Zechel, & Carter 2004). 
The two GPs in the FHP rural health working party who spoke of a storm 
warning would have been perceived to carry a considerable degree of power 
and gravitas within the group, thus making it particularly difficult for any one to 
challenge them. 
The relatively less powerful project co-ordinator within The Corner, therefore, 
did not have the authority or the ability to coerce, influence, force or 
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manipulate the Project Doctor to be stripped of her professional title. Nor was 
he able to persuade the GUM consultant to operate within the framework of 
The Corner culture. I suggest that had the issue and the context been given 
due consideration, engagement of the professional nursing staff, employed 
within the project with the requisite knowledge and expertise to deliver the 
sexual health services in these negotiations, may have met with less 
resistance and may have achieved a different outcome, possibly an outcome 
more favourable for the young people accessing the service. 
The construction of the rural health working party and the presentation of their 
recommendations gives the impression that the decision to develop a NP-led 
outreach service was reached through democratic means. The concern 
expressed by the community mental nurses involved in the project, that NPs 
may not have the requisite skills to identify and manage mental health 
problems, provides documented evidence of conflict. Nevertheless, at face 
value, it appears as if a consensus was reached which from a one- 
dimensional view of power could be interpreted as democracy in action. The 
decision to attempt to identify and address the healthcare needs of farmers 
through a NP-led outreach service could also be interpreted as a 
professionalizing strategy, which served the interests of those within the 
nursing professions who sought to progress the role of nurses as nurse 
practitioners. 
Whilst the dominance of some professional voices within the FHP may be 
attributed, in part, to medical hegemony through the influence of the GPs 
involved, the other key professional Influencer was a nurse who was also an 
academic who provided a University based nurse practitioner programme 
within a neighbouring University. 
Nursing began to embrace science and the academy considerably later than 
medicine. With the notable exception of Florence Nightingale (Nightingale 
1859), some of the earliest documented research in nursing in the UK is less 
than fifty years old, for example 'The Study of Nursing Care Project' 
(McFarlane 1970). Those who engaged in research activity at this time were 
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an elite minority within nursing. It was not until the 1990's when nursing 
education moved out of the NHS and into the Higher Education sector, that 
nursing began to move comprehensively towards the professional goal of an 
all graduate, research-based profession. Prior to this time, only small numbers 
of nurses were university educated to degree level and, still to this day, the 
majority within England register with a diploma level qualification. Whilst the 
numbers of nurses with doctoral level qualifications are rising, they still 
represent an elite minority within the profession. Therefore, the doctorally 
prepared nurse academic involved in the FHP may have commanded more 
power, in part, as a consequence of his academic background: 
"Knowledge construed as the preserve and private playground of a few 
has given power to those few: the power to exclude , to theorize about, 
and to intellectually dominate the other members of the species. " (Cole 
1993 p 79) 
He may also have commanded more power as a result of his gender. 
Feminist writers such as Carol Gilligan (1993), for example, argue that there is 
a cultural bias within society where the male is assumed to be the norm and, 
therefore, the female is perceived as 'the other. In her analysis of 
psychological theory and development, Gilligan illustrates how theorists, 
including Freud and Piaget, project a masculine image of the ideal psyche. 
Feminists argue that this bias is a hegemony which is endemic within society 
and serves to diminish the female contribution. Consider, for example, the 
relative proportion of men in leadership positions within nursing (Evans 2004). 
The male academic in the FHP was described by a female with a different 
view, as "quite determined". Equally, within The Corner hierarchy, the nurses 
were female and the project co-ordinators were both male. 
The dominant male professional voice argued with conviction that the coming 
together of two parallel agendas presented a win-win situation, addressing 
both the interests of farmers and the interests of those within the nurse 
practitioner movement. In this context, the focus on farmers may have been 
perceived simply as a means to securing funding to progress the nurse 
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practitioner agenda. This conviction was not shared by all members of the 
project team. Nevertheless, a nurse without NP experience or qualifications 
was appointed to develop an NP-led outreach service autonomously within a 
defined geographical area. The assumption was that this nurse could 
simultaneously train for a NP qualification and establish a novel nurse-led 
outreach service. By not completing the training and electing to work 
differently, this nurse was perceived as a failure by some members of the 
project team. This raises two key issues, which I suggest are indicative of 
three-dimensional power. Firstly, whilst tolerated, the role adopted by this 
nurse was spoken of as if it was `the other' and, within the context of the 
project, the practice of the NP was referred to as the norm. As stated in 
Chapter 5, it was the crisis of Foot and Mouth Disease which effectively 
stopped the outreach service in its tracks and opened the minds of the project 
team to alternative possibilities. Secondly, her inability to perform as a nurse 
practitioner may have been an unintended consequence of the decision to 
appoint her, or alternatively, she may have been set up to fail and thus 
highlight the complexity and potential impact of the NP role. 
I have argued that there was no evidence presented to justify the amount of 
time and effort the FHP team expended on trying to circumvent the then 
legislative framework for nurse prescribing. As a result, I concluded that, 
whilst such a focus may have served the interests of the nurse practitioner 
movement, I could uncover no evidence in this case, to support the final 
conclusion that the legislative framework for nurse prescribing was a barrier to 
the development of outreach services for marginalised communities. 
Arguably, such a conclusion not only serves the interests of the nurse 
practitioner movement, but it also, by default, serves to expand the reach of 
the pharmaceutical industry. Whilst the positive impact of pharmaceuticals on 
health is evident, as an industry it has been reported to have acquired the 
capacity, hitherto attributed to the medical profession, to shift everyday 
problems into the domain of professional biomedicine in order to maximise 
profit (Metzl 2007). In the 1970's, Historian-Philosopher Ivan Illich expressed 
concern that medicine had overextended its scientific and cultural authority. In 
so doing, it had 'medicalised' society to the point where medicine itself 
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actually caused harm. For example, the use (and abuse) of medico-scientific 
technological interventions has arguably created new, iatrogenic illnesses and 
risks, including, for example, auto-immune deficiency disease (AIDS) and the 
hospital "superbug" methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). To 
avoid this 'iatrogenesis', Illich recommended that the public become more 
active in the management of their own health (Illich 1995) and reduce their 
dependency upon the medical profession, which had overstretched the mark. 
Metzl (2007) has argued that within the 21St Century, the pharmaceutical 
industry has commandeered this agenda. For example, the Chief Executive of 
Glaxo-Wellcome, Robert Ingram boldly stated: 
"We are on the cusp of a new paradigm.... (which) can best be 
described as moving from treating disease to creating health. " (Ingram 
1999) 
There is increasing evidence of what some might describe as innovative 
attempts to medicalise normal life processes in order to expand 
pharmaceutical markets. Moynihan and colleagues have argued: 
"the social construction of illness is being replaced by the corporate 
construction of disease. "(Moynihan, Heath, & Henry 2002) 
Payer (2004) does not see these endeavours as positive innovations. He has 
labelled those self-interested parties, who promulgate manufactured, mythical 
diseases in order to profit from the sale of overpriced, oversold remedies, 
which in some cases have the potential to do more harm than good, as 
"disease mongerers". For example, endeavours to medicalise female 
sexuality to create a market amongst women for the pharmaceuticals 
currently used in the medical management of male impotence, has been 
described as disease mongering (Moynihan 2003). 
The paradigm shift described by Ingram (above) Is driven by profit margin and 
not by the burden of ill health. For example, the focus of the pharmaceutical 
industry is seen to have a tendency to rest on the sections of society who 
have the capacity to pay, rather than on communities and parts of the world 
with the greatest need. To put this in context, globally, for example, around 
1 260 
40% of the population is at risk of malaria. In sub-Saharan Africa, three 
thousand children under five years old die of malaria every day. 
Pharmaceutical industry critics argue that because there are no profits to be 
made here, the industry would rather engage in disease mongering in the first 
world than address this global atrocity. Third-dimensional power appears to 
be present here as the pharmaceutical industry, arguably, have the capacity 
to act in the Third World, but choose not to. Critics argue that, by failing to act, 
they are culpable. Instead, they choose to act in a manner that is seen to be 
self-serving and potentially dangerous. 
Whilst there were undoubtedly some farmers who would have benefited from 
pharmaceutical intervention, the pursuit of nurse prescribing In this context 
was problematic for two reasons. Firstly, there was no evidence base from 
which to justify the amount of time and effort the project team expended on 
this massively complex issue. Secondly, the capacity to prescribe increases 
the potential for the medicalisation of a community with complex health and 
social needs, which may benefit more from social, non-pharmaceutical 
interventions. 
Dominant professional voices appeared to have the capacity to silence the 
voices of lay and other less powerful members of staff, and the FHP was 
steered in a particular direction. Managers colluded by stifling endeavours in 
their own patch to develop services for, and with, local farming communities. 
From a one-dimensional view of power, the FHP infrastructure appeared to 
offer the opportunity for democratic, pluralistic decision-making. From both a 
one and two-dimensional view, elite decision-making processes appeared to 
dominate the project and they were sustained by the uncritical acceptance of 
cultural norms, or three-dimensional power. 
suggest this analysis confirms Lukes' latter conclusion that examination of 
power is much more complicated than simply the assessment of binary 
relations between actors with unitary interests. In these cases we can see 
multiple layers of potential overt and covert biases which have the potential to 
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impact both positively and negatively on the capacity of an innovation to 
flourish. 
7.3.2 Purpose 
The FHP emerged from a group of people with a shared interest seeking to 
identify a common purpose. The Comer, on the other hand emerged from two 
major stakeholders, with a common purpose, who decided to join forces. In 
the former, the partnership preceded the purpose and in the latter the purpose 
preceded the partnership. More significantly, in the former there were multiple 
purposes with relatively limited room for manoeuvre and in the latter there 
appeared to be absolute clarity of purpose with the capacity to take risks and 
try out new ideas. Senge proposes that where there is a shared focus and 
mutual purpose: 
"... people learn to nourish a sense of commitment in a group or 
organisation by developing shared images of the future they seek to 
create and the principles and guiding practices by which they hope to 
get there. " Senge (1999 p 32) 
This appeared to be borne out in The Corner with the initial members of the 
project team, who were able to take time out together prior to the opening of 
the drop-in and collaboratively work on the development of policies such as 
The Corner Child Protection Policy. The experiences of those who joined the 
project at a later stage would suggest that projects should have inbuilt 
systems for reviewing their policies in the light of new developments and 
experiences, and new staff should be encouraged to question and challenge 
current practice without fearing that they may be perceived as being 
obstructive. Evaluation was an integral part of the ways of working within The 
Corner and its focus was entirely on young people. The Comer may benefit 
from building into their evaluation strategy a survey, perhaps on an annual 
basis, to assess the experiences of the staff working in the project. 
The decision-making processes within the initial Corner project team were 
presented by the project co-ordinator, from his perspective, as pluralist. The 
262 
concerns raised by the nurses appointed at a later stage and their reticence to 
question current practices has, from a one-dimensional perspective, more of 
an elite view of power. Acknowledging that different members of staff had 
differing experiences within the same environment, in part, depending upon 
when they joined the project, further serves to highlight the complexity of the 
dynamic and the limitations of considering binary relations between actors 
with unitary interests in isolation. 
The outreach staff on the FHP team also valued the time they were afforded 
to network extensively prior to the arrival of the mobile clinic from which they 
would deliver their service. The difference here was that these staff were 
telling other people about their new service and learning about the services 
provided by others. They were not specifically negotiating new ways of 
collaborative working. The FHP team were not negotiating at this stage but, 
with the benefit of hindsight, perhaps an assessment of the capacity of the 
various stakeholders they encountered to support, or indeed stifle the project 
in the long term, could have been commenced at this stage. Had this 
happened, negotiation to secure the sustainability of the initiative could have 
begun at an earlier stage, with potentially a different outcome. Part of the 
reason the project proved to be unsustainable was that it sat on the periphery 
of the system and there was no-one within the system either willing, or able, 
to champion it. Part of the reason for this was that the system was going 
through yet another reorganisation and those within the system reported that 
they were overwhelmed by the demands of national policy implementation 
and faced uncertainly over their own futures. Supporting local innovation can 
be challenging at the best of times. Perhaps it is next to impossible if 
managers feel overwhelmed by centrally-driven changes and they do not 
know if they will still have a job the following week. 
Understanding the context in which these NHS managers were operating is 
necessary to appreciate why they felt unable to support an innovation 
developed outside of the mainstream. The empirical data of a view from the 
world of policy collected and analysed in this study and presented in chapter 3 
and discussed in chapter 4 has served to illuminate this context. 
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Serial reorganisation and reform have become regular features of the NHS 
over the last twenty years as a result of repeated endeavours to improve the 
service and at the same time contain NHS costs (Klein 2001). Managerial 
interventions have sought to increase fiscal efficiency and top-down policy 
initiatives have endeavoured to increase control of professional practice in 
three main ways. Firstly, national standards have been developed in 
partnership with the professional elites. Secondly, conformity has been 
incentivised through new contractual arrangements and thirdly, as discussed 
above, consumerism in healthcare has been actively promoted. Comparison 
of these two case studies has illustrated some of the inherent tensions within 
the promotion of consumerism, especially if this is seen to pose a threat to 
professional power or autonomy. In addition, analysis of the sustainability of 
the FHP has demonstrated the tensions managers face when trying to 
balance the demands of central control with their capacity for local 
responsiveness. 
In sharp contrast, The Corner project team were supported by a strong, 
cohesive, senior management team which enjoyed a considerable degree of 
stability. Their commitment was evidenced when members of the team who 
were promoted within their respective organisations continued to serve on 
The Corner management group. It was a team that was clearly politically 
aware at macro-, meso- and micro-levels, They actively encouraged a 
proactive approach to the management of political tensions. This was 
evidenced through, for example, the management of top-down national policy 
initiatives which threatened to undermine the progress The Corner team had 
achieved locally, the proactive management of the Identity of the project, In 
part, by building a strong relationship with the local media and the awareness 
of the potential threat of the new initiative, The Shore, posed to the morale of 
The Corner team. Where the FHP was driven from outside of the system, and 
was never fully embraced by the system, The Corner was driven from within 
the system, but because of its project status and its multi-agency backing, It 
appeared to sit outside of the system and the senior management team 
recognised the political advantage of this position, 
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The gestation period of each of these initiatives may have been a factor which 
impacted upon the degree of clarity of purpose within each case. The 
gestation of the FHP was less than a tenth of the time it took to begin to 
address the pressing health needs of the young people within the city of 
Dundee through the establishment of The Corner. During this long and 
protracted period, the key stakeholders within the local authority and the 
health board were persuaded of the value of tackling their concerns In 
partnership. This, in turn, eventually led to a joint, matched funding package. 
Funding for the FHP, on the other hand, was secured from a range of sources 
outwith the local health economy. By definition, therefore, the establishment of 
this project, outside of the system, may have appeared to be an overt criticism 
of the capability of planners and healthcare providers within the local health 
economies to address the health needs of the farming communities they were 
supposed to serve. It is possible, that this legacy may have impacted 
negatively, when endeavours were made to mainstream the initiative, if local 
managers felt that those within the project were seeking to manipulate them 
and their decision-making. 
7.3.3 Politics 
For the purposes of this discussion I define politics as the processes though 
which groups of people make decisions through the acquisition and 
application of power. In order to illuminate the conditions in which innovations 
may flourish, I have considered these political processes taking place on throo 
levels, namely micro, meso and macro. Micro-level politics refers to 
interpersonal politics, meso-level politics refers to organisational politics and 
macro-politics refers to governmental / national politics. 
The discussion above, comparing and contrasting the two cases examined 
and the critical incidents, which shaped their trajectories, through tho 
conceptual framework of power constructed by Lukes, has illustrated the 
significant impact of micro- and meso-level politics on the capacity of an 
innovation to flourish. In the FHP, the interpersonal power relations between 
the health visitor and the academic serves as an illustration of micro-level 
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politics. The influence of professional power in the decision to focus on the 
health of farmers illustrates meso-level politics. In The Corner the dynamics 
between the nurses and the project co-ordinators highlights micro-politics and 
the complexity of the genesis of the project, the subsequent joint-funding and 
management arrangements between health and social care illustrates the 
significance of meso-level politics. For this reason, I have elected to redesign 
figure 5.2, as figure 7.2, illustrating the relationships between the 
interconnecting emergent themes within this study, with politics serving as the 
meta-theme. 
Figure 7.2: The relationships between the themes 
Politics 




In addition to the interpersonal, intra-professional, inter-professional and inter- 
agency power dynamics between the various stakeholders and stakeholder 
groups within the FHP, and their capacity to shape the purpose and the 
trajectory of this innovation, politics was also evident at a macro-level. Rural 
issues were described by one informant as a political hot potato. The 
Countryside Alliance, a membership, subscription-funded, lobbying 
organisation, was established in 1997, and according to their website: 
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"The Countryside Alliance works for everyone who loves the 
countryside and the rural way of life. Through campaigning, lobbying, 
publicity and education the Alliance influences legislation and public 
policy that impacts on the countryside, rural people and their activities. " 
(The Countryside Alliance 2008) 
There was awareness within the project team that, through their lobbying 
activities, The Countryside Alliance had raised the political stakes with regard 
to the concerns of rural communities. The decision to focus the project on the 
health of farmers was, therefore, considered to be politically expedient. It was 
thought this probably gave the project a much higher national profile than It 
might have enjoyed and indeed it led to additional funding from the 
Countryside Agency specifically to support dissemination, and, potentially, 
encourage replication elsewhere. It did not, as hoped however, lead to 
funding from the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to 
sustain the project through indications within recent policy developments (as 
reported in chapter 5). 
Equally, within The Corner there was strong evidence of power dynamics at 
individual and organisational levels. At a national level, the blanket 
implementation of policy with a lack of regard for local initiatives was 
considered particularly unhelpful. 
Both of the cases of innovation examined in this study aimed to facilitate 
access to healthcare for people who were known to have physical and mental 
health problems. Access to healthcare was identified by policymakers as a 
key public concern and improving access to health services was, and still is, a 
public policy priority in England (Department of Health 1997; Department of 
Health 2007b) and in Scotland (The Scottish Office Department of Health 
1997; The Scottish Office NHS Scotland 2003). 
A critical examination of these policy positions suggests that there are a 
number of possible reasons why the government should choose to focus on 
access to healthcare. Firstly, by improving access, the government of the day 
can tangibly demonstrate its impact on health services and potentially win or 
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retain the support of the public. Leys (2001) has argued that, within the global 
economy, the political landscape is driven by the market, policy-making is 
sensitive to 'market sentiment' and state institutions are restructured to serve 
business interests, remodel internal operations along business lines and 
reduce Government exposure to political pressure from the electorate. Here, 
the economic well being of the country is the primary concern of the 
Government and the 'consumer is king'. 
Untreated morbidity is known to have a negative impact on the economy. One 
of the assumptions underpinning the creation of the NHS was that by 
increasing access to healthcare, morbidity would be reduced (Klein 2001). 
The fiscal argument is that national productivity will be Increased if morbidity 
is reduced and, as discussed above, endeavours to manage the nation's poor 
health serves the interests of the pharmaceutical industry. This In turn, serves 
the interests of the UK economy which in turn serves the interests of the 
Government and helps them to retain their political power. 
Improving access to healthcare may, at face value, appear to be an altruistic, 
benign undertaking. By examining whose interests are served in specific 
endeavours to improve access, it may be possible to throw some light on what 
enables, drives and sustains such an innovation. Whilst rural issues were 
described as a political 'hot potato', particularly as a consequence of the 
activities of groups such as the Countryside Alliance, the reality is that the 
farming industry is an industry in decline in England and is no longer a 
significant contributor to the UK economy. Had the economic significance of 
the farming industry been greater, it is arguable that the FHP may have 
garnered stronger political support and its future may have been secured. The 
Corner, on the other hand, was driven from local concern within the overtly, 
highly politicised environment of the local authority, shared with the equally, 
but relatively covertly politicised health board, with the collective concern that 
the health and social care needs of young people were not being adequately 
addressed. With its long gestation period, matched funding arrangements and 
stable management group membership, The Comer enjoyed strong local 
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political support from the outset. It was also seeking to address a concern of 
national, not just local, significance. 
Discussion of the similarities and differences between the two cases has 
illustrated a significant degree of political tension and influences at many 
levels. However, these tensions and influences were, in the main, hidden from 
the public face of these innovations. Indeed 'politics' appear to be hidden from 
the public face of innovations in general. Innovation in the organisation and 
management of health services is generally presented as a rational, ordered 
process. According to Buchanan and Badham: 
"... political behaviour plays a more significant role in organizational life 
than is commonly recognised - or than is openly admitted. We... like to 
think of our social and organizational cultures as characterized by 
order, rationality and trust. The reality Is different. " (Buchanan & 
Badham 1999) 
The uncovering of macro- meso- and micro-level politics in the analysis of 
these innovations supports this assertion. My thesis is that it is necessary to 
surface and acknowledge the political dimensions within Innovations in order 
to understand the conditions in which they may flourish. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
In this study, I have considered the conditions in which innovation in 
healthcare may flourish. It is the first, to my knowledge, to focus on innovation 
in health care from a CMS standpoint and, thus, offers an Innovative 
contribution to the field. My starting point was a critical reflection of the 
assumption underpinning the orthodox scientific world-view, namely that 
innovation is the potential product of research and development. By taking the 
endpoint of this process - innovation - as the starting point for my study, I 
have examined two initiatives which have innovatively endeavoured to Identify 
and address the health care needs of groups of people, who, as a routine, do 
not access mainstream health services. With the aim of looking beyond the 
traditional technical-rational perspective, I inductively applied a case study 
methodology in order to foreground processes of power and ideology, reveal 
sectional interests and question any assumptions and 'taken-for-granteds' 
embodied therein. In order to contextualise my analysis and offer insight into 
the potential impact of national policy on local endeavours to develop 
innovative services, I coupled these data with an empirically-based 
assessment of the policy context. This approach served to reveal the 
differences between the rhetoric within Government policies and the reality of 
their implementation, and highlight the tensions and paradoxes therein, 
From a CMS standpoint, my aim in this study is, as Reynolds (1999) states, 
to work towards an emancipatory Ideal. Through the questioning of 
assumptions and the foregrounding of power and ideology, I aim to offer 
recommendations that can usefully inform policy makers and practitioners 
who innovatively seek to identify and address the health care needs of people 
who do not routinely access mainstream health services. 
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8.2 Were the aims achieved? 
The orthodox, technical-rational view, where innovation is conceptualized as a 
rational, predictable and controllable endeavour, would appear to have a 
place, inasmuch as it supports the development of national standards. 
However, because it fails to recognise the socio-political complexity of 
innovation at an interpersonal, organisational and national level, I would 
suggest that the orthodox view is limited. Indeed, a lack of engagement with 
this complexity may be part of the reason that the potential of nationally 
defined standards to shape the provision of services locally has not been 
realised (Sheldon, Cullum, Dawson, Lankshear, Lowson, Watt, West, Wright, 
& Wright 2004). 
8.3 Contribution to knowledge 
In this study i have discussed the often hidden impact of micro-, meso- and 
macro-level politics on the potential of innovations in health care to flourish. 
Through analysing, comparing and contrasting two case studies of innovation, 
I have highlighted the role of interpersonal and organisational politics and the 
impact of national policy. By exploring the policy context, I have offered 
insights into why national policy and the methods of implementation may 
affect local endeavours to innovate, 
8.4 Limitations of the study 
Since the study was conceived, there have been significant developments in 
the involvement of service users in the research process, from study design 
through to the execution of social and health research (Williamson 2007). I 
see it as a limitation of this study that, as stated In chapter 7, I failed to 
engage people as informants who do not routinely access mainstream 
services other than the farmers who were actively Involved In the strategic 
management of the FHP. I also wish I had been able to engage with some 
stakeholders who were accused by one Informant of 'melting like the snow' 
when the intent to progress the FHP, for example, was formalised. A first- 
hand account of why these Initial stakeholders distanced themselves from the 
271 
initiative would arguably have enriched my analysis. I would recommend that 
any future research on innovation addresses these issues. 
My terms of engagement with informants in The Comer were negotiated 
differently in comparison with other case study informants and policymaker 
respondents in this study. This created an ethical dilemma that possibly could 
have been avoided had I thought through the consequences of allowing the 
process to proceed differently in this case. I would recommend that 
consistency in the process of negotiating the informed consent of potential 
informants is applied wherever possible. 
8.5 In conclusion 
The assumption that innovation, under the guise of modernisation, as a 
means of increasing efficiency and effectiveness, was a prerequisite to the 
future sustainability of the NHS (and indeed the Government) appeared to 
underpin Government reform. However, this push for innovation appears to be 
inhibited by the pull of the Governments' centralising tendencies, which, in 
turn, were fuelled by the highly politicised nature of the health care agenda. 
These included centrally, 'performance managed' demands for the 
implementation of nationally defined standards and evidence that national, 
some might argue, politically motivated, targets, were met. In addition, drives 
to redesign or 're-engineer services, in order to increase efficiency and 
'throughput', may cause labour process Intensification that, In turn, may limit 
innovation capacity. In stating that the ends justified the means, the Third Way 
politics embraced by the UK and Scottish New Labour Governments 
appeared to assume a teleological ethical position. The problem with this 
position is that it denies the capacity of 'means' to produce unintended 
consequences. Policymaker respondents argued that the Governments' 
national targets created unintended consequences and this was confirmed in 
the literature. 
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This study would indicate that, if the National Health Service were genuinely 
to foster innovation, decision-making authority must be devolved so that 
priorities can be set and resources allocated locally. However, the political 
costs of the risks associated with localism may mean that Governments will 
continue to centralise and the innovation paradox will continue. Ultimately, it 
may be up to the public to decide whether they want a centrally-defined, 
commodified health service or a locally-defined, responsive service. However, 
to suggest this arguably creates a dualism. It oversimplifies the argument and 
leads to a false dichotomy. A compromise -a third way - may be a Health 
Service that adopts the best within these two positions and has balances and 
checks in place to prevent the domination of one (centralisation) at the 
expense of the other (localism). The evidence presented in this study would 
suggest that unchecked centralisation, particularly within the market governed 
NHS in England (see table 4.1), may stifle the capacity to flourish of 
innovations, which seek to identify and address local health need. Equally, 
absolute localism would inhibit the pooling of knowledge and expertise to 
create national standards, which in turn, may limit the capacity of a health 
service to commit resources locally to interventions that may be the most 
clinically- and cost-effective. This would suggest, that in order to foster 
innovation, UK Health Services need to merge the best of centralisation with 
the best of localism and put balances and checks in place to prevent the 
domination of one (centralisation) at the expense of the other (localism). 
Innovation is clearly not an apolitical process and I would suggest that political 
engagement would appear to be a requirement for innovation to flourish. By 
contrasting two cases of innovation, I have illustrated the Importance of 
achieving clarity and consensus with regard to the primary purpose of an 
innovation. I suggest that a lengthy 'pre-innovation' period may be necessary 
to ensure that all key stakeholders sign up to a shared primary purpose. 
Additionally, any new members of staff who join a project that Is up-and- 
running should receive a comprehensive Induction to the project. 
In initiatives that seek to identify and address the health care needs of groups 
who do not routinely access mainstream services, it would appear imperative 
273 
that these groups of people are authentically engaged In the process from the 
outset. Lack of authentic engagement may otherwise lead to the development 
of a service based more on professional priorities than on the priorities of the 
community in question, as was argued in the analysis of the case of the FHP. 
The nurse academic on the FHP proposed that the coupling of his goal of a 
NP-led service with the aim of improving the health of farmers was a win-win 
situation. However, I have argued that the 'means', that is a NP-led service, 
appeared at times to be to be the primary goal, forcing the 'ends', namely the 
health of the farmers into second place. In contrast to the teleological ethic of 
the Third Way, discussed above, where the ends are considered to justify the 
means, in this case a deontological ethic appeared to be assumed where the 
means are thought to justify the ends. This interpretation offers a possible 
rationale for the fundamental differences between the stakeholders and a 
route of some of the tension within the project. It also further serves to 
highlight the importance of achieving clarity of purpose from the outset. 
The purchase and maintenance of the van in the FHP served to illustrate the 
capacity that untested assumptions about what would, and would not, be 
culturally sensitive, can lead to expenditure that could possibly be avoided or 
invested elsewhere more effectively. In The Corner, on the other hand, young 
people appeared to be firmly at the centre of the project and fully engaged 
with the development and the delivery of the service. Without critical analysis 
of decision-making processes, however, systems, set up to protect the public, 
such as research ethics committees and professional regulatory bodies, have 
ironically been shown to have the capacity to conspire against authentic 
engagement with the community whose health care needs these innovations 
sought to address. In short, without the authentic engagement of these 
stakeholders, innovations risk their design and delivery being based on 
assumptions, with no means of checking them out. Further, the silencing of 
certain, less traditionally powerful voices risks the marginalisation of 
alternative proposals before they even reach the agenda. 
When engaged authentically, stakeholders have a voice, which, if necessary, 
is heard by using unorthodox, creative means. Only then can their concerns 
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be recognised and treated as paramount. Indeed, the authentic engagement 
of all stakeholders directly affected by decision-making processes would 
appear to be essential, if innovations that endeavour to minimise the 
perceived negative impact of a traditional hegemony are to avoid replacing 
one type of hegemony with another, for example, replacing a professional 
power base with a managerial one. From my critical, emancipatory standpoint, 
I would argue that whenever possible they should. All staff, Irrespective of 
their traditional status, should be afforded the opportunity to engage in the 
regular review of operational policies and procedures to which they are 
expected to adhere. 
There would appear to be unequivocal evidence that innovation was a risky 
and unsettling business, shrouded in uncertainty. Agents who engage in 
innovation would seem to have to be prepared to take personal risks, be 
reflective and reflexive, amenable to challenge, and willing to challenge others 
openly. Without this human capacity and organisational culture, there may be 
a lack of clarity about the roles and contributions of each member of a project 
team. Consequently, criticisms may not always be recognised as constructive 
and perceptions may be harboured that vested interests are being served. 
Traditionally powerful people, such as professionals and managers, may find 
the legitimacy of their power bases questioned and their professional safety 
nets, or other aspects of their authority, openly challenged. Hence, innovation 
can be disruptive for all concerned. 
It would appear useful to couple clarity of focus with a willingness to question, 
systematically, whose interests are served by any proposal and if those 
interests are 'legitimate'. In the FHP, the legitimacy of spending time and effort 
to progress nurse prescribing was not challenged. The legitimacy of the 
position of the chair of the research ethics committee on cold calling remained 
unchallenged. It took the crisis of Foot and Mouth before the legitimacy of the 
proposals offered by the project nurse who was not an NP came Into focus. 
Here, evidence of a proposal's potential contribution to the agreed focus, the 
primary purpose of an innovation, could help to assess Its 'legitimacy', 
Arguably, this was the position held by policymakers with a leaning towards a 
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'corporate' assessment of the legitimacy of an Innovation (figure 3.3) 
discussed in chapter 3, which highlights the potential of any screening 
process, such as the one at Xerox described in chapter 4, to stifle innovation. 
Thus, the potential impact of a decision taken at any stage throughout the 
process of an innovation should not be underestimated. Indeed, it may be a 
'critical incident'. This study would suggest that there should be a considered 
analysis of the socio-political consequences of each potential course of action 
(or inaction) that has the potential to shape the trajectory of an innovation. In 
order to be transparent and open to scrutiny, that analysis should Incorporate 
a stakeholder mapping, perhaps similar to those presented in figures 5.1 and 
6.2, with the primary focus placed clearly and firmly at the focal point. This 
may serve to remind stakeholders of their collective purpose, and help to 
inform their decision-making. Illustrating the structural, organisational and 
cultural differences that have the capacity to fuel micro-politics, a stakeholder 
analysis can also facilitate open and frank discussion about the potential of 
vested interests to undermine the primary purpose of an Innovation. 
Arguably, this principle could apply in the case of a local innovation or a policy 
driven innovation. For example, a stakeholder analysis may have 
demonstrated that the initiative taken by the health visitor and her colleagues, 
cited in the FHP analysis, working in partnership with 'farmers' wives', was in 
the interests of the local farming community. Equally, a stakeholder analysis 
may have demonstrated to policymakers in Scotland, seeking to reduce the 
incidence of teenage pregnancies, the contribution The Corner was making in 
this area. Perhaps, then they would have been In a position to invest In The 
Corner or channel additional investment into areas of unmet need rather than 
potentially duplicate services. 
Within The Corner, this clarity of focus was coupled from the outset by a 
cohesive and committed management team, strong, value-driven leadership 
and a dedicated project team. In contrast, the FHP sat on the margins of a 
health care system that was subject to permanent revisionism and the 
sequential, structural changes that ensued, This appeared to be part of the 
reason the FHP failed to find champions within the various systems it 
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impacted on and failed to achieve integration with, and be sustained by, the 
system. This would indicate that engagement in meso-level political 
processes at the outset of an innovation may be necessary to sustain it. 
However, this may prove close to impossible in a system that offers no 
continuity of personnel in key positions. The Government must recognise that 
permanent revisionism does not appear to create an environment where 
innovation can be supported and nurtured. 
Innovation clearly needs investment. However, there was a tendency for 
innovations to be investment-led rather then needs-led. This practice serves 
to undermine the primary stakeholders of innovations aiming to address the 
health needs of people who do not routinely engage in, or have any Influence 
over, service provision. Therefore, efforts should be made to ensure that, 
wherever possible, innovations are needs-led rather then funding-led. 
Innovation is a dynamic process and evaluation and feedback was shown to 
be a useful mechanism for sustaining vibrancy within The Comer. Evaluation 
was also used successfully here as a tool to ensure that the service provided, 
and any new developments, were in keeping with the needs and concerns of 
the young people - the primary stakeholders in the initiative. 
In conclusion, my thesis is that it is necessary to surface, acknowledge and 
engage with the political dimensions of innovations in order to understand the 
conditions in which they may flourish. 
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